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I. INTRODUCTION TO THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
URING the summer and fall of 2008, a financial crisis exploded
that threatened to plunge the world into an economic meltdown
similar to, or worse than, the Great Depression of 1929 and en-
suing years. The crisis was triggered by a drop in home values, which in
turn triggered a cascade of mortgage defaults, particularly with regard to
the subprime and Alt-A mortgages. Many of these mortgages had been
rolled into various forms of mortgage-backed securities and sold to the
public, including financial institutions. The crisis triggered three major
pieces of legislation.
President Bush's Secretary of Treasury, Henry Paulson, responded to
the crisis by calling congressional leaders together and informing them
that "[u]nless you act, the financial system of this country and the world
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will melt down in a matter of days."1 Shortly thereafter, Congress en-
acted the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008,2 which made
$700 billion available for the purchase of the toxic mortgage assets (as
reflected in its acronym, TARP, or the Troubled Asset Repurchase Pro-
gram) that were held by financial institutions. As borrowers defaulted,
the market for mortgage-related assets dried up and plunged in value,
threatening the solvency of financial institutions here and abroad. How-
ever, instead of purchasing the mortgage-related assets, Paulson used
TARP to infuse capital into the banks.3
Although not appreciated at the time, the recession started quietly in
December 2007. Home prices, which had been constantly rising over
time, peaked in 2006 and then began a sharp fall.4 The bottom likely has
not yet been reached. Job losses began in 2007 and accelerated until Jan-
uary 2009, when job losses reached almost 800,000 a month 5 and aggre-
gated a total loss of about 4.5 million jobs from December 2007 to
January 2009.6 To stem the recession and consequent job losses, Con-
gress, at the urging of now-President Obama, enacted the American Re-
covery and Reinvestment Act of 2009,7 a $787 billion stimulus bill.
The recession was also devastating from a fiscal standpoint. From FY
2002 to 2007, budget deficits averaged about $300 billion,8 and at the end
of fiscal 2007, the national debt stood at $9.01 trillion. 9 This, in itself, was
unsustainable. But in fiscal years 2008-2010, the annual deficits were
1. See Frontline: Inside the Meltdown (PBS television broadcast Feb. 17,2009), availa-
ble at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/meltdown/etc/script.html.
2. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat.
3765 (2008), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110-
cong__public laws&docid=f:pub1343.110. Passed by the Senate on October 1, 2008, by the
House on October 3, 2008, and signed into law by President Bush on October 3, 2008.
3. OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TRUSTED ASSET RELIEF PRO-
GRAM, EMERGENCY CAPITAL INJECTIONS PROVIDED TO SUPPORT THE VIABILITY OF BANK
OF AMERICA, OTHER MAJOR BANKS, AND THE U.S. FINANCIAL SYSTEM 2 (2009), available
at http://www.sigtarp.gov/reports/audit/2009/Emergency-Capital-InjectionsProvided-to_
Support theViabilityof__Bank ofAmerica. . ._100509.pdf.
4. See Barry Ritholtz, Case Shiller Index Declines 19.1% in Q1 '09, THE BIG PICTURE
(May 26, 2009, 10:00 AM), http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2009/05/case-shiller/ (citing STAN-
DARD & POORS, S&P/CASE-SHILLER METRO AREA HOME PRICE INDICES 27 (2006), avail-
able at http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdflindex/SPCSMetroAreaHomePrices_
Methodology.pdf); see also app. A.
5. See Press Release, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, THE EMPLOYMENT SITUA-
TION-JANUARY 2011 (Feb. 4, 2011), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/
empsit_02042011.pdf; see also America is on a Path to Economic Recovery, FLICKR (Feb. 5,
2010), http://www.flickr.com/photos/speakerpelosi/4332827382/; see also app. B.
6. See Databases, Tables & Calculators by Subject: 2001-2011, BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNS14000000 (last visited Nov. 1, 2011).
7. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat.
115 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.A.).
8. A History of Surpluses and Deficits in the United States, DAVEMANUEL.COM, http://
www.davemanuel.com/history-of-deficits-and-surpluses-in-the-united-states.php (last vis-
ited Nov. 2, 2011).
9. Historical Debt Outstanding-Annual 2000-2010, TREASURY DIRECT, http://




$455 billion, $1.4 trillion, and $1.35 trillion, respectively, 10 and the na-
tional debt reached $13.56 trillion," due to the increased spending mainly
reflected in the above bills and the drop in revenues caused by the
recession.
At the state level, the situation was arguably worse since states gener-
ally cannot fund deficits by borrowing, and the recession necessitated
drastic cuts in spending.12 Two years after the economic meltdown, the
impact continues as local governments turn off streetlights, cut back on
police and fire departments, close down transit systems, return paved
roads to gravel, and put schools on a four-day week.13 However, bank
profits have now reached such a level that the big banks are seeking to
increase their dividends,14 and the bonus pool for bank executives and
key employees reaches into the billions of dollars. 15 These are the people
who arguably caused the crisis. On the other hand, unemployment re-
cently reached 9.8%,16 and ordinary Americans are concerned about
their personal economic prospects and the economy in general. This has
caused some to comment that profits have been privatized and risk has
been socialized.
TARP and the stimulus bill were reactive in nature, seeking to stem
and reverse the ongoing financial and economic crisis. What was needed
next was a proactive legislative response, aimed at preventing future cri-
ses. Congress responded by enacting the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Re-
form and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank).17 It should be clear
from the foregoing data that the United States cannot weather another
financial crisis of the current magnitude for the foreseeable future. After
the New Deal legislation in the 1930s, this country went almost fifty years
10. DAVEMANUEL.COM, supra note 8.
11. TREASURY DIRECT, supra note 9.
12. Judy Lin & Shannon McCaffrey, State Budgets: Year Ahead Looms As Toughest
Yet, HUFFINGTONPOST.COM (Jan. 15, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/01/15/
state-budgets-year-ahead-_n_809521.html.
13. Michael Cooper, Governments Go to Extremes as the Downturn Wears On, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 7, 2010, at Al; Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., America Goes Dark, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
9, 2010, at A19.
14. See Shahien Nasiripour, Bank Profits Soar, Lending Falls As Banks Pay Next To
Nothing For Funds, HUFFINGTONPOST.COM (Aug. 31, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2010/08/31/bank-profits-soar-lending__n_700574.html.
15. See Susanne Craig & Kevin Roose, Wallets Out, Wall St. Dares to Indulge,
DEALBOOK (NOV. 23, 2010), HTTP://DEALBOOK.NYTIMES.COMJ2010/11/23/
SIGNS-OF-SWAGGER-WALLETS-OUT-WALL-ST-DARES-TO-CELEBRATE/ (The
five largest banks, "Goldman, Morgan Stanley, Citigroup, Bank of America and JPMorgan
Chase have set aside $89.54 billion this year to pay employees, 2.8 percent less than a year
ago, according to data from Nomura"); see also Eric Dash & Susanne Craig, Big Paydays
Return With Big Profits at Wall St. Banks, DEALBOOK (Jan. 22, 2001), http://
dealbook.nytimes.com//20/01/21/big-paydays-return-with-big-profits-at-wall-st-banks/.
16. Sudeep Reddy, Jobs Setback Clouds Recovery, WALL ST. J., Dec. 4, 2010, http://
online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703989004575652483381 2 08608.html.
17. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank),
Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified in scattered sections of the U.S.
Code).
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before the next crisis, 18 the savings and loan debacle in the 1980s. This is
a pattern of stability that, hopefully, Dodd-Frank can replicate. This Ar-
ticle will analyze Dodd-Frank from the perspective of whether it would
have prevented the current crisis had it been in place at the start of the
2000s and whether its scope is sufficiently broad and rigorous to prevent
other crises that are not clones of the present meltdown.
The analysis in this Article is very critical. In signing Dodd-Frank,
President Obama stated that the Act will:
rein in the abuse and excess that nearly brought down our financial
system. It will finally bring transparency to the kinds of complex and
risky transactions that helped trigger the financial crisis . . . . And
finally, because of this law, the American people will never again be
asked to foot the bill for Wall Street's mistakes. There will be no
more tax-funded bailouts-period. 19
On the other hand, a day after President Obama signed the Bill into law,
the minority leader of the House of Representatives, Congressman John
Boehner, said at his weekly press briefing that:
the financial regulatory bill that the [P]resident signed this week is
just another big-government power grab that will make it even
harder to create jobs. It provides for permanent bailouts to Presi-
dent Obama's Wall Street allies at the expense of small businesses
and community banks across our country. Frankly, it's just more of
the same.20
Following up on this attitude, the week that the new Congress convened
in January 2011, Representative Bachmann introduced a bill to repeal
Dodd-Frank. 21
Thus, there are two different perspectives upon the wisdom and effi-
cacy of Dodd-Frank. As this Article demonstrates, Dodd-Frank clearly
would prevent a financial crisis similar to the present one. However, as
this Article also demonstrates, whether it will eliminate other financial
crises will, in part, be a function of regulations that must be drafted and
implemented.
18. See David Moss, Reversing the Null: Regulation, Deregulation, and the Power of
Ideas 3 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 10-080), available at http://www.hbs.edu/
research/pdf/10-080.pdf; see also Professor Moss' graph of the pattern of bank failures, text
following note 285, infra. Professor Moss later correlated his bank failure graph with rising
income equality; 1928 and 2007 were periods of the highest income inequality, followed by
devastating economic downturn.
19. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at Signing of Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (July 21, 2010) (transcript available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-signing-dodd-frank-wall-
street-reform-and-consumer-protection-act).
20. Reform Fannie and Freddie? Fuhgeddaboudit!, JOHNBOEHNER.HoUSE.GOV (July
22, 2010), http://johnboehner.house.gov/News/DocumentSingle.aspx?DocumentlD=
199958.
21. Ronald Orol, GOP's Bachmann Seeks to Repeal Dodd-Frank. . .Completely,




It is premature to speak of repealing Dodd-Frank. In view of the dev-
astating impact of the current crisis, it is critical to understand how the
crisis evolved, what incentives drove it, and who the responsible players
were. Until these factors are understood, an intelligent assessment of the
Act cannot be made.
The present call for repeal is driven by two beliefs: (1) that the Act was
over-regulation and (2) that government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs),
such as Fannie Mae, and the Community Reinvestment Act were respon-
sible for the crisis. For example, the Washington Legal Foundation, a
free-market advocacy group, asserted, "Our heavily regulated markets
were pushed to the brink of collapse in spite of hundreds of laws and
rules enforced by numerous federal and state agencies. No amount of
oversight could have stopped the wreckage that resulted when ideologi-
cally-motivated politicians socialized major aspects of mortgage
lending., 22
Similarly, the American Enterprise Institute (AEI), a conservative
think tank, laid the blame for the subprime crisis solely on the shoulders
of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac:
This Outlook tells the disheartening story of how the GSEs [Fan-
nie Mae and Freddie Mac] sold out the taxpayers by taking huge
risks on substandard mortgages, primarily to retain congressional
support for the weak regulation and special benefits that fueled their
high profits and profligate executive compensation. As if that were
not enough, in the process, the GSEs' operations promoted a risky
subprime mortgage binge in the United States that has caused a
worldwide financial crisis. 23
In a similar vein is Peter Wallison's statement, in his dissenting opinion
from the Report of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission:
I believe that the sine qua non of the financial crisis was U.S. gov-
ernment housing policy, which led to the creation of 27 million sub-
prime and other risky loans-half of all mortgages in the United
States-which were ready to default as soon as the massive 1997-
2007 housing bubble began to deflate.24
Mr. Wallison continued by also placing responsibility for the crisis on the
GSEs and the Community Reinvestment Act.25
22. Daniel J. Popeo, The American Bad Dream, WASH. LEGAL FOUND. (Oct. 20,
2008), available at http://www.wlf.org/upload/10-20-08baddreamnytopedslick.pdf.
23. Peter J. Wallison & Charles W. Calomiris, The Last Trillion-Dollar Commitment:
The Destruction of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, AM. ENTER. INST. (Sept. 30, 2008), avail-
able at http://www.aei.org/outlook/28704.
24. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 444 (2011)
(Wallison Dissent), available at http://www.gpoaccess.govlfcic/fcic.pdf [hereinafter FCIC
REPORT]. Mr. Wallison is also a fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.
25. See, e.g., id. at 524-32. Contrariwise, the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission con-
cluded that "the CRA was not a significant factor in subprime lending or the crisis. Many
subprime lenders were not subject to the CRA. Research indicates only 6% of high-cost
loans-a proxy for subprime loans-had any connection to the law. Loans made by CRA-
regulated lenders in the neighborhoods in which they were required to lend were half as
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In another sense, the ideological dispute is between consumer protec-
tion versus "big bank" protection. Representative Spencer Bachus, the
incoming chairman of the House Financial Services Committee, has as-
serted that federal lawmakers and regulators exist to "serve the banks. ' 26
However, as this Article demonstrates, it was the "big banks"-by fund-
ing the subprime lenders, buying their mortgages and securitizing them,
slicing them to form CDOs and synthetic CDOs27 through derivatives,
and leaning on the credit rating agencies to get AAA ratings for junk-
that were the primary cause of the financial crisis. The problem was not
over-regulation but, rather, a lack of wise regulation.
Since Dodd-Frank was a response to the worst financial crisis since the
Great Depression and is aimed at preventing another such financial
meltdown, it is critical to understand the real causes of the current finan-
cial crisis and the extent to which Dodd-Frank will remediate the past
and provide assurance that the future will not lead to a repeat of history.
In other words, we need more light and less heat on an issue this grave.
The organization of the Article is as follows: Part II is fairly dry-it
deals with data. But in a financial crisis, numbers are important. Part II
first deals with the incredible increase in assets under investment, which
created the demand for the toxic mortgages, and then analyzes the chang-
ing characteristics of the subprime mortgages and their dramatic increase
in volume and riskiness, a fact that was recognized by neither the regula-
tors nor the financial services industry.
Part III introduces the roles of the players who drove the subprime
crises, namely the borrowers, the mortgage brokers, the mortgage lend-
ers, the GSEs (such as Fannie Mae) and the investment banks, the credit
rating agencies, and the issuers of derivatives. Part IV deals with mort-
gage origination and looks at the incentives that motivated the borrower,
the broker, and the lender. With respect to "liars' loans," it examines
why brokers and lenders were either complicit with the borrower in creat-
ing false data or actually provided the false data. It also discusses the
erosion in underwriting standards that was prompted by the desire to
continually push earnings growth, which led to higher stock prices and
increased compensation for management. It then reviews the provisions
of Dodd-Frank that would have prevented the erosion in underwriting
standards.
likely to default as similar loans made in the same neighborhoods by independent mort-
gage originators not subject to the law." FCIC REPORT, supra note 24, at xxvii.
26. Peter Schroeder, Rep. Bachus Tells Local Paper that Washington Should 'Serve'
Banks, THEHILL.COM (Dec. 13, 2010), http://thehill.com/blogs/on-the-money/banking-
financial-institutions/133379-bachus-tells-local-paper-that-washington-should-qserveq-
banks.
27. A collateralized debt obligation, or CDO, is a type of security often composed of
the riskier portions of mortgage-backed securities. A synthetic CDO is a CDO that holds
credit default swaps that reference assets (rather than holding cash assets), allowing inves-
tors to make bets for or against those referenced assets. See FCIC REPORT, supra note 24,




Part V analyzes the role of the players in the securitization process: the
GSEs and the investment banks. It describes how the investment banks
became the dominant player in fueling the subprime crises by packaging
risky loans into securities and financing the non-banks that originated
most of the defective mortgages. It also details the incredible growth and
concentration in the financial services industry.
The effectiveness of Dodd-Frank's response to the investment banks is
somewhat mixed. The Act provides a modest risk retention requirement
of 5% so that securitizers will have some "skin in the game."'28 With re-
spect to curbing excessive management risk taking, the Act relies upon
disclosure and independent boards, neither of which has been highly ef-
fective in the past. The provisions dealing with inadequate capitalization
and proprietary trading require extensive rulemaking before their impact
can be known. With respect to "too big to fail," Dodd-Frank does not
deal adequately with the "too big" aspect, but it does set up a mechanism
to deal with failing institutions.
Part VI deals with the credit rating agencies and how they lost their
souls by valuing market share and growth over critical analysis. The im-
pact of Dodd-Frank upon credit agencies should be very positive. It
makes substantial structural and transparency changes and also clarifies
that the credit rating agencies can be held accountable through private
litigation, thereby undercutting the claim of such agencies that their rat-
ings are protected by the First Amendment.
Part VII examines the role of derivatives, both in creating the crises
and prolonging it. It discusses the Goldman Sachs settlement when
Goldman sponsored a synthetic CDO without disclosing that the mort-
gages underlying the credit default swaps had in part been chosen by an
investor who wanted to bet against the mortgages. The Article also as-
serts that credit default swaps should be prohibited because of the moral
hazard and information asymmetry when a creditor, which has a due dili-
gence obligation, buys protection from a third party. Moreover, the exis-
tence of naked default swaps magnified the impact of the subprime
mortgage defaults.
The Conclusion asserts that Dodd-Frank should prevent a financial cri-
sis in the future that mirrors the past crisis since it should markedly
change lending practices. It should also put a stop to the shameful role of
the credit rating agencies that went from serving as trusted analysts to
wholesaling AAA ratings. However, the impact on the big banks remains
to be seen. With respect to "too big to fail," the Act fails to address
adequately the "too big" issue, namely, the ever-increasing aggregation of
financial power in large financial institutions, but it does create a sound
mechanism to deal with systemically large institutions that may fail in the
future. In addition, it does not adequately deal with the underlying issue
that drives any financial crisis, management incentives that lead to exces-
28. Statement of the Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee: Risk-Retention in the
Dodd-Frank Act, AM. ENTER. INST. (2011), available at http://www.aei.org/paper/100217.
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sive risk-taking, nor does it reverse the increased concentration in the
financial services industry.
II. THE EXTRAORDINARY INCREASE IN ASSETS UNDER
INVESTMENT AND THE CHANGING NATURE OF
SUBPRIME LOANS
One of the drivers of the subprime crisis was the surge in wealth exper-
ienced in many countries around the world. Between 2002 and 2007
there was a tremendous upsurge in the amount of assets available for
investment by those seeking a profitable yet safe return. While assets
under investment over the decades had grown to $37 trillion by 2002,
these assets basically doubled between 2002 and 2007 to $73 trillion.2 9
The United States has historically been attractive to both domestic and
foreign investment. But treasury bonds, from 2003 to 2005, ranged from
a little over 1% to a little over 4%, depending upon the date and matur-
ity.30 Investors, seeking a better but safe return, turned to real estate
securities, which historically had a relatively low default rate.31
When there is a surge of demand, the demand curve shifts upward to
the right, resulting in higher prices. What is not always understood is that
risk is a part of the price, and what occurred in the subprime markets as a
result of the surge in demand was that the product purchased became
much riskier. Mortgage originations grew modestly from 1990 until 2001;
they then exploded, particularly with respect to refinancings, as indicated
in the graph below.32
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29. See INT'L FIN. SERV. LONDON, FUND MANAGEMENT REPORT 7 (2008).
30. See STATISTICAL ABSTRAcr OF THE UNITED STATES: 2009, 729 (2009) (available
by section from the U.S. Census Bureau at http://www.census.gov/prod/www/abs/
statab2006-2010.html).
31. For example, total loans in the foreclosure process from 1990 to 2007, before the
real estate bubble burst, ranged from 0.9% to 1.5%. See id. at 727.





Home mortgage debt approximately doubled between 1990 and 2001;
however, in the next five years between 2001 and 2006, it basically
doubled again. 33 In a sense, the pool of borrowers constituting a sound
risk was depleted and was replaced by a pool of less credit-worthy risks,
whether by virtue of their personal financial characteristics or the inflated
value of the real estate underlying the security that they were offering.
The causes of the subprime crisis, and the responsibility therefore, can-
not be understood without a perspective on the nature of subprime loans,
their explosive growth, and how the risk characteristics of these loans
grew riskier over time. It is important to identify the period during which
this move toward greater risk took place in order to assess who were the
prime contributors to the crisis and what motivated them. Hopefully, the
following two pages of data analysis will not discourage the reader, since
an understanding of this data is necessary to allocate the appropriate re-
sponsibility between the investment banks, on the one hand, and the gov-
ernment-sponsored entities, such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, on the
other, and to understand how management of the commercial and invest-
ment banks and the non-bank lenders was indifferent to the risk that they
were undertaking.
From 2000 to 2003, fixed-rate subprime mortgages constituted about
33% of subprime mortgages, with the percentage being basically constant
across time.34 Meanwhile, adjustable rate mortgages, which would reset
to a higher interest rate after two or three years, averaged about 60%. 3 5
These mortgages are sometimes described as "2/28" or "3/27" mortgages,
reflecting the fact that a low teaser rate would be in effect for two or
three years, and then the mortgage would reset to a much higher interest
rate, often leading to defaults. 36
However, from 2004 to 2006, the fixed rate subprime percentage
dropped to about 25%. In contrast, the adjustable rate mortgages in-
creased to over 70% from 2004 to 2006. While the percentage change
moved only modestly toward riskier investments, from a volume perspec-
tive, the dollar volume of subprime mortgages increased from $100 billion
33. In 1990 mortgage debt was $2.504 trillion; in 2001, $5.325 trillion; and in 2006,
$9.854 trillion. See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE Sys., FEDERAL RESERVE
STATISTICAL RELEASE, Z.1, FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES, 8, 59
(2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/zl/20080306/.
34. U.S. Gov'T AccOUNTABiLrY OFFICE, GAO-09-848R, CHARACTERISTICS AND
PERFORMANCE OF NONPRIME MORTGAGES 24 (2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d09848r.pdf [hereinafter GAO REPORT]. The data in this section on the per-
centages of subprime and Alt-A loans is derived from Tables 2 and 3 in Enclosure I, pages
24-25. A subprime loan is one made to a borrower with a low credit score at an interest
rate above that of a traditional mortgage.
35. Id.
36. A Federal Reserve Bank study found that about 70% of subprime loans were what
is known as "2/28" or "3/27" loans, meaning that that they have a low teaser rate for two or
three years, and then reset to a much higher interest rate which can double the mortgage
payment. See Kelly D. Edmiston & Roger Zalneraitis, Rising Foreclosures in the United
States: A Perfect Storm, FED. RESERVE BANK OF KAN. CITY ECON. REV., Fourth Quarter
2007, at 127-28, available at http://www.kansascityfed.org/publicat/econrev/pdf/4q07
Edmiston.pdf.
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in 2000 to $600 billion in 2006, a 600% increase. 37
What is the significance of the foregoing data? It illustrates that not
only was there an explosive growth in a risky class of loans, namely sub-
prime loans, but also that the composition of these loans was growing
riskier over time, as the percentage of adjustable rate loans in the sub-
prime class also increased.
There is a similar and even more distressing picture with respect to Alt-
A loans. Alt-A loans are typically low documentation loans that were
originally designed for credit-worthy, self-employed persons who could
not meet the documentation requirements for traditional loan underwrit-
ing. For example, such person would not have a W-2 form from his em-
ployer to evidence his income. As discussed in the next section, these
loans evolved into what became known as "liars' loans."
The dollar volume of Alt-A loans was only $25 billion in 2000, but in-
creased to $400 billion in 2006,38 an increase of 1,600%. Sparking this
rise was a loosening of underwriting standards. From 2000 to 2003, the
percentage of fixed-rate Alt-A loans slowly dropped from 85% to 71%.39
However, from 2004 to 2006, the percentage of fixed-rate loans dropped
markedly and was steady at about 38%.40
What products replaced the fixed-rate Alt-A loans? One essentially
new product was what the Government Accounting Office described as
payment-option ARMs, 41 which have been more colorfully described as
"pick-a-pay" loans.42 These loans comprised only about 2% of Alt-A
loans from 2000 to 2003, but during 2004 to 2006, this percentage rose
from 13% to 25%. 43 These loans enabled the borrower, for some fixed
period, to choose how much of a payment he or she would make. Often
this payment was less than the accruing interest, and the deficiency in
interest payment was added to the principal. Thus, the loan would be-
come a negative amortization loan, that is, one in which the principal
owed is rising over time. Contrast this with a standard loan in which the
payment not only covers interest, but also reduces the principal balance.
The pick-a-pay loan was initially designed for a sophisticated borrower
who understood the risk and knew there was no Santa Claus. However,
as housing prices rose, lenders began marketing this type of loan to
lower-income borrowers as an "affordability" loan 44 that would enable a
borrower to buy a more expensive house than the borrower could afford
37. GAO REPORT, supra note 34, at 1.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 30.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 5.
42. With this type of loan, the borrower could choose a payment amount that was
substantially below the accruing interest rate, with the deficiency in accrued interest added
to the principal. When these loans reset, the mortgage payment could triple. See generally
Edmiston & Zalneraitis, supra note 36, at 127-28.
43. GAO REPORT, supra note 34, at 26, tbl.5.
44. Id. at 24.
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if the mortgage payment were determined under a standard amortized
loan.
The other product that replaced the fixed-rate Alt-A loan was the ad-
justable rate Alt-A loan. From 2000 to 2003, the loans steadily increased
from about 14% to 25%. 45 However, they rose to over 60% from 2004 to
2006.46 Thus, the number of Alt-A loans increased even more explosively
than the subprime loans, and, like the subprime loans, as their numbers
increased, their risk characteristics also increased as more and more loans
were adjustable rate or pick-a-pay loans.
If the foregoing analysis is correct, one would expect that the delin-
quency, default, and foreclosure rates (default rates) for loans would in-
crease for annual cohorts of loans from 2000 to 2006 and that the loan
types this Article asserts as the riskiest would have the highest default
rates. That is exactly what the data has demonstrated.
The default rate for fixed-rate subprime mortgages dropped from 23%
in 2000 to 11% in 2003, but then rose from 16% in 2004 to 32% in 2006. 47
The default rate for hybrid ARMs dropped from 23% in 2000 to 13% in
2003, but then rose from 17% in 2004 to 50% in 2006.48 A similar pattern
existed for Alt-A loans. The default rate for fixed-rate Alt-A loans was
8% in 2000 and averaged less than 5% for the next three years.49 From
2004 to 2006, the default rate rose from 4% to 13% to 23% for fixed-rate
alt-A loans.50 With respect to payment-option loans, the default rate av-
eraged less than 1% from 2000 to 2002, when they were used by sophisti-
cated borrowers. 51 From 2003 to 2006, the default rates increased from
4% to 8% to 22% to 37%. There was a similar pattern of increased de-
fault rates for adjustable Alt-A mortgages in 2004 to 2006, which con-
trasted with an average default of about 4% from 2000 to 2003.
Thus, there is a clear pattern that the default rates for annual cohorts of
mortgages increased over time and particularly from 2004 to 2006. There
is a second clear pattern which shows that the default rates for the riskier
mortgages increased faster than the default rates for the fixed mortgages.
This continued into 2007.52
Thus, the critical period is 2004 to 2007. Accordingly, who were the
major players involved in producing these risky mortgages, and what
drove them to take such risk?
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 35-36. The percentage used in this section for default rate is the sum of
percentages for mortgages that are delinquent, that are in default, that are in the foreclo-
sure process, and that have completed the foreclosure process. The higher default rate in
2000 is probably attributable to the bursting of the dot-corn bubble.
48. Id. at 36.
49. Id. Default rates in the period 2000-2003 are generally highest in the 2000 cohort
of loans. This may be related to the dot-com bubble bursting in 2000. Banks which
originated mortgages in 2000 may have found that the income and assets upon which they
relied shrank when the bubble burst.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 40-41.
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III. WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THESE RISKY LOANS,
WHAT DROVE THEIR ACTIONS, AND TO WHAT
EXTENT WILL THE FINANCIAL REFORM
ACT PREVENT A FUTURE CRISIS?
It has already been posited that the overarching driver of the subprime
crisis was the explosion in assets under investment looking for a home.
However, it is difficult to assign culpability to investors when they
thought they were buying securities with AAA credit ratings from rating
agencies and prospectuses that did not adequately alert them to the dan-
gers of these investments. Accordingly, Parts IV and V will examine the
cast of participants involved in bringing the loan to the investor. These
include the borrower, the mortgage broker, the mortgage banker, the
syndicator of the security (generally either a government-sponsored en-
terprise or an affiliate of an investment banker), the rating agencies, and
the issuers of derivatives. The Article will examine the role that each
played and the incentives that drove their conduct. With a cast of charac-
ters this broad, the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission paraphrased
Shakespeare by stating, "the fault lies not in the stars, but in us. ''53
IV. FATAL FLAWS IN THE ORIGINATION OF TOXIC
MORTGAGES: THE ROLES OF THE BORROWER, THE
MORTGAGE BROKER, AND THE MORTGAGE LENDER, AND
THE CURATIVE IMPACT OF THE FINANCIAL REFORM ACT
A. THE BORROWER: OPPORTUNIST OR VICTIM?
The borrower is often portrayed either as an unscrupulous opportunist,
who sought to cash out some of the inflated value of his home or to buy a
property beyond his means, or a victim of avaricious businesses who
euchred her into a transaction that she did not understand. The data,
often anecdotal, suggest that there is truth to both tales, as well as many
situations falling on a continuum in between. There undoubtedly were
borrowers who sought to game the system.5 4 On the other hand, there is
no doubt that there was incredible selling pressure brought to bear upon
prospective borrowers. 55 Numerous actions by state attorneys general
53. FCIC REPORT, supra note 24, at xvii.
54. See Matthew Haggman & Jack Dolan, Probe of Broker Agency Is Sought, MIAMI
HERALD July 29, 2008, http://www.miamiherald.com/1060/story/787362.html. A tattoo-par-
lor owner, known as Sonny, made ninety sales in about four years, often using strawmen
buyers who received a small slice of the mortgage proceeds, put no money down, and then
disappeared and were untraceable. He cleared $6.4 million. Sonny's deals were financed
by Wachovia, Wells Fargo, Washington Mutual, Bank of America, Lehman Brothers, Fan-
nie Mae, and Freddie Mac, who obviously did little due diligence. See Michael Van Sickler,
House Flipper Sonny Kim to Plead Guilty to Money Laundering Fraud, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, June 17, 2010, http://tampabay.com/news/courts/civil/house-flipper-sonny-kim-to-
plead-guilty-to-money-laundering-fraud/1102796.
55. Even today, as I was writing this article, I received a text message soliciting me to




demonstrate that many borrowers were duped or defrauded.56 What
would induce mortgage brokers to go out into the hinterlands to find pro-
spective mortgagors and dupe them? That is a subject for the next sec-
tion. But first let us examine the incentives for borrowers to enter into
risky transactions.
At one end of the spectrum, some degree of opportunism lurks in all of
us. Combined with optimism, there is frequently a tendency to stretch to
move up in the housing market, particularly when prices are rising and
there is a fear of being left behind. When offered the so-called "2/28" or
"3/27" adjustable-rate mortgage, there is a tendency to focus upon being
able to afford the payment predicated upon the teaser rate, rather than
the sobering reality of being able to make the principal payment when
the mortgage resets. How do you deal with opportunistic optimism?
There is a serious question as to whether 2/28 or 3/27 mortgages have a
place in the financing system for home mortgages, at least below a certain
threshold of income. This is not to suggest that there is a correlation
between income and intelligence, but rather that there is a correlation
between income and sophistication, namely the ability to appreciate risk.
Certainly, ability to pay should be based on amortizing the mortgage at
its expected reset interest rate, not some teaser rate.
Do we need more regulation here? A good case can be made that naive
regulation has complicated the task of being able to decipher the eco-
nomics of a proposed mortgage. As one commentator stated, "Most of us
have experienced being overwhelmed and befuddled by the huge stack of
documents full of confusing language in small print presented to us at a
mortgage closing. These documents are the result of legal and compli-
ance requirements, including regulatory attempts to insure disclosure. '57
What is needed is a one-page mortgage summary sheet, which, among
other information, would give the borrower the current interest rate and
mortgage payment and the maximum reset interest rate and correspond-
ing monthly payment 58
How many borrowers find the mortgage documentation to be confus-
ing? The Milken Institute, relying on Federal Trade Commission data,
56. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC, Illinois Attorney General Announce
Mortgage Broker Settlement: Defendants Allegedly Misrepresented Key Loan Terms to
Consumers (Nov. 3, 2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2003/11/diamond.shtm;
Foreclosure- and Mortgage-Related Consumer Protection Cases, COLO. Arr'Y GEN., http://
www.coloradoattorneygeneral.gov/departments/consumer-protection/mortgage-fraud_
informationcenter/learnmore.about-attorneygeneral% E2%80% 99#brokercases (last
visited Sept. 1, 2011); Press Release, Attorney Gen. Martha Coakley, Former Mortgage
Broker Sentenced to Serve at Least Two Years in State Prison for Role in Elaborate Mort-
gage Fraud Scheme (Jan. 20, 2011); Monique Bryher, Attorney General Brown Files Crimi-
nal Charges Against Mortgage Brokers, EXAMINER.COM (Sept. 11, 2009) http://
www.examiner.com/fraud-in-los-angeles/attorney-general-brown-files-criminal-charges-
against-mortgage-brokers. See generally David Segal, Financial Fraud Is Focus of Attack
by Prosecutors, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2009, at Al.
57. ALEX J. POLLOCK, AM. ENTER. INST., AFTER THE SU3PRIME LENDING BUST 4
(2007), available at http://www.aei.org/docLib/20070515Pollock-g.pdf.
58. ALEX J. POLLOCK, AM. ENTER. INST., THE POLLOCK PROTOTYPE (2007), available
at http://www.aei.org/docLib/20070515-PollockPrototype.pdf.
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found that 87% of respondents could not identify the total upfront cost of
the loan, 51% could not identify the loan amount from the documents,
and 30% could not identify the presence and amount of a balloon pay-
ment.59 Financial regulation should not encourage pages of boilerplate
disclosure, but rather meaningful disclosure. There is often a wide gap in
sophistication between the borrower and the providers of credit. In this
context, complexity works to deceive the borrower.
But what of the borrowers who were unscrupulous opportunists? As
the subprime market developed in the mid-2000s, prospective borrowers
were encouraged to be unscrupulous by the explosion of the so-called
"liars' loans." These loans evolved from stated income loans, in which
the borrower did not need to document income and that made some
sense for a self-employed person,60 into "stated asset" loans, in which the
borrower need document neither income nor assets. As one lender
stated: "So I don't really need to know what you make. I don't need
proof. You tell me you make $200,000 a year? You make $200,000 a
year."'61 The Internet was alive with mortgage brokers and mortgage
lenders offering stated income and stated asset loans. 62 For those at the
unscrupulous end of the spectrum, it is hard to conceive of a better incen-
tive to fabricate personal financial data than the broad-based solicitation
of liars' loans.
One way to take the incentive out of lying is criminal prosecution for
fraud. Unfortunately, as the next section illustrates, it often is not clear
whether the borrower unilaterally lied, whether the borrower lied with
the explicit or tacit encouragement of the broker or lender, as illustrated
in the preceding paragraph, or whether the broker or lender itself falsi-
fied the documents. Today the business sector is overwhelmed by the
problematic consequences of liars' loans. The criminal system has far
fewer resources and, with proof beyond a reasonable doubt required, has
little incentive to prosecute "he said, she said"-type cases. 63
Looking forward, why should a financial institution ever make a loan
without verified documentation as to income and assets? Even with self-
employed persons, there should be state and federal income tax returns
and estimated tax payments on the income side. Just because it is not
possible to obtain some of the documentation that would be available to
an employee is no justification for not seeking any documentation. With
59. See JAMES R. BARTH & GLENN YAGO, DEMYSTIFYING THE MORTGAGE
MELTDOWN: WHAT IT MEANS FOR MAIN STREET, WALL STREET AND THE U.S. FINANCIAL
SYSTEM 78, (2008).
60. The early rationale for these loans was that some borrowers, such as self-employed
persons, could not provide income verification because of the lack of documents such as
W-2s.
61. 60 Minutes: The U.S. Mortgage Meltdown, (CBS television broadcast May 25,
2008).
62. Googling "stated income loans" produces over 2 million responses, many of which
are offering such loans.
63. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 187 (McKinney 2008) (introducing a new Article 187,
"Residential Mortgage Fraud," to the New York State Penal Code).
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respect to assets, status as a self-employed person has no impact whatso-
ever on the ability to disclose assets. Moreover, disclosure of assets, such
as bank accounts, may well provide correlation to income disclosure.
Thus, a legislative or regulatory tightening of lending standards and a re-
quirement of documentation would have been a simple way to eliminate
liars' loans.
B. THE MORTGAGE BROKER
One of the culprits in the subprime crisis was the mortgage broker.
Mortgage brokers clearly were incentivized to make loans, since the com-
mission was paid upfront, often out of the points charged. While an hon-
est broker might charge a commission of around 1%,64 unscrupulous
brokers charged fees ranging up to 5% or higher. 65 A 5% commission on
a $200,000 loan would produce a fee of $10,000. Not bad for a day's
work! Six-figure incomes were typical,66 and some brokers made
upwards of $1 million a year.6 7 One mortgage research organization re-
ported that, at the end of 2006, the average monthly volume of a mort-
gage broker was $1.6 million.68 At a 1.5% fee, this would produce a
monthly income of $24,000, or $288,000 annually.
While this compensation may seem exceptional to some, salesmen are
often compensated by commissions and, in some non-public companies, a
salesman could make more than the CEO. The purpose of paying on a
commission basis is to incentivize performance, namely, to generate sales.
The problem is not compensation in the abstract, but rather whether the
broker is acting ethically and whether the amount of compensation incen-
tivizes brokers to engage in fraud, or to act in a manner antithetical to the
interests of the borrower.
64. See Rick Brooks & Ruth Simon, Subprime Debacle Traps Even Very Credit-Wor-
thy, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 2007, at Al ("On average, U.S. mortgage brokers collected 1.88%
of the loan amount for originating a subprime loan, compared with 1.48% for conforming
loans, according to Wholesale Access, a mortgage research firm.").
65. See Better Business Bureau, Beware of Predatory Practices in Home Mortgage
Lending, BBB. ORG (Apr. 12, 2002), http://www.bbb.org/us/article/beware-of-predatory-
practices-in-home-mortgage-lending-265 ("In the sub-prime market, there are mortgage
brokers who will attempt to sell the borrower on a loan with the most fees and highest
interest rate possible so that he/she will get more compensation. Some of these brokers
may charge fees of 8 to 10 points. That means that on a $100,000 loan, the borrower is
paying and financing an additional $8,000 to $10,000."); see also Predatory Mortgage Lend-
ing, SOCIALSERVE.COM, http://www.socialserve.com/tenant/PredatoryLending.html (last
visited Sept. 1, 2011).
66. See The Effect of Subprime Mortgage Lending on Mortgage Brokers, SUBPRIME
LENDING CRISIS, http://www.subprimelendingcrisis.com/Effect-ofSubprimeMortgage-
Lending-onMortgageBrokers.php (last visited Sept. 1, 2011); see also PETER J. GENERIS,
GETTING STARTED As A COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE BROKER: How TO GET TO A SIX-
FIGURE SALARY IN 12 MONTHS (2008).
67. Thomas H. Perkins, The Origins of the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 1 THE TRUSTED
ADVISER 5, 2008, available at http://ww2.atgf.comIDevFiles/TrustedAdviser/2008/10Oct/
PerkinsTalk081010.asp.
68. See ACCESS MORTGAGE RESEARCH & CONSULTING, INC., SEPTEMBER 2008
MONTHLY BROKER REPORT (2008).
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The term "broker" is ambiguous. When the broker tells a prospective
borrower that he can get the borrower the "best" mortgage, the borrower
would understand that the broker is acting for the borrower's benefit. In
other words, the borrower would expect that the broker is the agent of
the borrower. In such a case, the broker has fiduciary duties, including
duties of full disclosure of all material aspects of the transaction as well as
the compensation of the broker.69 And of course, the broker has an obli-
gation not to deceive or defraud the borrower.70
In response to the subprime crisis, California,71 New York, and Illinois
passed laws in 2008 that would, in effect, legislatively impose fiduciary
duties on mortgage brokers. In California, Governor Schwarzenegger ve-
toed the legislation, in part because of his concern that the legislation
covered independent brokers but not employees of the lender, and in
part over the ability of borrowers to obtain attorney's fees. 72 However,
Governor Paterson signed the New York legislation. Among other
things, this legislation would require each MORTGAGE BROKER TO:
(a) act in the borrower's interest;
(b) act with reasonable skill, care and diligence;
(c) act in good faith and with fair dealing;
(d) not . . . charge any undisclosed compensation, directly or
indirectly;
(e) clearly disclose.., all material information.., that might reason-
ably affect the rights, interests, or ability of the borrower ... and
(f) diligently work to present the borrower with a range of loan prod-
ucts for which the borrower likely qualifies and which are appropri-
ate to the borrower's existing circumstances, based on information
... obtained in good faith by[ ] the broker.73
The Illinois legislation, championed by Attorney General Lisa Madigan,
contained similar provisions.74 It also gives borrowers a private right of
action and requires verification of the borrower's reasonable ability to
service the mortgage. 75
Placing a borrower in a 2/28 or 3/27 teaser loan, which could reset into
69. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (2011).
70. See id.
71. See Assembly Bill 1830 (Lieu) Fact Sheet: California Mortgage Lending Reform,
CONSUMERS UNION, http://www.censumersunion.ors/pdf/CA-mortgage-lending-fact-sheet.
pdf.
72. The first reason that Governor Schwarzenegger gave for vetoing the bill was that
"its provisions will only apply to state regulated entities, as federally regulated entities will
be exempt." However, the federal government does not regulate mortgage brokers. Thus,
the governor must have been referring to lenders that are regulated by the federal govern-
ment. But most subprime lenders were "non-banks" that were not regulated by the FDIC.
Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, Address Regarding Assembly Bill 1830 (Sept. 25,
2008), available at http://www.consumersunion.orglpdf/CA-mortgage-lending-fact-sheet.
pdf.
73. N.Y. BANKING LAw § 590-b (McKinney 2008) (amending the New York State
Banking Law to add a new section 590-B). ILLINOIS ADOPTED SIMILAR LEGISLATION. See
205 I11. Comp. Stat. Ann. 635/5-7 (WEST 2008).
74. 205 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 635/5-7 (West 2008).
75. Id. at 635/4-16, 5-7.
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a mortgage payment that would double or more, 76 generally would not be
in the borrower's best interest, even if there were full disclosure to the
borrower of the risks involved and the scope of the potential reset. Nor
would steering the borrower into a subprime loan be in the borrower's
best interest, when the borrower could qualify for a conventional loan. 77
A study commissioned by The Wall Street Journal found that in 2005,
55% of the subprime borrowers had credit scores generally high enough
to qualify for conventional loans with far better terms.78 In 2006, the
proportion was even higher, namely, 61%.79 While there is some softness
with respect to what credit score is sufficient to get conventional financ-
ing-generally over 620-during the period 2004 to 2007, about one-
eighth of the subprime borrowers had credit scores over 700, clearly suffi-
cient for conventional financing.80
What drove mortgage brokers to place qualified buyers in subprime
loans? Very likely, the increased commissions that are generated in the
subprime market.81 On many subprime mortgage loans, brokers receive
a kickback from the lender known as a "yield spread premium. '82 Basi-
cally, the lender offers a wholesale rate, and the broker quotes a retail
rate to the borrower, which can be a point or two higher and in some
cases, substantially higher.83 The higher the interest rate, the more the
broker gets paid.84 Professor Elizabeth Warren of Harvard has estimated
that 85% to 90% of subprime loans involved a yield spread premium.85
She opined that a borrower who could qualify for a 6.5% fixed-rate,
thirty-year mortgage could end up with a 9.5% variable mortgage. 86
While this is clearly to the disadvantage of the borrower, it provides a
substantial increase in compensation to the mortgage broker.87
Regulation of mortgage brokers varies widely across the country.88 In
Florida, more than 10,000 convicted criminals worked in the mortgage
76. See Edmiston & Zalneraitis, supra note 36, at 127-28.




81. See Elizabeth Warren, Op-Ed., Mortgage Brokers' Sleight of Hand, THE BOSTON
GLOBE, Oct. 2, 2007, htto://www.boston.com/business/personalfinance/articles/2007/10/02/
mortgage-brokers-sleight-of-hand/.
82. Brooks & Simon, supra note 64.
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. Michael Calhoun, president of the Center for Responsible Lending, which had
been trying for over a decade to get regulators to outlaw yield spread premiums, analyzed
the incentive for brokers to engage in this practice: "People didn't just happen to end up in
risky loans. Mortgage brokers and other people on the front lines were getting two to three
times as much money to push buyers into those loans than they were into 30-year fixed-
rate loans. So what do you think happened?" David Streitfeld, Fed Adopts Rules Meant to
Protect Home Buyer, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2010, at B3.
86. Warren, supra note 81.
87. See id.
88. See, e.g., George Packer, The Ponzi State: Florida's Foreclosure Disaster, THE NEW
YORKER, Feb. 9, 2009, at 81.
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business, thousands of whom were licensed brokers.89 One congress-
woman observed that "Florida was particularly lax when it [came] to
mortgage regulation," and "[s]he connected ... the lack of oversight with
state politics and the political power of developers." 90
The potential to make huge sums of money motivated some mortgage
brokers to falsify documentation and even create bogus transactions. 91
Chicago Public Media detailed a situation in which a mortgage applica-
tion was filled out by the mortgage broker and listed the borrower's in-
come at $16,250 a month, or almost $200,000 a year. 92 The borrower's
actual income was $37,000, and he had provided the broker with his tax
returns.93 The broker's fee was $18,500.94 The borrower would have
qualified for a VA loan, but instead was placed in an adjustable rate sub-
prime loan.95 When the loan reset, the borrower's payments increased by
$2,000 a month. 96
Such action should be criminal. In fact, mortgage fraud prosecutions
are ongoing around the country. 97 Recently, forty-one defendants were
charged in Ohio in one of the largest mortgage fraud schemes in the
country.98 The mastermind of the scheme allegedly pocketed $31 million
through bogus mortgage loans by bringing in buyers and helping them
falsify credit applications to obtain loans. 99 But, as observed in the pre-
ceding section, the criminal system does not have the resources to deal
with this problem.' 00 The goal should not be prosecution, but rather pre-
vention. That is why it is essential to regulate mortgage brokers and lend-
ers by requiring them to obtain documentation and verify it.
C. THE MORTGAGE LENDERS
Lenders, many of whom were non-banks, financial institutions that do
not accept deposits and thus are not subject to close regulation, believed
they had discovered the perfect business plan. 10 1 As previously dis-
89. Haggman & Dolan, supra note 54.
90. Packer, supra note 88.
91. One mortgage broker, just out of college, made $75,000-$100,000 a month. This
American Life: The Giant Pool of Money (Chicago Public Media radio broadcast May 9,






97. See Colorado Mortgage Prosecution Results in Four Guilty Pleas, MORTG. FRAUD
BLOG, (Jan. 9, 2007), http://www.mortgagefraudblog.com/index.php/weblog/permalink/col-
oradomortgage-prosecution-resultsjin-four_.guilty-pleas/; Senators Schumer and Kyl
propose Fighting Real Estate Fraud Act of 2009 Bill, THE MORTG. FRAUD REP., Oct. 1,
2009, http://www.mortgagefraudreporter.com/journaU2009/10/1-senators-schumer-and-kyl-
propose-fighting-real-estate-fraud.html.
98. Press Release, Ohio Attorney Gen., Task Force Cracks Mortgage Fraud Case In-
volving 453 Homes (Aug. 26, 2009).
99. Id.




cussed, and as will be discussed further in connection with the role of
investment banks, there seemed to be an insatiable demand for mort-
gages that could be packaged as mortgage-related securities. 10 2 Since the
plan was to sell the mortgages, the lender did not worry about the
creditworthiness of the borrower.
This moral hazard led to an erosion of underwriting standards. Investi-
gations by state attorneys general have documented this laxity in due dili-
gence and basic mortgage underwriting.' 0 3 Moreover, in testimony
before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, Richard Bowen, a for-
mer senior vice president and business chief underwriter for Citi Mort-
gage, testified that of $50 billion in prime mortgages in 2006, over 60%
were defective; defective mortgages increased to over 80% of production
in 2007, even though he warned management of the risk to CitiMortgage
because of the representations and warranties made to investors. 10 4 With
respect to subprime mortgages, large numbers of underwriting decisions
were reversed by management from "turndown" to "approved." 10 5
It does not take a rocket scientist to decipher the incentive for mort-
gage lenders to ratchet up subprime lending to satisfy the market demand
for mortgage backed securities. More loans meant more revenue, which
translated into greater earnings, higher stock prices, and, of course,
greater compensation for management. Coupled with this was the seem-
ing lack of risk when loans could be packaged and sold to investors with-
out recourse. 10
6
Consider Countrywide Financial, now part of Bank of America, 1°7 a
classic example of greed run amok. Set forth below is a graph of the
stock prices for Countrywide Financial, one of the major mortgage lend-
ers, from 2000 to 2008.108
Until 2003, Countrywide primarily lent conventional 30 year fixed-rate
mortgages. Mortgages for securitization were sold to the GSEs,10 9 as the
investment banks were not major players. 110 But Countrywide then got
102. See supra text accompanying notes 32-33.
103. See, e.g., Complaint, Illinois v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., No. 08CH 2994 (Ill. Cir.
Ct. Cook Co.); see also Final Judgment and Consent Decree, Illinois v. Countrywide Fin.
Corp. No. 08CH40569, (Ill. Cir. Ct. Cook Co.); supra note 56 and accompanying text.
104. Subprime Lending and Securitization and Government-Sponsored Enterprises:
Hearing of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 111th Cong. (2010) (statement of
Richard Bowen, former Senior Vice President, CitiMortgage, Inc.).
105. Id.
106. See id.
107. See Savio D'Souza & Chelsea Emery, BofA in $8.6 bin settlement over Country-
wide loans, REUTERS, Oct. 7, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/10/07/sppageO12-
bng287494-oisbn-idUSBNG28749420081007.
108. Since Countrywide Financial is no longer publicly traded, this graph was devel-
oped from data available from Thomson Reuters' "Datastream." The code for Country-
wide is 916036.
109. See Subprime Lending and Securitization and Government-Sponsored Enterprises,
supra note 104; see also text accompanying notes 165-68.
110. See infra text accompanying note 169.
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heavily into the subprime business.11 ' When Countrywide started pro-
ducing riskier products, loan volume, revenues, earnings, and executive
compensation all increased, paralleling the increase in stock prices. See
the chart below. 112
111. See E. Scott Reckard & Annette Haddad, Credit Crunch Imperils Lender, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 16, 2007, http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-fi-countrywidel6augl6,
0,6834329.story (quoting Bill Dallas, an executive at Ownit Mortgage, which also failed).
112. Countrywide Fin. Corp, Annual Report (Form 10-K/A), at 24 (Apr. 24, 2008)
(showing CEO compensation for 2006-2007); Countrywide Fin. Corp, Annual Report
(Form 10-K), at 29, 47 (Feb. 29, 2008) (showing total revenues, net earnings, and volume of
loans originated for 2003-2007); Countrywide Fin. Corp, Annual Report (Schedule 14A),
at 26 (Apr. 28, 2006) (showing CEO compensation for 2003-2005); Countrywide Fin. Corp,
Annual Report (Schedule 14A), at 29 (Apr. 29, 2004) (showing CEO compensation for
2002); Countrywide Fin. Corp, Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 18-19 (Mar. 28, 2003)
(showing total revenues, net earnings, and volume of loans originated for 2000-2002);
Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc., Annual Report (Schedule 14A), at 21 (Apr. 29, 2002)
(showing CEO compensation for 2000-2001), available at http://www.sec.gov (searching by
CIK No. 0000025191). The chart above is developed from the following table of data:
Volume of Loans CEO
Total Revenues Net Earnings Originated Compensation
2000 2,073,839,000 374,153,000 68,923,000,000 6,476,604
2001 2,860,359,000 537,541,000 126,980,000,000 7,682,302
2002 4,519,466,000 841,779,000 251,901,000,000 11,041,852
2003 7,978,642,000 2,372,950,000 434,864,000,000 25,925,941
2004 8,566,627,000 2,197,574,000 363,364,000,000 24,642,098
2005 10,016,708,000 2,528,090,000 499,301,000,000 24,350,342
2006 11,417,128,000 2,674,846,000 468,172,000,000 51,755,223
2007 6,061,437,000 -703,538,000 415,634,000,000 10,812,297
2011]
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The two charts above essentially demonstrate the correlations between
the venture into risky lending practices, which thereby generated in-
creased volume and earnings, and hyped the stock price and increased
the compensation for Andrew Mozilo, the CEO of Countrywide.
Much of Mr. Mozilo's income was attributable to stock options. 113 This
form of incentive compensation is supposed to align the interests of man-
agement with that of the stockholders. However, this conventional wis-
dom has a fatal flaw in that it does not take into account the risk profile
of the two groups. Shareholders have a sunk-economic stake in their
stock investment and a risk profile that is more conservative than man-
agement's. On the one hand, when management takes on increased risk,
the stockholders can gain handsomely or lose all. On the other hand,
were management to be given substantial options, coupled with a million
dollar salary, taking risk can pay off handsomely if gains ensue. If the
loans eventually turn out badly, the executive holding options, unlike the
long-term shareholder investor, has no sunk investment to lose. But, if
the increased risk drives up profits in the short term, with a correspond-
ing increase in the price of the stock, the benefit to management can be
enormous, since management can exercise options and sell the stock
before the bottom falls out. That is what Mr. Mozilo sought to do." 4
In the case of Countrywide, the price of the stock quadrupled from
2001 to 2007.1 5 Mr. Mozilo sold $130 million of Countrywide in 2007
113. See, e.g., Countrywide Fin Corp, Annual Report (Form 10-K/A), at 24 (Apr. 24,
2008) (summarizing the success of Mr. Mozilo's compensation).
114. See Kara Scannell & John R. Emshwiller, SEC Poised to Charge Mozilo with
Fraud, WALL ST. J., May 14, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124224647957816523.
html.
115. E. Scott Reckart & William Heisel, SEC Staff Recommends Civil Fraud Charges
Against Mozilo of Countrywide, L.A. TIMEs, May 14, 2009, http://articles.latimes.com2009/
may/14/business/fi-mozilol4.
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before the market for Countrywide stock plummeted and was later
charged with fraud.116 Through stock options, Mr. Mozilo could buy
cheaply and sell at the peak. 117 This gave him an incentive of hundreds of
millions of dollars to take the risks that ultimately brought the company
down.118
Conversely, investors were not privy to the inside information Mr.
Mozilo had. 119 According to FOXBusiness, "Countrywide portrayed it-
self as underwriting mainly prime-quality mortgages, using high under-
writing standards. But concealed from shareholders was the true
Countrywide, an increasingly reckless lender assuming greater and
greater risk.' 120 Mr. Mozilo's attorney asserted that Mr. Mozilo was not
aware of the problems with Countrywide's loan portfolio, but FOXBusi-
ness released a series of his e-mails in which Mr. Mozilo recognized the
"toxic" nature of the loans.121 When the stock of Countrywide plum-
meted, it was the investors who lost their sunk investment.
After Bank of America acquired Countrywide, it paid $8.6 billion to
settle lawsuits brought by the attorneys general of eleven states based on
Countrywide's predatory lending practices. 22 Apparently, one of the
reasons that Governor Schwarzenegger vetoed the California legislation
was that it would have imposed fiduciary duties upon mortgage brokers,
but not apply to mortgage lenders. 123 In point of fact, legislation is
needed not just to impose fiduciary duties upon mortgage brokers but
also to impose similar responsibilities upon lenders and their employees.
It is equally serious for the lender to misrepresent the terms of the trans-
action or to induce borrowers to enter into mortgages that they cannot
afford.
By way of illustration, one of the subprime lenders, Fremont Invest-
ment & Loan, was subjected to a cease-and-desist order by the FDIC that
required the lender not to make mortgage loans without adequately con-
sidering a borrowers' ability to repay the mortgage.' 24 In particular, the
lender was enjoined from qualifying borrowers for loans with low initial
payments based on an introductory rate that would expire after an initial
116. See Scannell & Emshwiller, supra note 114 ("Mr. Mozilo sold $130 million of
Countrywide stock in the first half of 2007 under an executive sales plan, according to
securities filings, compared with $60 million in the year-earlier period. He had modified his
prearranged plan in late 2006 to accelerate the sales."). According to FOXBusiness,
"Mozilo was widely criticized for selling some Countrywide stock for $140 million in profits
by exercising 5.1 million options and selling the underlying shares-in 2006 and 2007, just
as the mortgage market topped out." Peter Barnes & Joanna Ossinger, Countrywide Ex-
CEO Angelo Mozilo Charged with Fraud, FOXBUsINESS.COM (June 4, 2009), http://
www.foxbusiness.com/story/markets/countrywide-ceo-mozilo-charged-fraud/.
117. See Barnes & Ossinger, supra note 116.
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. See id. (quoting SEC Enforcement Director Robert Khuzami).
121. Id.
122. D'Souza & Emery, supra note 107.
123. See supra text accompanying note 72.
124. Order to Cease and Desist, In re Fremont Inv. & Loan, No. FDIC-07-035b (FDIC
Mar. 7, 2007), available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/enforcement/2007-03-00.pdf.
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period without an adequate analysis of the borrower's ability to repay the
debt at the fully-indexed rate; approving borrowers without considering
appropriate documentation and/or verification of their income; providing
borrowers with inadequate and/or confusing information; approving
loans with inadequate debt-to-income analyses that did not properly con-
sider borrowers' ability to repay; and approving loans with loan-to-value
ratios approaching or exceeding 100 percent of the value of the
collateral.125
Subprime lenders share a similarity with mortgage brokers. Both re-
ceive substantial upfront fees, enabling them to realize income at the
front end, without waiting for the borrower to begin making mortgage
payments that would translate into interest income on an ongoing basis.
In the abstract, there is nothing wrong with a lender charging points and
other reasonable upfront fees. But the availability of upfront fees accel-
erates income to the lender and provides an incentive for the lender to be
less concerned about the creditworthiness of the borrower.
Of the top twenty-five subprime lenders in 2006-2007, only five are still
in the lending business; the large majority, like Countrywide, are now
either insolvent or have been bought out at distressed prices. 126 Many of
these subprime lenders were "non-banks," that is, they did not accept
deposits.127 Accordingly, they were not regulated by the FDIC. Since
depositors were not providing the funds for these mortgage banks to
loan, their funding came in the way of lines of credit and other arrange-
ments with the major investment banks and commercial banks.' 28 The
role of the investment banks in funding these non-banks will be consid-
ered in a later part.
D. THE RESPONSE OF THE DODD-FRANK Acr TO THE CREATION OF
Toxic MORTGAGES
While critics of Dodd-Frank argue that the legislation involves govern-
mental intrusion into business and will stifle the economy, the foregoing
analysis demonstrates that we have not been able to rely upon the mort-
gage industry to determine whether a borrower has the capacity to make
the required loan payments. Liars' loans should never have existed.
Some sort of documentation always exists; the reason it was not sought
was that brokers and lenders were indifferent as to whether the loan
would be repaid-loans were created to be sold and the originator had
"no skin in the game."
125. Id.
126. See Who's Behind the Financial Meltdown?, CR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (May 6,
2009), http://www.publicintegrity.org/investigations/economicmeltdown/.
127. John Daber & David Donald, The Roots of the Financial Crisis: Who Is to Blame?,
C'rR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (May 6, 2009), http://www.publicintegrity.org/investigations/eco-
nomicmeltdown/articles/entry/1286.
128. See infra text accompanying notes 187-90.
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Had Dodd-Frank been in place at the turn of this century, the sub-
prime crisis probably would not have occurred. However, whether the
legislation goes far enough to prevent future crises is less clear.
Title 14, subtitle B, of the Financial Reform Act creates minimum stan-
dards for residential loan mortgages by amending the Truth in Lending
Act to add a new section 129C which would prohibit lenders from making
a loan unless the lender (1) "makes a reasonable and good faith determi-
nation" that is (2) "based on verified and documented information" that
... the consumer has a reasonable ability to repay the loan" including (3)
"taxes, insurance (including mortgage guarantee insurance), and assess-
ments. 1 29 Thus, in one short sentence, this new provision has three ele-
ments that could have prevented the subprime crisis had lenders utilized
it in the past.130 While it took many players to create and prolong the
crisis, stopping the origination of unsound loans would have nipped the
crisis in the bud by requiring verified information that supports a reason-
able belief that the customer can make the mortgage payments including
not just principal and interest but also taxes, insurance, and assess-
ments. 131 One would think that these requirements would be a no-
brainer; unfortunately, mortgage brokers and lenders were financially in-
centivized to ignore common sense.
The new Act also makes clear that the obligation to determine ability
to pay is based upon "a payment schedule that fully amortizes the loan
over the term of the loan."'1 32 In calculating the payment, the interest
rate over the entire term of the loan is to be "a fixed rate equal to the
fully indexed rate at the time of closing, without considering the introduc-
tory rate.' 33 Thus, for the so-called 2/28 or 3/27 mortgages with an initial
low teaser rate, the ability to pay cannot be predicated upon the initial
mortgage payment, which in turn is based upon the teaser rate. 34 As
discussed earlier, it was the resetting of the teaser rate, with a resulting
monthly payment that could double or triple the original payment, which
led to many mortgage defaults. 135
In the case of interest-only loans or pick-a-pay loans with a negative
amortization, there are specific provisions that require the ability to pay
to be predicated upon a fully amortizing repayment schedule.136 Thus,
the ability to repay cannot be finessed by assuming that the buyer has the
option of not paying interest and just adding the interest to principal. 137
This provision also would have barred many of the improvident loans that
ultimately defaulted. Pick-a-pay loans are another financial innovation
129. Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, § 1411 (2010) (to be codified in
scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. Id. § 129C(a)(3).
133. Id. § 129C(a)(6)(D)(iii).
134. See id.
135. See Edmiston & Zalneraitis, supra note 36, at 127-28.




that helped drive the economy into a financial meltdown.1 38
In the case of 2/28 or 3/27 loans, which the Act defines as a "hybrid
adjustable rate mortgage," six months before the reset, the creditor or
servicer of the loan must furnish the borrower with a notice that includes
the basis for the reset, "a good faith estimate" of the new monthly pay-
ment, "a list of alternatives" such as refinancing or pre-foreclosure sale,
and the names and contact information of consumer counseling agen-
cies. 139 This is designed to give the borrower a sufficient time frame to
adjust to the higher payments or to make alternative arrangements. 140
The new legislation not only would have effectively barred many im-
provident loans, but also would have restricted some of the incentives
that led to such loans. In particular, the new legislation would bar yield
spread premium or other compensation "based on the terms of the loan
(other than the amount of the principal)."'1 41 What this basically means is
that the compensation of a broker cannot be a function of inducing the
customer to enter into a more expensive loan with a higher rate.142 Many
subprime borrowers could have qualified for a conventional loan, but
mortgage brokers put them into a more expensive loan because of the
higher fees the subprime loans generated. 143
A mortgage originator is defined as a person who "takes a residential
mortgage loan application," or "assists a customer in obtaining or apply-
ing" for such a loan, or "offers or negotiates terms" of such a loan. 144
Thus, the term would include both a broker and a lender. 145 In general,
an originator cannot steer a customer to a loan that he or she does not
have the "ability to repay" or that is "predatory" in nature.146 An origi-
nator also cannot:
(i) mischaracteriz[e] the credit history of a consumer or the resi-
dential mortgage loans available to a consumer;
(ii) mischaracteriz[e] or subor[n] the mischaracterization of the ap-
praised value of the property securing the extension of credit; or
(iii) if unable to suggest, offer, or recommend to a consumer a loan
that is not more expensive than a loan for which the consumer
qualifies, discourag[e] a consumer from seeking a residential
mortgage loan secured by a consumer's principal dwelling from
138. See generally Edmiston & Zalneraitis, supra note 36.
139. Dodd-Frank § 1418.
140. See id.
141. Id. § 403; see also Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Fed-
eral Reserve Announces Final Rules to Protect Mortgage Borrower From Unfair, Abusive,
or Deceptive Lending Practices that Can Arise from Loan Originator Compensation Prac-
tices (Aug. 16, 2010), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/
20100816d.htm. On August 16, 2010, the Federal Reserve Board amended its Truth in
Lending Regulations, in effect, to provide mortgage brokers cannot be compensated by
both the borrower and lender, and that they cannot be compensated by quoting a higher
rate to the borrower in return for what in essence was a kickback from the lender.
142. See Dodd-Frank § 1403.
143. See Brooks & Simon, supra note 64.
144. Dodd-Frank § 1401.
145. See id.
146. Id. § 1402.
[Vol. 641268
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act
another mortgage originator.1 47
The first two restrictions are designed to preclude fraudulent transac-
tions, while the third is designed to stop the practice of steering customers
into expensive, subprime loans when they would qualify for a conven-
tional loan. 148 These provisions again should curtail loans that have been
prime candidates for default. There have been numerous enforcement
actions seeking to curtail the practice of inflated appraisals to justify a
loan to a borrower.1 49
Part of the opposition to a requirement that the broker and the lender
make a determination of the borrower's ability to repay has been based
upon the argument that this is a subjective issue and that the subsequent
events may push what had been a "good" loan into default. There is then
the concern that a prior determination would be judged by hindsight.
To remedy this, the Act introduces a safe harbor for "qualified mort-
gages."' 150 In general, a qualified mortgage is one that does not permit
negative amortization or contain a balloon payment, that is based upon
verified documentation of the borrower's ability to repay under a fully
amortizing payment schedule, that takes into account forthcoming regula-
tions relating to debt to income or other ratios, and it is a mortgage in
which the fees do not exceed 3%, and the term of the loan does not ex-
147. Id.
148. See id.
149. See supra note 56.
150. A qualified mortgage is one:
(i) for which the regular periodic payments for the loan may not
(I) result in an increase of the principal balance or;
(II) ... allow the consumer to defer repayment of principal;
(ii) ... the terms of which do not result in a balloon payment where a
'balloon payment' is a scheduled payment, that is more than twice as
large as the average of earlier scheduled payments;
(iii) for which the income and financial resources relied upon to qualify the
obligors on the loan are verified and documented;
(iv) in the case of a fixed rate loan, for which the underwriting process is
based on a payment schedule that fully amortizes the loan over the
loan term and takes into account all applicable taxes, insurance, and
assessments;
(v) in the case of an adjustable rate loan, for which the underwriting is
based on the maximum rate permitted under the loan during the first 5
years, and a payment schedule that fully amortizes the loan over the
loan term and takes into account all applicable taxes insurance, and
assessments;
(vi) that complies with any guidelines or regulations established by the
Board relating to ratios of total monthly debt to monthly income or
alternative measures of ability to pay regular expenses after payment
of total monthly debt, taking into account the income levels of the bor-
rower and such other factors as the Board may determine relevant ... ;
(vii) for which the total points and fees ... payable in connection with the
loan do not exceed 3 percent of the total loan amount;
(viii) for which the term of the loan does not exceed 30 years, except as such
term may be extended ... such as in high-cost areas; and
(ix) in the case of a reverse mortgage ... a reverse mortgage which meets
the standards for a qualified mortgage, as set by the Board in rules that
are consistent with the purposes of this subsection.
Id. § 1412 (adding § 129C(b)(2) to the Truth in Lending Act).
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ceed 30 years. 15'
If the mortgage is a qualified mortgage, the lender "and any assignee"
may assume that the determination of "ability to repay" has been met. 152
In addition, if a qualified loan is securitized, the retention requirements
of Subtitle D of Title IX are waived for the originator and the securi-
tizer. 153 This is discussed later in the Article.
From a liability perspective, Dodd-Frank provides for actual damages
of up to three times the compensation "accruing to the mortgage origina-
tor in connection with the loan," together with costs and a "reasonable"
attorney's fee, when there has been a violation of these provisions.' 5 4 In
addition, in foreclosure proceedings, the customer can assert a violation
by originator as a defense or setoff.155
The foregoing discussion that the provisions of Dodd-Frank would
have prevented the current crisis is qualified by the fact that many of the
requirements are subject to or are to be implemented by regulations to be
promulgated by the Federal Reserve Board or other administrative bod-
ies.156 Thus, it is not until these regulations are promulgated that a firm
determination can be made of the effectiveness of some aspects of the
legislation.
The creation of the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau should
also mitigate abusive mortgage lending practices.15 7 The Bureau may
make investigations 158 and conduct hearings,159 issue cease and desist or-
ders, and initiate litigation to prevent unfair, deceptive, or abusive prac-
tices.160 It can also prescribe rules identifying unfair, deceptive, or
abusive practices.' 61 However, the Act stringently defines 'unfairness' as
that which is likely to cause substantial, unavoidable injury to consumers
that is not outweighed by countervailing benefits or competition, and de-
fines 'abusive' as that which materially interferes with consumers' under-
standing or takes unreasonable advantage of a lack of consumer
understanding, or the inability of the consumer to protect himself.' 62
These standards could be a substantial restraint on the Bureau's ability to
promulgate meaningful rules curtailing unfair and abusive practices.
In view of the foregoing, Dodd-Frank is a reasoned and practical re-
sponse to many of the abuses involving the customer, the broker, and the
lender that led to the subprime crisis. But the subprime debacle could
151. Id.
152. Id. § 1412 (adding § 129C(b)(1) to the Truth in Lending Act).
153. Id. § 941(b).
154. Id. § 1404.
155. Id. § 1413.
156. See, e.g., id. § 1412.
157. Title X, the "Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010," creates a new "Bureau
of Consumer Financial Protection" (the Bureau) as an independent Bureau within the Fed-
eral Reserve System. See id. § 1011.
158. Id. § 1052.
159. Id. § 1053.
160. Id. §§ 1053-1055.
161. Id. § 1031.
162. Id.
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not have occurred without the instrumentality of the investment bankers
and others who facilitated the ability of lenders to get the loans off the
books by securitizing them. While the Act responds to some of the ac-
tions of these actors, many incentives toward taking excessive risks re-
main and the "too big to fail" scenario may not be foreclosed for the
future. These issues are addressed below.
V. THE SECURITIZATION PLAYERS: INVESTMENT
BANKERS, GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED ENTITIES,
AND CREDIT RATING AGENCIES
The subprime lenders would not have made the riskiest of loans if they
were not able to sell them into the securitization market. Once a loan
was sold, the lender could care less if the borrower could repay, since the
lender had made its profit and no longer had "any skin in the game."
Subprime loans generally were sold either to Fannie Mae or Freddie
Mac, sometimes referred to as government-sponsored enterprises, or to
investment banks that created what are sometimes known as private-label
securities (PLSs). However, investors would not have purchased these
exotic securities unless the credit rating agencies, particularly Moody's,
Standard & Poor's, and Fitch, provided their stamp of approval, fre-
quently in the form of a AAA rating.163
The roles of the GSEs, investment banks, and the credit rating agen-
cies, and the incentives that drove them, are analyzed below.
A. FANNIE MAE, FREDDIE MAC, AND THE INVESTMENT BANKS-THE
INCREASING ROLE OF THE INVESTMENT BANKS
There is no doubt that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the dominant
GSEs, committed serious errors of judgment and engaged in questionable
underwriting practices in the 2004-2007 period, and that risky lending and
securitization practices during this period were significant drivers of the
subprime crisis.164 As discussed earlier, the American Enterprise Insti-
tute laid the blame for the subprime crisis solely on the shoulders of Fan-
nie Mae and Freddie Mac. 165
Unfortunately, focusing solely upon the GSEs looks only at a small
part of the picture. First of all, the GSEs do not originate loans; they
guarantee or purchase loans. Second, the GSE standards for the mort-
gages they would buy were higher than the investment banks' standards.
Finally, not only did the investment banks purchase mortgages and
securitize them, but they also financed the non-banks that created many
163. See Elliot B. Smith, 'Race to the Bottom' At Moody's, S&P Secured Subprime's
Boom, Bust, BLOOMBERG, Sept. 25, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=2060
1109&sid=ax3vfya_Vtdo&refer=home.
164. See The Role of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the Financial Crisis: Hearing
Before the H. Oversight and Gov't Reform Comm., 110th Cong. (2008) (Statement of
Thomas Stanton, Fellow, Ctr. for the Study of Am. Gov't).
165. See supra text accompanying note 23.
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of the toxic mortgages and created, bought, and sold the derivatives that
exacerbated the financial meltdown. AEI failed to recognize that the in-
vestment banks were also a significant, if not major, cause of the sub-
prime crisis.
Mortgage-backed securities (MBS) increased from $3.161 trillion in
2000 to $4.55 trillion in 2003, a 44% increase. 166 However, from 2004 to
2007, mortgage-backed securities increased from $4.84 trillion to $7.42
trillion, an increase of over $2.5 trillion, or 53%. Overall, mortgage-
backed securities increased over $4.25 trillion, or 135%, from 2000 to
2007.167
Consider now the GSEs: Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac issued $1.88
trillion in 2000, about 60% of the total of mortgage-backed securities.
This increased to $3.01 trillion in 2003, or about 66% of the total. But
while the volume of mortgage-backed securities issued by these two
GSEs grew steadily from $3.09 trillion in 2004 to $4.02 trillion in 2007, the
impact of these GSEs dropped from 64% to 54%,168 since the private
investment banks had now become significant, if not dominant, partici-
pants in this market.
Then consider the private-label securities issued by the investment
banks: From 2000 to 2003, the investment banks were minor players. Pri-
vate-label securities grew from $0.67 trillion in 2000 to $1.06 trillion in
2003. But from 2004 to 2007, private-label securities grew from $1.29 tril-
lion $2.95 trillion, an increase of almost 130%. From 2000 to 2007 pri-
vate-label securities grew by an astounding 343%.169
From a relative perspective, between 2000 and 2003, private-label se-
curities as a percentage of the mortgage-backed securities increased mod-
estly from 21% to 23%.170 But from 2004 to 2007, the percentage of
private-label securities increased from 25% to 40%.171 However, even
though the investment bankers were no longer minor players, they still
were not equal to the GSEs in volume or percentage. Why then were
they so significant in causing the crisis?
There are four areas of culpability for the investment banks: (1) the
risky nature of the loans they securitized, (2) their financing of the sub-
prime lenders, particularly the so-called "non-banks," (3) the financial in-
centives provided to management, and (4) their sponsoring of derivatives.
The first three are addressed below; the fourth is considered separately in
a later section.
166. 1.54 Mortgage Dept Outstanding, FEDERALRESERVE.GOV, 1. 55 (Dec. 2004), http://
www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/supplement/2004/12/tablel_54.htm.
167. 1.54 Mortgage Debt Outstanding, FEDERALRESERVE.GOV, 1. 55, (June 2009), http://
www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/releases/mortoutstand/current.htm.
168. 1.54 Mortgage Debt Outstanding, FEDERALRESERVE.GOV, 1. 70, (Dec. 2004), http://
www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/supplement/2004/12/tablel_54.htm.
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1. The Risky Nature of Loans Securitized by Investment Banks
The complicity of the investment bankers in the subprime meltdown is
a function, not just of the volume of subprime loans that they securitized,
but also the quality of such loans. Keith Johnson, the former president of
Washington Mutual's Long Beach Mortgage, testified before the Finan-
cial Crisis Inquiry Commission that traditional lending platforms were
transformed into large financial factories: "Several of these factories were
originating, packaging, securitizing and selling at the rate of $1 billion a
day. The quality control process failed at a variety of stages during the
manufacturing, distribution and on-going servicing."'1 72 A study by Fan-
nie Mae on the comparative riskiness of Fannie Mae versus private-label
Alt-A loans is set forth in the table below.173
Fannie Mae Alt-A Versus Private-Label Security Conforming Alt-A
Fannie Mae Alt-A Private-Label Alt-A
Outstanding Alt-A loans Outstanding loans
in Fannie Mae's Single- backing non-agency
Family Guaranty Book of Conforming Alt-A MBS
Business as of May 2009 as of May 2009
FICO 718 710
Original Loan-to-Value Ratio 73% 75%
Combined Loan-to-Value










As of 2009, only 28% of the Fannie Mae loans were adjustable-rate
loans, whereas 50% of the private-label securities loans were. 174 As dis-
172. D. Keith Johnson, Testimony of Keith Johnson, Former President of Clayton Hold-
ings, Inc., and Former President of Washington Mutual's Long Beach Mortgage Before the
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (Sept. 23, 2010) (unpublished testimony), available at
http://fcic.laws.stanford.edu/hearings/testimony/the-impact-of-the-financial-crisis-
sacramento.
173. Fannie Mae Alt-A-Loans Versus Loan & Underlying Private Label Securities, 2009





cussed earlier, adjustable-rate loans were prime candidates for default
when their teaser rates reset and the mortgage payments doubled.175 In
addition, only 3% of the Fannie Mae loans were "pick-a-pay," or negative
amortization loans, whereas 20% of the private-label securities loans
were.' 76 If a borrower cannot even pay the interest at the outset of the
loan, when the loan resets to an amortization schedule at a higher interest
rate, the likelihood of default obviously increases dramatically.
The anticipated higher default rate for the private-label securities un-
derwritten by the investment banks is confirmed by the graph below. 177
CUMULATIVE DEFAULT RATES FOR FANNIE MAE ALT-A
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For each cohort of loans-2005, 2006, and 2007-the default rate for
the private label Alt-A loans is more than twice that of the Fannie Mae
Alt-A loans.' 78 The risky loans that the investment banks were willing to
securitize also had an impact on the practices of the GSEs. In 2003, Fan-
nie Mae lost 56% of its loan-reselling business to investment bankers and
other competitors. 79 Accordingly, the next year, Daniel Mudd, the CEO
of Fannie Mae, met with Angelo Mozilo, "the head of Countrywide Fi-
nancial, . . .which sold more loans to Fannie than anyone else."' 80
175. See Edmiston & Zalneraitis, supra note 36, at 127-28.
176. Fannie Mae, supra note 173, at 12.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Charles Duhigg, The Reckoning: Pressured to Take More Risk, Fannie Reached
Tipping Point, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 5, 2008, at Al.
180. Id.
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Mozilo "threatened to upend their partnership unless Fannie started buy-
ing Countrywide's riskier loans."'18 1 Since the investment banks were
moving heavily into the securitization business, this was no idle threat.'8 2
According to anonymous sources, Mozilo told Mudd, "you're becoming
irrelevant," and added that if Fannie Mae didn't take the loans that
Mozilo was pushing, "you'll find you can lose much more.' 8 3
2. Investment Bank Financing of Subprime Lenders
Besides securitizing loans, the investment banks, together with the
large commercial banks, were a major source of financing for the sub-
prime lenders.' 8 4 In addition, the investment banks also had subprime
lending subsidiaries: "Bear Stearns owned and operated EMC Mort-
gage," while "Merrill Lynch bought First Franklin, a non-bank lender that
used only independent loan brokers who were paid on commission;"' 8 5
"BNC Mortgage Inc. was part of Lehman Brothers."'81 6 However, more
significant was the fact that the investment and commercial banks funded
the operations of the non-bank subprime lenders.187 For example, the 10-
Q report for one of the non-bank lenders, New Century Financial Corpo-
ration, for the quarterly period ending June 30, 2006, disclosed:
We have credit facilities with Bank of America, N.A., Barclays Bank
PLC, Bear Stearns Mortgage Capital Corporation, Citigroup Global
Markets Realty Corp., Credit Suisse First Boston Mortgage Capital
LLC, Deutsche Bank Securities, Inc., IXIS Real Estate Capital Inc.
(formerly known as CDC Mortgage Capital Inc.), Morgan Stanley
Mortgage Capital Inc., UBS Real Estate Securities Inc., Goldman
Sachs Mortgage Company, State Street Bank and Trust Company
and Guaranty Bank, and we also have an asset-backed commercial
paper facility. We use these facilities to finance the actual funding of
our loan originations and purchases and to aggregate pools of mort-
gage loans pending sale through securitizations or whole loan sales.
We typically sell all of our mortgage loans within one to three
months of their funding and pay down the credit facilities with the
proceeds. 8 8
From a dollar standpoint, there was $3 billion from two lines of credit
from Bank of America, $1 billion from Barclays, $800 million from Bear
181. Id.
182. See id.
183. Id. This conversation did not dissuade Fannie Mae from aggressively pursuing
Countrywide's business and from buying risky loans. See Gretchen Morgenson, Housing
Policy's Third Rail, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2010, at BUL.
184. Id.
185. See Perkins, supra note 67.
186. Daber & Donald, supra note 127. In addition, some of the largest commercial
banks also had the subprime lending units, including Wells Fargo, JP Morgan Chase, Ci-
tigroup, and HSBC Holdings. Id.
187. See id.





Stearns, $1.5 billion from Credit Suisse First Boston, $3 billion from Mor-
gan Stanley, and $450 million from Goldman Sachs, as well as additional
billions from other major commercial banks.'8 9 The financial statements
of New Century for this period showed $9,303,086,000 of mortgage loans
held for sale and $8,786,300,000 of credit facilities on such loans.190 In
other words, the investment and commercial banks were providing al-
most 100% financing.
3. The Financial Incentives for Investment Banks
What drove the investment banks to fund the subprime lenders and
securitize their loans? It is the same incentive that drove the subprime
lenders: revenues translating to earnings, leading to stock appreciation
and executive compensation. For example, the stock performance of
Merrill Lynch from 2003 to 2008 is not unlike that of Countrywide:' 91
MERRILL LYNCH
120 T
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As illustrated by the above graph, Merrill Lynch stock had dropped into
the $30s around the start of 2003. After aggressively getting into the sub-
prime mortgage game, the stock rose into the $90s in 2007. However,
Merrill Lynch stock dropped precipitously when the subprime crisis un-
folded. While the Dow Jones industrial average increased about 50%
189. Id. at 67-69.
190. Id. at 5.
191. Since Merrill Lynch is no longer publicly traded, this graph was developed from
data available from Thomson Reuters' "Datastream." The code for Merrill Lynch is
922060. Cf stock price graph for Countrywide, supra note 108.
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from 2003 to 2007,192 this increase paled in comparison to that of Merrill
Lynch, which increased about 200%.193
There is a similar pattern with Wall Street bonuses, as disclosed by the
deputy comptroller of New York 194 which are graphed below:
The average Wall Street bonus increased from $74,140 in 2001 to
$99,930 in 2003. However, between 2003 and 2006, it almost doubled to
$190,600.195 Funding the subprime lenders and packaging subprime
mortgages into securities paid off handsomely during those years.' 96
Guidance by the Department of Treasury in 2010 recognized that
flawed incentive compensation practices in the banking industry were fac-
tors that led to the financial crisis. 197 The report opined:
Incentive compensation practices in the financial industry were one
of many factors contributing to the financial crisis that began in mid-
2007. Banking organizations too often rewarded employees for in-
creasing the organization's revenue or short-term profit without ade-
quate recognition of the risks the employees' activities posed to the
organization. These practices exacerbated the risks and losses at a
number of banking organizations and resulted in the misalignment of
the interests of employees with the long-term well-being and safety
and soundness of their organizations.198
192. See Dow Jones Industrial Average, YAHOO! FINANCE, http://finance.yahoo.com/
echarts?s= %5EDJI#chartl0:symbol= Adji;range=my;indicator=volume;charttype=line;
crosshair=on;ohlcvalues=0;logscale=on;source=undefined (last visited Aug. 24, 2011).
193. See supra text and graph accompanying note 191.
194. See Press Release, Office of the State Deputy Comptroller, New York City Sec.




197. Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Policies, 75 Fed. Reg. 36,395-02,




The guidance recognized that it was important to align management in-
centives with the interests of shareholders. However, while this may pro-
tect the safety of the organization, such alignment may not be enough to
address safety-and-soundness concerns. 199
In the previous section, it was asserted generally that stock options do
not align the interests of management with those of the shareholders. 200
The same lack of alignment also occurred in the banking industry. The
New York Times recently analyzed how shareholders and management
would fare after Merrill Lynch's "new" incentive plan was introduced in
2006.201 The Article stated that the incentive program "did not keep
workers from taking risks that nearly sank a brokerage giant. '202 But
many of the major risks were taken in the period 2004 to 2006, before the
plan went into effect, so the plan cannot be blamed for the earlier risks
that the employees took.20 3 However, it does demonstrate that the incen-
tive program did not align the interests of managers and shareholders.
The study compared a $2 million investment by private investors with a
$2 million investment by company management. 20 4 The executives would
have realized a $570,000 gain on their investment, or an annualized return
of 9%, whereas the private investors would have lost $1.55 million, or -
45% return on their investment. 205 The top six executives would have
lost money because they had a less favorable match of company contribu-
tions, but they still would have lost less than the private investors.206
B. THE TEPID RESPONSE OF DODD-FRANK TO THE
INVESTMENT BANKS
While the provisions of Dodd-Frank should curtail the creation of
toxic mortgages in the future, whether it will curtail the taking of exces-
sive risk in other circumstances is far less clear. Management of both the
mortgage banks and the investment banks were motivated to take what
ultimately turned out to be excessive risk driven by the desire for short-
term profits with little apparent risk because the mortgages could be sold
and securitized without recourse. While the toxic mortgages were rapidly
turned over, as the crisis unfolded, many of these banks were caught with
toxic instruments still on their books.
199. Id.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 113-14.
201. See Louise Story, In Merrill's Failed Plan, Lessons for Pay Czar, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
8, 2009, at B1 (summarizing Merill Lynch's compensation plan as follows: "Tie executives'
compensation to their company's stock price. Withhold big paydays for years. Claw back
bonuses if things go wrong. And force risk-loving traders to gamble with their own money,
not just their company's.").
202. Id.
203. See Stephen Labaton, The Reckoning: Agency's '04 Rule Let Banks Pile Up New
Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2008, at Al.
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Most of the major subprime lenders were "non-banks," that is, they did
not accept deposits, but rather were funded by loans from the commercial
and investment banks.20 7 After the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act,
commercial and investment banking activities often resided side by side
in the same institution.20 8 Thus, the public's deposits were put at risk,
leading to the charge that the banks took excessive risk with other peo-
ple's money. Because of the size and interconnectedness of the major
banks, they were deemed "too big to fail." °209
Putting derivatives aside for the time being, there are five issues that
true financial reform needed to address: (1) the lack of accountability by
operating on a no-recourse basis or, as said in the trade, having "no skin
in the game"; (2) management incentive programs, which encouraged ex-
cessive risk taking in the short run without accountability should the bets
turn sour in the long run; (3) undercapitalization of the major banks such
that, when the toxic assets on their books dropped in value, capital was
depleted, and the banks were legally, if not equitably, insolvent; (4) pro-
prietary trading, arguably with depositors' money; and (5) size and inter-
connectedness of such magnitude as to give rise to "too big to fail." Let
us consider each and the response of Dodd-Frank.
1. "No Skin in the Game" Versus Risk Retention
One reason mortgage banks and investment banks were so cavalier in
creating and securitizing toxic mortgages is that they perceived they had
no risk if the mortgage went into default since they would have sold off
the risk by securitizing the mortgage. Thus the characterization: "no skin
in the game." But, as the crisis has developed, investors have sought to
hold the investment banks accountable based upon misrepresentation
and failure to disclose the nature of the risks.210
Subtitle D of Title IX of Dodd-Frank imposes credit risk retention ob-
ligations in certain circumstances. It coordinates with Title XIV, dealing
with standards for mortgages211 by eliminating risk retention require-
ments for qualified residential mortgages,212 and provides that the defini-
207. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial Con-
glomerates and the Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN. L. REv. 963, 1017-19
(2009).
208. The Glass-Steagall Act was adopted in 1933 to separate commercial and invest-
ment banking. It was repealed in 1999 by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, which was lauded
at the time as a further step in the deregulation of financial institutions. See Reem Heakal,
What Was the Glass-Steagall Act?, INVESTOPEDIA.COM (July 16, 2003), http://
www.investopedia.com/articles/03/071603.asp (the author's positive comments about the
benefits of repeal were written prior to the current financial crisis).
209. See Steven M. Davidoff, The Too Big to Fail Quandry, DEALBOOK (Feb. 22, 2011),
http://www.dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/02/22/a-quandary-over-deeming-behemoths-too-
big-to-fail.
210. See Louise Story & Gretchen Morgenson, A.LG. to Sue Bank on Loss In Fiscal
Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2011, at Al.
211. See supra text accompanying notes 129-52.
212. Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 991(b), 124 Stat. 1376, 1892 (2010) (to be




tion of qualified mortgages under Title IX cannot be broader than the
definition under Title XIV.213 As discussed earlier, a qualified mortgage
is one in which the ability to repay is based upon verified documentation
and determined using a fully amortizing payment schedule, and where the
mortgage meets other standards relating to the term, fees, and appropri-
ate ratios relating to debt and income.2 14 For other asset-backed securi-
ties, regulations must establish a risk retention requirement of at least
5%,215 unless the originator of the loan meets standards promulgated by
future regulation that indicate a low credit risk. In such circumstances,
the risk retention can be less than 5%.216 The risk retention cannot be
hedged.217
The forthcoming regulations must also allocate the retained risk be-
tween the originator of the loan and the securitizer who packages loans
into securities 218 and should establish asset classes and underwriting stan-
dards for different classes of assets, such as residential mortgages, com-
mercial mortgages, commercial loans, auto loans, and other types of
assets.219
The 1934 Securities Exchange Act was also amended by the Financial
Reform Act to remove the exemption from registration for certain real
estate transactions220 and to enhance the disclosure obligations of the
securitizer with respect to each tranche or class of security. Such disclo-
sure should facilitate comparison of data across securities and, at a mini-
mum, disclose risk retention data and other appropriate data to enable
investors to do due diligence.221 A securitizer is also required to disclose
repurchase requests across all the securitizer's trusts so that investors will
be able to identify mortgage originators with weak or deficient underwrit-
ing standards. 222 Finally, the securitizer is required to perform a due dili-
gence review of the underlying assets and to disclose the nature of such
review. 223
All of the above is subject to implementation by rule making, and the
banking agencies and SEC can adopt "exemptions, exceptions, or adjust-
ments" for classes of institutions or assets.224 Since Congress was heavily
lobbied to eliminate risk retention in the legislation, we can expect the
regulatory agencies also to be heavily lobbied to minimize the impact of
213. Id. § 941(b)(adding § 15G(e)(4)(C) to the 1934 Securities Exchange Act).
214. See supra text accompanying notes 150-52.
215. Dodd-Frank § 941(b) (adding § 15G(c)(1)(B)(i) to the 1934 Securities Exchange
Act).
216. Id. (adding § 15G(c)(1)(B)(ii) to the 1934 Securities Exchange Act).
217. Id. (adding § 15G(c)(1)(A) to the 1934 Securities Exchange Act).
218. Id. (adding § 15G(d) to the 1934 Securities Exchange Act).
219. Id. (adding § 15G(c)(2) to the 1934 Securities Exchange Act).
220. Id. § 944(a) (deleting § 4(5) from the 1934 Securities Exchange Act).
221. Id. § 942(b) (adding § 7(c) to the 1933 Securities Act).
222. Id. § 943.
223. Id. § 945 (adding § 7(d) to the 1933 Securities Act). In January of this year, the
SEC promulgated Rule 193, implementing this provision. See Review of Underlying As-
sets in Asset-Backed Securities Transactions, 17 C.F.R. § 230.193 (2011).
224. Dodd-Frank § 945 (adding § 15G(e)(1) to the 1934 Securities Exchange Act).
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the legislation through weak rules.225
The efficacy of the above remains to be seen. The 5% standard itself is
not a substantial guarantee since it can be allocated between originator
and securitizer, both of which, as discussed earlier, often receive fees in
excess of 5%. If the retention is allocated equally, the originator and the
securitizer will each only have 2.5% of the risk. In the long run, the obli-
gation to do due diligence and to disclose the nature of such diligence
may have a more positive impact.
2. The "Tired" Solution to Executive Risk-Taking
This Article has already demonstrated that during 2004-2007, when the
bulk of the toxic mortgages were originated and securitized, the earnings
and stock prices of the subprime lenders and investment bankers
skyrocketed. So did Wall Street bonuses and the compensation of finan-
cial executives. In effect, these persons were being highly rewarded for
leading the nation into a financial crisis.
The Article has also pointed out that, contrary to conventional wisdom,
stock options do not align management incentives to those of sharehold-
ers. Shareholders have a sunk investment that they can lose in the long
term. Stock options provide management with the opportunity to hype
the price of stock without making an investment, then to exercise the
option and quickly get out if storm clouds appear on the horizon. The
Act's approach to management accountability is basically the same tired
and ineffective approach that Congress and the SEC have employed for
years without success: disclosure and supposedly independent compensa-
tion committees. With respect to compensation committees, the Act does
give the committee the authority to engage independent legal counsel
and other advisers. 226 This could be significant if the compensation com-
mittee is inclined to exercise independent judgment, which, unfortu-
nately, often it is not.227
225. See Eric Lichtblau, Ex-Regulators Get Set to Lobby on New Financial Rules, N.Y.
TIMES, July 27, 2010, at B1.
226. Dodd-Frank § 952(a) (adding § 1OC(d) to the 1934 Securities Exchange Act).
227. The Commission on Public Trust and Private Enterprise has stated:
In the area of executive compensation, the Commission shares the public's
anger over excessive compensation, especially to executives of failed or fail-
ing companies who may have garnered substantial compensation even as
their companies and the retirement savings of their employees have col-
lapsed. The additional collapse of the dot-coin market and the abrupt halt of
the raging bull market of the 1990s (with its unsustainable growth and un-
realistic price/earnings ratios) have also contributed to an unprecedented loss
of confidence in the stock market and in corporate America.
THE CONFERENCE BD., COMMISSION ON PUBLIC TRUST AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISE EXECU-
TIVE SUMMARY 1, 4 (2003), available at http://www.conference-board.org/pdf-free/SR-03-
04-ES.pdf.
The Commission stated that its recommendations:
are based on perceptions of lax board and compensation committee over-
sight, skewed relationships between consultants and compensation commit-
tees, failure to effectively tie compensation to long-term corporate growth
and success, and excessive use of fixed-price stock options whose value re-
2011] 1281
SMU LAW REVIEW
One positive addition to the disclosure requirements is that disclosures
are now required to provide information showing "the relationship be-
tween executive compensation actually paid and that the financial per-
formance of the issuer. ' 228 This is an effort to introduce some rationality
and accountability into executive compensation. The Act also requires
disclosure of the ratio of the CEO's compensation to that of the median
pay of other employees. 229 This may produce some shocking results. In
2001, Business Week reported that "loin average, CEOs at 365 of the
largest publicly traded U.S. companies earned $13.1 million last year, or
531 times what the typical hourly employee took home. '230 In the past
decade, the spread is even greater, as CEO compensation has risen and
employee compensation has been essentially flat.231
Dodd-Frank does require financial institutions to disclose "the struc-
ture of all incentive-based compensation arrangements" (but not the ac-
tual compensation of particular individuals, although the SEC rules do
require disclosure of the compensation of the top five executive of-
lated more to short-term stock price gains than to long-term performance
goals.
Id. at 6. It then asserted that there was a delinking of compensation and performance and
that excessive use of stock options, in which executive had little downside risk, encouraged
excessive risk-taking:
The Commission believes that in the executive compensation area there has
been a "perfect storm"-a confluence of events that created an environment
ripe for abuse. The excessive use of stock options-especially fixed-price op-
tions-was encouraged by the fact that they did not result in a charge to
earnings while providing substantial tax deductions. In the unprecedented
bull market of the 1990s, the substantial use of stock options and other eq-
uity-based incentives resulted in an enormous incentive to manage compa-
nies for short-term stock price gains and led to massive unanticipated gains in
options unrelated to management's operating performance. In sum, execu-
tive compensation has become too "de-linked" from long-term performance
goals in many corporations. There is an imbalance between unprecedented
levels of executive compensation, with little apparent financial downside risk
or relationship of this compensation to long-term company performance. Fi-
nally, there is a widespread public perception of unfairness associated with
the perceived ability of corporate executives to cash in stock even as their
companies and the retirement savings of their employees have collapsed.
Id.
228. Dodd-Frank § 953(a) (adding § 14(i) to the 1934 Securities Exchange Act).
229. Id. § 953(b).
230. Eric Wahlgren, Spreading the Yankee Way of Pay, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK
(Apr. 18, 2001), http://www.businessweek.com/careers/content/apr200/ca20010419_812.
htm (The article further reported that, for Britain, the CEO compensation ratio as a multi-
ple of average employee compensation was only 25 and for France, only 16.).
231. See David Leonhardt, A Decade With No Income Gains, NYTMES.COM, Sept. 10,
2009, http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/09/10/a-decade-with-no-income-gain/ (In
October 2011, the Congressional Budget Office reported that, for the period 1979-2007,
income of the top 1% of the population grew by 275%. Income for the balance of the top
quintile grew by 65%, whereas the income for the middle 60% of the population grew by
only 40%. For the bottom 20% of the population, income growth was only 18%. Trends in
the Distribution of Household Income between 1979-2007, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OF-
FICE (Oct. 2011), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/124xx/doc12485/10-25-Household
Income.pdf.
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ficers)232 and requires federal regulators to prescribe regulations or
guidelines that prohibit an incentive provision that "encourages inappro-
priate risks" through "excessive compensation," or that could lead to
"material financial loss." '233 There is also a new requirement that compa-
nies disclose whether any employee or director is permitted to purchase
financial instruments enabling the person to hedge the value of the com-
pany stock in the event of a decline in value.234 This could make execu-
tives more cautious in undertaking risk since they would not be able to
hedge a drop in stock price. Note, however, that hedging is not prohib-
ited; rather, it only must be disclosed.
The Act also adds a non-binding shareholder vote on compensation
every three years. 235 While these provisions are positive, what is really
needed, at a minimum, is a rigorous clawback 236 provision such that,
when history shows that bonuses or stock options were not earned, the
company can recoup the compensation paid or void the options granted.
The Act makes a token step in that direction. It provides that, when a
company is required to restate its financial statements because of mate-
rial non-compliance with the disclosure requirements of the securities
laws, the company may recover from any current or former executive of-
ficer "who received incentive-based compensation during the 3-year pe-
riod preceding the date on which the issuer is required to prepare an
accounting restatement based on the erroneous data" in excess of that
which would have been paid to the executive officer under the accounting
232. Rule 14-3 of the proxy rules, which requires the proxy statement to include the
information in Schedule 14A, Item 8 of which requires the information specified in Item
402 of Regulation S-K, which in turn requires disclosure of the compensation of the Princi-
pal Executive Officer, the Principal Financial Officer, and the three most highly compen-
sated executive officers other than the foregoing. See Information To be Furnished to
Security Holders, 17 C.F.R. § 214,14a-3 (2010); Item 8. Compensation of Directors and
Officers, 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-101 (2010); Persons Covered, 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2010).
233. Dodd-Frank § 956(a), (b) (emphasis added).
234. Id. § 955 (adding § 14(j) to the 1934 Securities Exchange Act). A study by The
New York Times disclosed that many Wall Street executives reduce the risk of the stock
they received as compensation through various hedging strategies. See Eric Dash, Stock-
Hedging Lets Bankers Skirt Efforts to Overhaul Pay, DEALBOOK (Feb. 6, 2011), http://
dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/02/05/stock-hedging-lets-bankers-skirt-efforts-to-overhaul-
pay/. While Bank of America bans all employees from hedging their company's stock,
"most big banks-including JP Morgan Chase, Morgan Stanley, and Goldman Sachs-
prohibit only their highest ranking executives from such transactions." Id. One Goldman
investment banker avoided more than seven million dollars in losses over a four-month
period. Id.
235. Dodd-Frank § 951 (adding § 14A to the 1934 Securities Exchange Act).
236. The Department of the Treasury gives the following explanation of a clawback:
The deferral-of-payment method is sometimes referred to in the industry as a
"clawback." The term "clawback" also may refer specifically to an arrange-
ment under which an employee must return incentive compensation pay-
ments previously received by the employee (and not just deferred) if certain
risk outcomes occur. Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (15
U.S.C. § 7243), which applies to chief executive officers and chief financial
officers of public banking organizations, is an example of this more specific
type of "clawback" requirement. Guidance on Sound Compensation Poli-




For this clawback to be triggered, first of all, there must be a restate-
ment of earnings; moreover, the restatement must be predicated upon a
violation of the disclosure provisions of the securities laws. Then there is
the quoted material above: how far back will the clawback reach? More-
over, since this provision applies only to executive officers, it would not
cover the traders whose risk-taking contributed to the crisis, but who
were extraordinarily well-compensated for taking such risks.
Consider Mozilo of Countrywide. His company, under his direction,
loosened underwriting standards beginning in 2003. From January 2004
until mid-2007, the stock soared, as did Mozilo's compensation. The au-
dit of Countrywide's 2007 fiscal year typically would not be completed
until the second quarter of 2008, or later if a restatement was required.
The restatement could be issued in 2008. Would a loosening of under-
writing standards compel a restatement? If not, would the restatement be
required because of a violation of the securities laws? Who would have
the burden of proof? What would be the period covered by the
clawback? Could it reach back to 2003 or 2004? These conditions and
uncertainties undercut the effectiveness of the clawback provision.
Or consider the bank bonuses that were given from late 2008 up to the
enactment of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009.238
Kenneth R. Feinberg, the Special Master for TARP Executive Compen-
sation (sometimes referred to as the "Pay Czar"), analyzed $1.7 billion of
compensation paid to bank executives who made more than $500,000 per
year. 239 Many of these banks had received billions of dollars of payments
to keep them afloat from the $700 billion bailout fund.240 According to
press reports, Mr. Feinberg found that 80% of the compensation was un-
merited.241 Even though these bonuses, in many instances, were given to
the players who helped cause the economic crisis, Mr. Feinberg deter-
mined that the payments were legal. 242
Mr. Feinberg recommended that the compensation committee of a
company's board of directors should have the authority to restructure,
reduce, or cancel pending payments to executives if the company's board
of directors has identified that the company is in a crisis situation.243 This
237. Dodd-Frank § 954 (adding § 10D (b) to the 1934 Securities Exchange Act).
238. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123
Stat. 115 (2009).
239. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, The Special Master for TARP Exec-
utive Compensation Concludes the Review of Prior Payments (July 23, 2010), http://
www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg786.aspx.
240. See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 101,
122 Stat. 3765 (2008). Passed by the Senate on October 1, 2008, by the House on October
3, 2008, and signed into law by President Bush on October 3, 2008. See Kimberly Amadeo,
What Exactly Was the Bank Bailout Bill?, ABOUT.CoM (May 23, 2011), http://useconomy.
about.com/od/criticalssues/a/govt bailout.htm.
241. Eric Dash, Federal Report Faults Banks on Huge Bonuses, N.Y. TIMES, July 23,
2010, at Al.
242. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, supra note 239.
243. Id.
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authority would supersede any rights and entitlements executives would
otherwise have.244 But, as discussed above, this places considerable faith
in compensation committees. There is concern that this leaves too much
discretion with the company. 245
What is needed is a legislative fix that would require that incentive
compensation earned in any year vests in 20% increments over five years,
and that stock obtained through the exercise of stock options is similarly
alienable only in 20% annual increments. If it were discovered that the
compensation was not really earned, the company would be able to void
the unexercised portion of the option or cancel the stock still held by the
executive, among other remedies. This would convert the horizon of the
executives or other employees into a long-term one. While this could be
done on an ad hoc basis by the compensation committees, there could be
a reluctance to do this out of concern that other companies would use
their weaker constraints as a recruiting tool.
The guidance of the federal banking regulators recognized that the
deferral is one method to make compensation more sensitive to risk.
Deferral means:
The actual payout of an award to an employee is delayed signifi-
cantly beyond the end of the performance period, and the amounts
paid are adjusted for actual losses or other aspects of performance
that are realized or become better known only during the deferral
period. Deferred payouts may be altered according to risk outcomes
either formulaically or judgmentally, subject to appropriate over-
sight. To be most effective, the deferral period should be sufficiently
long to allow for the realization of a substantial portion of the risks
from employee activities, and the measures of loss should be clearly
explained to employees and closely tied to their activities during the
relevant performance period. 246
Paradoxically, a recent study by the Council of Institutional Investors
that compared the Wall Street banks to the Fortune 50 companies found
that the Wall Street banks had long restriction periods that applied to
much of equity compensation and that such pay practices, which entail
substantial exposure to stock price volatility, should have prevented se-
nior executives from taking excessive risks with shareowners' money.247
However, the study also found that weak clawbacks, excessively high
levels of compensation, and lack of correlation with long-term perform-
ance offset the effect of long deferral periods:
244. Id.
245. Editorial, Bankers' Pay, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2010, at A22.
246. Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Policies, 75 Fed. Reg. 36,395-02,
36,409 (2010).
247. PAUL HODGSON, COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS, WALL STREET PAY:





In sum, the lack of long-term performance measurement on Wall
Street and high absolute levels of compensation likely helped to fuel
excessive risk-taking. Large amounts of compensation were deliv-
ered without restrictions and based on short-term performance.
Such payouts were partly a legacy of the banks' origins as partner-
ships-but without the moderating element of partner-ownership. 2
48
The median compensation for Wall Street CEOs was $30,460,451, while
the median compensation for the Fortune 50 CEOs was $11,835,175.249
The study also found that the forfeiture and clawback provisions for the
Wall Street executives were less stringent than those of their European
counterparts.250
Another study in 2010, focusing upon Bear Stearns and Lehman Broth-
ers, explains why retention alone does not prevent excessive risk taking
by management:
As to shares, Bear Stearns and Lehman did have substantial limita-
tions on unloading, which was permitted only five years after vesting.
With such limitations, executives who are in their first or second year
of their service would not attach any weight to short-term prices.
However, when a firm's top executives serve for many years, as was
largely the case with Bear Stearns and Lehman's executives, such
arrangements will not prevent executives who have served the com-
pany for a long time (and who consequently have some awarded
shares they are free to unload) from placing a significant weight on
short-tem [sic] prices. 251
The study concluded that "[t]he executives' regular cashing out of eq-
uity incentives provided them with incentives to attach weight to short-
term results. '252
A broader study of fourteen major financial institutions supported the
previously-discussed analysis and reported:
As a group these CEOs bought shares of their respective banks 73
times during 2000-2008, but sold their shares 2,048 times during the
same period. In dollar terms, they purchased shares worth $36 mil-
lion but sold shares worth $3,467 million during 2000-2008. In addi-
tion, CEOs acquired stock by exercising options 470 times during the
2000-2008 period at a total cost of $1,660 million. Because they typi-
cally paired these option exercises with open market sales, they did
not necessarily invest $1,660 million of (pre-sale) cash to acquire
these shares.253
248. Id. at 2.
249. Id. at 6.
250. Id. at 18.
251. Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Holger Spamann, The Wages of Failure: Exec-
utive Compensation at Bear Stearns and Lehman 2000-2008 26 (Harvard John M. Olin Ctr.
for Law, Econ., & Bus., Finance Working Paper No. 287/2010, 2010) (Bebchuk analysis),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1513522.
252. Id.
253. Sanjai Bhagat & Brian Bolton, Bank Executive Compensation and Capital Re-
quirements Reform 15 (Jan. 2011) (unpublished working paper), available at http://Ieeds-
faculty.colorado.edu/bhagat/BankComp-Capital-Jan20ll.pdf.
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A similar approach, clawbacks, forfeitures, and tie-in to long term per-
formance, should be taken with regard to traders. 254 If a trader wins in
odd years but loses big in even years, there is no benefit to the company,
but the risk-taking trader could be handsomely rewarded.255 It would be
preferable if issues such as these could be left to the boards of directors
and their compensation committees, but, as discussed above, a board
could be concerned about executive and employee retention if its stan-
dards were more stringent than the norm. Since directors frequently are
executives of other companies, they also have a structural bias in favor of
excessive compensation and weak accountability.
3. Inadequate Capitalization
One of the reasons some financial institutions were in jeopardy was
that they had inadequate capital. If capital is inadequate, a drop in the
value of the assets an institution holds could render it insolvent. This is
illustrated by the simple illustration below, where a bank holds mortgages
supposedly worth 90:
Assets Liabilities
Mortgages 90 Debt (Deposits) 80
Cash 1i Capital 2-0
Total 100 Total 100
But what if those mortgages are only worth 70 instead of 90?
Asses Liabilities
Mortgages 70 Debt (deposits) 80
Cash 10 Capital Q
Total 80 Total 80
At this point, the bank has no capital.
This is essentially what happened in the current financial crisis. As the
value of real estate dropped, so did the value of the mortgage-backed
securities and collateralized debt obligations. In effect, assets disap-
peared from the bank's balance sheet, leaving capital impaired. During
the 2000s, the ratio of total assets to capital for Merrill Lynch and Morgan
Stanley went from 19:1 and 22:1, respectively, in 2000, to 32:1 and 33:1 in
254. Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Policies, 75 Fed. Reg. 36,395-02,
36,407 (final guidance June 25, 2010) (giving the example of "individual employees, includ-
ing non-executive employees, whose activities may expose the organization to material
amounts of risk (e.g., traders with large position limits relative to the organization's overall
risk tolerance)").
255. See Tyler Cowen, The Inequality That Matters, THE AM. INTEREST, Jan.-Feb. 2011




2007.256 Additionally, Bear Stearns's 2007 ratio was even higher at 34:1,
while Lehman Brothers was 31:1.257 This undercapitalization was facili-
tated by the SEC, which, in 2004, modified the net capital rules for bro-
kers to enable five major firms to about double their leverage. 258
When a firm's leverage ratio is in the mid-thirties, a 3% drop in the
value of assets could impair its capital. The relationship between the lev-
erage ratio and drop in the value of the assets necessary to wipe out a
bank's capital is illustrated by the graph below: 25 9
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In addition, banks have sought to reduce the capital they needed to
employ by a variety of techniques, as discussed below. Why is it that the
banks wanted to end-run capital requirements? In the old days, referenc-
ing the simplified balance sheet above, a bank's mortgage assets would be
supported by the deposits of the public and the capital provided by share-
holders; the bank's income would result from the spread between the in-
terest it received from the mortgages and the interest it was required to
256. See BARTH & YAGO, supra note 59; see also The Meeting behind the U.S. Banking
Crisis, BOoM2BUST.COM (Nov. 11, 2008), http://web.archive.org/web/20090218181110/http:/
/www.boom2bust.com/2008/11/11/the-meeting-that-caused-so-much-financial-chaos/.
257. BARTH & YAGO, supra note 59.
258. See Julie Satow, Ex-SEC Official Blames Agency for Blow-Up of Broker Dealers,
N.Y. SUN, Sept. 18, 2008, http://www.nysun.com/business/ex-sec-official-blames-agency-for-
blow-up/86130/; see also Lee A. Pickard, SEC's Old Capital Approach Was Tried - and
True, 173 AM. BANKER, Aug. 8, 2008.
259. Ezra Klein, Explaining Financial Regulation: Leverage and Capital Requirements,
WASH. POST, Apr. 19, 2010, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/ezra-klein/2010/04/explain-
ing-financial-regulatio.html.
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pay depositors. But if the bank were required to hold only half the capi-
tal, the return on capital would roughly double in contrast with the simple
model above.
Under the Basel II Accord, banks were to have an 8% capital buffer
against their risk-adjusted assets.260 This was adjusted to 10% in the
United States in order for a bank to be "well capitalized."'2 6 1 This would
seem to indicate a 10:1 asset/equity ratio, or a 9:1 debt/equity ratio. How-
ever, the key is the phrase "risk-adjusted assets." AAA-rated securities
supposedly had half the risk of mortgages and thus required only half the
capital.2 62 This was the driving force for banks holding billions of dollars
of AAA-rated CDOs, which, as events unfolded, were not so riskless.
Another technique to end-run capital requirements was to sell the
mortgage loans or CDOs to a structured investment vehicle (SIV).263
The SIV would fund the purchase with asset-backed commercial paper,
which would carry a low interest rate and thus provide an arbitrage profit
for the bank.2 64 However, the bank had to provide a guarantee to the
buyers.2 65 Since the guarantees were short-term, but were rolled over,
the bank was able to end-run the Basel capital requirements. 266 Thus, the
assets were supposedly off the balance sheet of the bank for regulatory
purposes, but the bank still had the liability therefor. 267
A third technique to end-run regulatory capital requirements was to
issue something called trust-preferred securities. The securities are a hy-
brid of a debt security issued by a bank to a trust or subsidiary it creates
and a preferred stock issued by the trust.268 The bank seeks to deduct the
interest paid on the debt for tax purposes, but can count the debt as capi-
tal for regulatory purposes since it is subordinate to all other debt.269 As
260. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF
CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS: A REVISED FRAMEWORK 12 (2006),
available at http://www.gis.org/publfbcbs128.pdf; see also COUNCIL OF MORTGAGE LEND-
ERS, BASEL 1I-A GUIDE TO CAPITAL ADEQUACY STANDARDS FOR LENDERS 2010, availa-
ble at http://www.cml.org.uk/cml/policy/issues/748.
261. See Capital Measures and Capital Category Definitions, 12 C.F.R. § 208.43 (2010).
262. Viral V. Acharya & Matthew Richardson, Causes of the Financial Crisis, 21 CRITI-
CAL REV. 195, 202 (2009), available at http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/communications/
pdf/2009/14150909/Session%202%20-%20P%20-%2OViral%20Acharya-2%5B1 %5D.pdf.
263. A structured investment vehicle is a leveraged special purpose vehicle, funded
through medium-term notes and asset-backed commercial paper, that invested in highly
rated securities. A special purpose vehicle is an entity that is created to fulfill a narrow or
temporary objective; typically holds a portfolio of assets such as mortgage-backed securi-
ties or other debt obligations; often used because of regulatory and bankruptcy advantages.
See FCIC REPORT, supra note 24, at 543.
264. Robert F. Webner, New Governance, Financial Regulation, and Challenges to Le-
gitimacy: The Example of the International Models Approach to Capital Adequacy Regula-




268. Michael D. Waters & W. Brad Neighbors, Trust Preferred Securities: A Viable Op-
tion in a Capital Crunch, BANKING TRADITIONS, Fall 2008, at 26.
269. Id. at 26-27.
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of 2007, there were about $160 billion of such securities outstanding.270
Today, many trust-preferred securities are trading at a fraction of their
issue price.27 1 While major banks, such as Citicorp, 272 issued billions of
dollars in such securities between 2000 and 2008, more than 1,500 small
and regional banks issued about $50 billion.2 73
If capital inadequacy is to be addressed, so also must the end-runs
which have enabled banks to hide capital inadequacy.
The response of Dodd-Frank once again was basically to punt to the
regulators. Section 171 of the Act provides that the appropriate federal
banking agencies shall establish "minimum leverage capital require-
ments" 274 (the numerator of which includes the regulatory capital compo-
nents and denominator of which includes the average total assets) 2 75 and
"minimum risk-based capital requirements. '2 76 These cannot be less than
the "generally applicable" requirements, which are tied into the regula-
tion of insured depository institutions "under the prompt corrective ac-
tion regulations implementing section 38 of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act. '27 7
While the legislation leaves most of the determinations to the regula-
tors, since trust-preferred securities have not been counted as capital for
depositary institutions, in effect this precludes the use in the future of
trust-preferred securities as capital. However, since Senator Susan Col-
lins was concerned about smaller banking institutions and wanted to level
the playing field for smaller banks,278 the Act as agreed to in conference
provided that small bank holding companies, i.e., those with less than
$500 million of assets, would still be permitted to continue using these
securities and having them count as tier 1 capital; it also grandfathered
securities issued before May 19, 2010, for bank holding companies with
less than $15 billion of assets and provided a three-year phase-in period
for larger bank holding companies. 27 9
The foregoing was not an entirely satisfactory solution for many who
were concerned with the failure of federal regulators to arrest excessive
leverage in the past. Representative Speier sought to include a measure
270. Bill Sammon, Raising Capital Via Trust Preferred Securities, INDEP. BANKER, Mar.
2008, at 104.
271. Andrew Bary, It Only Looks like a Wipeout, BARRON'S (Feb. 9, 2009), http://on-
line.barrons.com/article/SB123397130260259379.html.
272. Id.
273. Robin Sidel, Big Problem for Small Banks: Trust-Preferred, MARKETWATCH (Feb.
11, 2010), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/small-banks-big-problems-trust-preferreds-
2010-02-11-184400.
274. Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 171(bO(1), 124 Stat. 1376, 1436 (2010).
275. Id. § 171 (a)(1)(B).
276. Id. § 171 (b)(2).
277. Id. § 171 (a)(1)(A) & (a)(2)(A).
278. Clarity on the Collins Amendment, INDEP. BANKERS Assoc. OF TEX. (May 24,
2010), http://www.ibat.org/news/2010/05/24/clarity-collins-amendment.
279. Dodd-Frank § 171 (b)(4), (5).
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that would have capped leverage at large financial institutions at 15:1.280
She stated, "high leverage has been shown to have been one of the best
predictors of major financial firms' falling into distress or needing govern-
ment support during the current crisis. I believe that it is a mistake to
leave all discretion in how to accomplish that task to the primary regula-
tors."'28 1 Nevertheless, the basic issue of adequate capital for financial
institutions has been left to the regulators.
4. Proprietary Trading and the Volcker Rule
Paul Krugman, a Nobel Prize-winning economist, has opined that com-
mercial banking ought to be boring.282 And so it was, from 1933 when
the Glass-Steagall Act was passed 283 until 1980 when President Reagan
opined that "government is not the solution; government, is the prob-
lem,"'284 and began deregulating the financial industry. This resulted in
the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s. 285 The pattern of bank failures is
reflected in the graph below.
BANK FAILURES AND SUSPENSIONS, 1864-2009
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280. Ronald D. Orol, How a Cap on Big-Bank Leverage Was Watered Down, MARKET
WATCH (July 13, 2010), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/story/print?guid=77F02012-
3252-416C-95DF-1679466F39B0.
281. Id.
282. Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., Good and Boring, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2010, at A19.
283. Glass-Steagall Act, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/times-
topics/subjects/g/glass-steagallact_1933/index.html (last visited Aug. 29, 2011).
284. President Ronald Reagan, First Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1981).
285. See, e.g., FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., AN EXAMINATION OF THE BANNING CRISES OF




In the 1990s, President Clinton, at the urging of Chairman Greenspan,
Secretary of the Treasury Rubin, and his deputy, Lawrence Summers, ac-
complished the repeal of Glass-Steagall2 86 and thwarted efforts by
Brooksley Born, the chair of the Commodities Futures Trading Commis-
sion, to regulate derivatives. 287 This was a major contributor to the cur-
rent financial crisis.
While it has proved profitable in the short run, the marriage of com-
mercial banking and investment banking is actually a marriage made in
hell. There are two entirely different risk profiles associated with the two
types of banking. Commercial banking ought to be conservative or, as
Mr. Krugman suggests, boring, with a focus on lending and protecting the
safety of the public's deposits. 288 One reason that collateralized loan ob-
ligations (CLOs) have not had the default history of the CDOs is that the
loans undergirding the former were made to businesses with whom the
commercial lender typically had a long-standing relationship, the com-
mercial lender did due diligence, and the lender kept a piece of the ac-
tion. On the other hand, CDOs typically involved residential mortgage
loans made by a non-bank lender with no relationship to the borrower,
who cared less about the underlying safety of the loan, and who sold it to
get rid of the risk. CLOs represented appropriate risk; CDOs repre-
sented excessive risk.
When commercial banks (and non-banks) adopted the risk-taking in-
stincts of the investment bankers, they lost their compasses, failed to do
due diligence, and moved into the supposedly more lucrative activity of
trading.289 By its very nature, trading is a risky enterprise with the possi-
Most political, legislative, and regulatory decisions in the early 1980s were
imbued with a spirit of deregulation. The prevailing view was that S&Ls
should be granted regulatory forbearance until interest rates returned to nor-
mal levels, when thrifts would be able to restructure their portfolios with new
asset powers. To forestall actual insolvency, therefore, the FHLBB lowered
net worth requirements for federally insured savings and loan associations
from 5 percent of insured accounts to 4 percent in November 1980 and to 3
percent in January 1982. At the same time, the existing 20-year phase-in rule
for meeting the net worth requirement, and the 5-year-averaging rule for
computing the deposit base, were retained. The phase-in rule meant that
S&Ls less than 20 years old had capital requirements even lower than 3 per-
cent. This made chartering de novo federal stock institutions very attractive
because the required $2.0 million initial capital investment could be lever-
aged into $1.3 billion in assets by the end of the first year in operation. The
5-year-averaging rule, too, encouraged rapid deposit growth at S&Ls, be-
cause the net worth requirement was based not on the institution's existing
deposits but on the average of the previous five years.
Id. (citations omitted).
286. Daniel Gross, Shattering the Glass-Steagall: The Rise of the Commercial Banks,
SLATE (Sept. 15, 2008), http://www.slate.com/id/22001481.
287. See Brooksley Born & the Regulatory Limit of Democrats, COBa (Nov. 11, 2008),
http://cobb.typepad.com/cobb/2008/l1/brooksley-born.html; Peter S. Goodman, The Reck-
oning: Taking Hard New Look at a Greenspan Legacy, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 8, 2008, at Al.
288. Krugman, supra note 282.
289. Investment banks no longer make the bulk of their earnings from underwriting
public offerings, but rather from trading activities. See, e.g., Brady Dennis, JP Morgan
Reports 57 Percent Jump in Quarterly Profit, WASH. POST, April 15, 2010, at A18 ("Trading
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bility of millions being earned or lost on a particular trade. It was the
investment banking mentality, imported into banks such as Citicorp, and
their subsequent bailout by the federal government that led to charges
that profit has been privatized and risk has been socialized.
The Volcker rule, 290 which would have in part separated trading activi-
ties and banking activities, was supposedly dead in the water in early
2010.291 However, while there are different views as to the extent propri-
etary trading contributed to the financial meltdown,292 a version of the
Volcker rule was incorporated into Dodd-Frank.
Section 619 of the Financial Reform Act begins boldly by adding sec-
tion 13 to the Bank Holding Company Act 293 to impose what appears to
be an absolute prohibition on proprietary trading and holding an interest
in or sponsoring a hedge fund or a private equity fund:
(A) IN GENERAL:
(1) PROHIBITION - Unless otherwise provided in this section, a
banking entity shall not -
(A) engage in proprietary trading; or
(B) acquire or retain any equity, partnership, or other owner-
ship interest in or sponsor a hedge fund or a private equity
fund.
2 9 4
This seemingly absolute prohibition is also applied to non-bank finan-
cial companies. 295 But, the key words are "in general" and "unless other-
wise provided." The Act then mandates a six-month study and follow-up
profits in its investment bank helped offset continued consumer credit losses tied to mort-
gages and credit cards."), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/
14/AR2010041400981.html; Morgan Stanley Shares Rise Most in a Year on Earnings,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Jul. 21, 2010), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-07-
21/morgan-stanley-shares-rise-most-in-a-year-on-earnings.html ("Trading is still the pre-
dominant driver of Morgan Stanley's business"-$1.42 billion in equity trading; $1.7 billion
in fixed-income sales and trading; $885 million from investment banking).
290. See Volcker Rule, FIN. TIMES LEXICON, http://lexicon.ft.com/term.asp?t=Volcker-
rule (last visited Aug. 29, 2011) (defining the Volcker Rule as "a proposal, announced by
US President Barack Obama, aims to limit risky behavior within banks but is narrower
than the Glass-Steagall Act. Banks that take retail deposits would not be allowed to en-
gage in proprietary trading that is not directly related to the market making and trading
they do for customers. These banks would also be prohibited from owning or sponsoring
hedge funds or private equity funds.").
291. See Volcker Rule Unexpectedly Revived by Dodd Bill, REUTERS (Mar. 16, 2010),
http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2010/03/16/volcker-rue-unexpectedy-revived-by-
dodd-bill/.
292. Heidi N. Moore, Citigroup: Volcker Rule or Volcker Suggestion?, CNN MONEY
(July 8, 2010), http://wallstreet.blogs.fortune.cnn.com/2010/07/08/citigroup-volcker-rule-or-
volcker-suggestion/. In defending the separation of commercial banking and trading, Mr.
Volcker "pointed both to the problems at Societe Generale, the French bank that lost
billions of euros because of a rogue trader, and to Bear Stearns, the first casualty of the
financial crisis. Bear's problems first emerged in a hedge fund it ran, which it bailed out in
an effort to preserve its reputation. Eventually, a liquidity crisis brought the bank down."
Floyd Norris, Volcker Rule May Work, Even if Vague, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2011, at B1.
293. 12 U.S.C. § 1841 (2006).
294. Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 619, 124 Stat. 1376, 1620 (2010) (to be codi-
fied in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
295. Volcker Rule Unexpectedly Revived by Dodd Bill, supra note 291.
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rulemaking that, in effect, will defer the effectiveness of the amendment
for two years after enactment. 296
This is followed by a series of exceptions, designated as "permitted ac-
tivities,"297 and a "de minimis" provision, which will probably become the
rule. De minimis is defined as not more than 3% of the total ownership
interests in the fund or not more than 3% of the Tier 1 capital of the
banking entity.298 The banking entity is required to meet the 3% invest-
ment limitation within one year after the establishment of the fund;299
however, the one year period can be extended by two years.300
Early this year, a report by the Financial Stability Oversight Council,301
pursuant to the mandate of Dodd-Frank, 30 2 set forth the following rec-
ommended actions to implement the Volcker Rule:30 3
1. Require banking entities to sell or wind down all impermissible
proprietary trading desks.
2. Require banking entities to implement a robust compliance re-
gime, including public attestation by the CEO of the regime's
effectiveness.
3. Require banking entities to perform quantitative analysis to de-
tect potentially impermissible proprietary trading without provisions
for safe harbors.
4. Perform supervisory review of trading activity to distinguish per-
mitted activities from impermissible proprietary trading.
5. Require banking entities to implement a mechanism that identi-
fies to Agencies which trades are customer-initiated.
6. Require divestiture of impermissible proprietary trading positions
and impose penalties when warranted.
7. Prohibit banking entities from investing in or sponsoring any
hedge fund or private equity fund, except to bona fide trust, fiduciary
or investment advisory customers.
8. Prohibit banking entities from engaging in transactions that would
allow them to "bail out" a hedge fund or private equity fund.
9. Identify "similar funds" that should be brought within the scope
of the Volcker Rule prohibitions in order to prevent evasion of the
intent of the rule.
10. Require banking entities to publicly disclose permitted exposure
to hedge funds and private equity funds.
What may turn out to be a key recommendation is the requirement
that, not only must banks adopt a robust compliance program, but such
296. Dodd-Frank § 619 (adding § 13(b), (c)).
297. Id. § 619 (adding § 13(d)(1)(A)-(J)).
298. Id. § 619 (adding § 13(d)(4)).
299. Id. § 619 (adding § 13(d)(4)(B)(ii)).
300. Id. § 619 (adding § 13(d)(4)(C)).
301. FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, STUDY & RECOMMENDATIONS ON PROHIBI-
TIONS ON PROPRIETARY TRADING & CERTAIN RELATIONSHIPS WITH HEDGE FUNDS & PRI-
VATE EQUITY FUNDS 1 (2011), available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/
Volcker%20sec%20%20619%20study%20final%201%2018%2011%20rg.pdf.
302. Dodd-Frank § 619.
303. FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, supra note 301, at 3.
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efforts must be attested to by the CEO of the company. In so doing, the
Council is following the approach taken by the Sarbanes-Oxley
legislation.3 4
While it will be years before the effectiveness of the provision on pro-
prietary trading can be evaluated, the regulators seem to be off to a good
start.
5. Too Big to Fail and Stemming Systemic Risk
The reason that companies are "too big to fail" is that their failure
involves systemic risk, which impacts the rest of the economic system.
Consider the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, which was a result of the
firm's involvement in the subprime mortgage debacle. Lehman's bank-
ruptcy resulted in a money market fund, The Reserve Fund Primary,
"breaking the buck." That is, the value of a share in the mutual fund fell
below one dollar. 30 5 Money is invested or borrowed in a money market
system on a short-term basis, sometimes overnight. While the return is
not as much for a long-term investment, investors do not expect to lose
any money. Money market funds are regarded as totally safe. Compa-
nies park their money in them overnight and rely upon them as a source
of credit when they need short-term funds. All companies oscillate be-
tween having cash on hand and needing to borrow cash on a particular
day.
Thus, when the Lehman Brothers debt was written down, first to $.80
on the dollar and then to zero, it created a panic as investors rushed to
get their money out of money market funds.306 The result was that the
commercial paper market, the most liquid in the world, began to freeze
up. This then affected financial institutions and businesses around the
country: "Money stopped moving. Big, safe, respected companies far
away from all the subprime lending problems had trouble getting the
short-term loans they needed to pay their bills."'30 7 Fortunately, the
freeze only lasted for about twelve hours. 308 Federal Reserve Chairman
Bernanke feared that, had it lasted for days or weeks, "the consequences
would be worse than the Great Depression. ' 30 9
The same day that the Reserve Fund broke the buck, the Federal Re-
serve stepped in with an $85 billion loan to AIG, fearful that the lack of
liquidity for the firm, which was facing collateral calls from its
304. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 7241(a)(3)-(5) (2002). For further discussion of this approach in
Sarbanes-Oxley, see Charles W. Murdock, Sarbanes-Oxley Five Years Later: Hero or Vil-
lain, 39 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 525, 539-48 (2008).
305. Diana B. Henriques, Buck Broken, but Timing May Affect Redemptions, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 27, 2008, at B4.
306. Id.
307. Adam Davidson & Alex Blumberg, The Week America's Economy Almost Died,






counterparties, could force it into bankruptcy. 310 AIG also presented sys-
temic risk because, if it did not honor its hundreds of billions of dollars in
credit default swaps, its numerous counterparties would suffer devastat-
ing losses.311 Two days later, on September 18, Secretary Paulson and
Chairman Bernanke went to Congress seeking the $700 billion financial
bailout.312
From the foregoing, it is clear that systemic risk is a reality and that
steps need to be taken so that it does not lead to a financial meltdown in
the future.
There are two aspects with regard to avoiding "too big to fail." One is
to have a mechanism outside bankruptcy for the government to take over
the about to fail institution; another is to ensure that no institution is "too
big to fail." Arguably, if it is "too big to fail," it is too big.31 3
The "too big to fail" concept apparently originated with C. T. Cono-
ver's testimony in connection with the failure of Continental Illinois Na-
tional Bank, when he stated that he would not let the eleventh-largest
bank fail.3 14 This created an implicit guarantee for large banks. But after
the financial bailout in 2008, Sheila Bair, the head of the FDIC, stated
that the guarantee, which had been implicit, was now explicit and was
310. Edmund L. Andrews, Michael J. de la Merced & Mary Williams Walsh, Fed's $85
Billion Loan Rescues Insurer, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2008, at Al.
311. Id. On September 19, 2008, the Federal Reserve Board announced that it would
expand its emergency lending program to help commercial banks finance the purchase of
the asset-backed securities from money market mutual funds and the Treasury announced
that it would guarantee all money market funds against losses. Diana B. Henriques, Trea-
sury to Guarantee Money Market Funds, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2008, http://
www.nytimes.com/2008/09/20[business/20moneys.html.
312. See David M. Herszenhorn, Administration Is Seeking $700 Billion for Wall Street,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2008, at Al. Paulson presented Congress with a three-page bill that
totally exculpated him from any responsibility. See Text of Draft Proposal for Bailout
Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Sept, 20, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/21/business/
21draftcnd.html?; see also Bailout Bill: Full Text of Plan, HUFFINGTONPOST.COM (Sept. 28,
2008), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/09/28/bailout-legislation-full n_130063.html.
Congress ultimately enacted a 451-page bill, The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of
2008, which President Bush signed into law in early October. Emergency Economic Stabi-
lization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (2008), available at http://frweb
gate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong.public-laws&docid=f:pub 3 43
.110. The Act was passed by the Senate on October 1, 2008, by the House on October 3,
2008, and signed into law by President Bush on October 3, 2008. Bill Summary & Status
110th Congress (2007-2008) H.R. 1424 All Information, LIBRARY OF CONG., http://
thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/?dllO:H.R.1424: (follow "All Information" hyperlink)
(last visited Aug. 2, 2011).
313. See Michael McKee & Scott Lanman, Greenspan Says U.S. Should Consider
Breaking up Large Banks, BLOOMBERG, Oct. 15, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aJ]8HPmNUfchg (quoting Greenspan's statement, "If they're
too big to fail, they're too big").
314. Inquiry Into the Continental Illinois Corp. and Continental Illinois National Bank:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Inst. Supervision, Regulation, and Ins. of the Comm.
on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong. 299-300 (1984) (statement of Charles
Conover, Comptroller of the Currency, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury), available at http://
fraser.stlouisfed.org/historicaldocs/678/download/63823/house-cinbl984.pdf. See also FED.
DEPOSIT INS. CORP., supra note 285, at 246-47.
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giving large banks a competitive advantage. 315 The Center for Economic
and Policy Research estimated that the taxpayer subsidy for large banks
was $34 billion a year, a substantial advantage over smaller banks, as
stated above.316
The systemic risk posed by the financial sector is a function of both its
size and its concentration. Commercial banks in 1978 held $1.2 trillion of
assets, about 53% of U.S. GDP.317 By 2007, their assets had grown to
$11.8 trillion, or 84% of GDP.318 The assets of the six largest banks-
Bank of America, JP Morgan Chase, Citigroup, Wells Fargo, Goldman
Sachs, and Morgan Stanley-grew from under 20% of GDP to over
60%.319 Banking was no longer boring.
315. Paul Wiseman & Pallavi Gogoi, FDIC Chief" Small Banks Can't Compete with
Bailed-Out Giants, USA TODAY, Oct. 20, 2009, http://www.usatoday.com/money/indus-
tries/banking/2009-10-19-FDIC-chief-sheila-bair-bankingN.htm.
316. Dean Baker & Travis McArthur, The Value of the "Too Big to Fail" Big Bank
Subsidy, CTR. FOR ECON. & POLICY RESEARCH, Sept. 2009, at 2, available at http://
www.cepr.net/documents/publications/too-big-to-fail-2009-09.pdf.
The spread between the average cost of funds for smaller banks and the
cost of funds for institutions with assets in excess of $100 billion averaged
0.29 percentage points in the period from the first quarter of 2000 through
the fourth quarter of 2007, the last quarter before the collapse of Bear
Stearns. In the period from the fourth quarter of 2008 through the second
quarter of 2009, after the government bailouts had largely established TBTF
["Too Big to Fail'] as official policy, the gap had widened to an average of
0.78 percentage points.
If this gap is attributable to the TBTF policy, it implies a substantial tax-
payer subsidy for the TBTF banks. In effect, because of the government
safety net being extended to investors who lend money to these banks, the
TBTF banks are able to borrow at a much lower cost than banks who must
borrow based on their own credit worthiness. The increase in the gap of 0.49
percentage points implies a government subsidy of $34.1 billion a year to the
18 bank holding companies with more than $100 billion in assets in the first
quarter of 2009.
Id. Andrew Haldane, the Bank of England's executive director in charge of financial sta-
bility, estimated the subsidy that Britain's largest banks enjoy at between £30 billion and
£55 billion. Peter Thai Larson & Richard Beales, Britain Questions "Too Big to Fail", N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 1, 2010, at B2.
317. SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER
AND THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 59 (2010).
318. Id.
319. Id. at 203. A January 2011 study by the Financial Stability Oversight Council
noted that "there is limited evidence that economies of scale and scope exist in the finan-
cial sector beyond modest size levels." It further stated, "[m]ost research using data from
years prior to 2000 found that scale economies disappear long before a firm would become
large enough to be bound by the concentration limit. Some research using more recent
data has found economies of scale for even the largest banking organizations, though the
size of these economies is often modest and may not exist for firms with entrenched man-
agement." FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL, supra note 301, at 11 (citation omitted).
The study also found that the four largest U.S. commercial banking firms "control 56.6
percent of the market in general purpose credit card purchase volume. Similarly, these
four firms originated 58.2 percent of mortgage loans by volume in 2009 and serviced 56.3
percent of such loans." Id. at 13. They also have 34.68% of deposits. Id. at 24. Because
the banks' liabilities and capital are determined on a risk-weighted assets basis, the banks
"deemed" size is less than its actual size. Id. at 6. Thus, "JPMorgan Chase, the nation's
second-biggest bank by assets, can merge with U.S. Bancorp, the 10th-biggest lender, and
still fall comfortably under the limit." Shahien Nasiripour, Trillion-Dollar Banks Could
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"From the 1930s until 1980, financial sector profits grew at roughly the
same rate as profits in the nonfinancial sector. But from 1980 until 2005,
financial sector profits grew by 800 percent .... while nonfinancial sector
profits grew by only 250%. ' ' 320 Prior to 1982, compensation in the finan-
cial sector approximated that in the nonfinancial sector; however, by 2007
the financial sector compensation was twice that of other sectors.
321
The fact that the subsidy provided by "too big to fail" provides a com-
petitive advantage to the big banks has been discussed above. "Too big
to fail" obviously increases potential taxpayer costs. But from a long-
term perspective, it encourages management to engage in excessive risk-
taking since, as demonstrated by recent history, management scores in
the short term without consequences in the long term. Richard W.
Fisher, the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, has stated
that "[tihe social costs associated with these big financial institutions are
much greater than any benefits they may provide. We need to find some
international convention to limit their size."'322
When former Chairman Greenspan made his 2009 comment, "If
they're too big to fail, they're too big," before the Council on Foreign
Relations, he added, "So I mean, radical things, as you-you know, break
them up, you know. In 1911, we broke up Standard Oil. So what hap-
pened? The individual parts became more valuable than the whole.
Maybe that's what we need. ' 323 That would certainly seem the most di-
rect way to deal with the "too big" part of the "too big to fail" equation.
The U.S. mentality needs to realize that bigness is problematic, particu-
larly unregulated size.
So how do you put limits on size? One author has suggested that the
assets of a commercial bank be limited to 4% of GDP, or roughly $570
billion.324 That certainly is not small! With respect to investment banks,
the author would limit their size to 2% of GDP, or about $285 billion.325
These limits would only affect six banks: Bank of America (16% of
GDP), J.P. Morgan Chase (14% of GDP), Citigroup (13% of GDP),
Wells Fargo (9% of GDP), Goldman Sachs (6%) of GDP, and Morgan
Stanley (5%) of GDP.326
Smaller banks would increase competition, limit systemic risk, decen-
tralize decision-making and political power, provide more choice for con-
Get Bigger Under Financial Overhaul Law, HUFFINGTONPOST.COM (Jan. 18, 2011), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/01/18/trilliondollar-banks-could-get-bigger-n_810747.html.
320. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 317, at 60-61.
321. Id.
322. Gretchen Morgenson, Do You Have Any Reforms in Size XL?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
24, 2010, at BUL.
323. Alan Greenspan, Speech at the C. Peter McColough Series on International
Economics: The Global Financial Crisis: Causes and Consequences (Oct. 15, 2009), availa-
ble at http://www.cfr.org/publication/20417/c-peter-mccoloughseries-on-international_
economics.html.
324. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 317, at 214.
325. Id. at 215.
326. Id. at 217.
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sumers, and, if Chairman Greenspan is correct, increase profitability.
The argument to the contrary is that large, multinational corporations
need large banks. But, at present, these corporations are often serviced
by a consortium of banks, so that should not be a disabling argument.
Paradoxically, a part of the size of these large banks is attributable to
the aftermath of the financial crisis. Bank of America acquired Country-
wide and Merrill Lynch, and grew 138%; J.P. Morgan Chase acquired
Bear Steams and Washington Mutual, and grew 51%; and Wells Fargo
acquired Wachovia, and grew 43%.327 A previous conglomeratization
phase occurred during the deregulatory mindset of President Clinton.
For example, Wachovia was formed from mergers of First Union, Core-
States, and Wachovia; and Citicorp added Travelers Insurance, Primerica,
and Salomon Brothers.32 8
Unfortunately, Dodd-Frank provisions are woefully inadequate with
respect to the "too big" aspect. Section 622 of the Financial Reform Act
deals with "Concentration Limits on Large Financial Firms.
32 9 It
amends the Bank Holding Company Act by providing a broad definition
of the term "financial company," and then provides that a financial com-
pany shall not merge, consolidate, acquire substantially all the assets, or
otherwise control another company "if the total consolidated liabilities of
the acquiring financial company upon consummation of the transaction
would exceed 10% of the aggregate consolidated liabilities of all financial
companies," measured at the end of the preceding calendar year. 330 It
then restricts any interstate merger if "the resulting insured depository
institution . . . would control more than 10% of the total amount of
deposits of insured depository institutions in the United States. '331 It
also restricts a bank holding company from acquiring a depository institu-
tion if the bank holding company "would control more than 10% of the
total amount of deposits. '332 Finally, it restricts a savings and loan hold-
ing company from acquiring an insured depository institution if it would
control "more than 10% of the total amount deposits insured depository
institutions in the United States. '333
The problem with these provisions is that each of them is immediately
followed by a provision that negates the limits if the acquisition involves
an insured depository institution "in default or in danger of default. 33
4
327. David Cho, Banks 'Too Big to Fail' Have Grown Even Bigger, WASH. POST, Aug.
28, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/08/27/AR
2009082704193.html.
328. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 317, at 85.
329. Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 11.1-203, 124 Stat. 1376, § 622 (2010) (to be codified in
scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
330. Id. § 622 (adding § 14(a), (b) to the Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1843
(2006)).
331. Id. § 623(a) (adding § (13)(A) to § 18(c) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (12
U.S.C. § 1828(c) (2006)).
332. Id. § 623(b) (adding § 4(i)(8)(A)(a) to the Bank Holding Company Act).





As can be seen from the data above, many of the existing large banking
institutions grew even larger by acquiring failing institutions. In addition,
the Act would not deal with institutions that already exceed the 10%
limit. Each of the three institutions discussed above obtained waivers of
the 10% limit on deposits.
However, with respect to the "fail" aspect of "too big to fail,"
Dodd-Frank is a landmark change, in that it provides governmental au-
thority to take over a failing financial institution and thereby prevent the
institution from going into bankruptcy. Former Secretary Paulson, when
asked if the new Act would have prevented the current crisis, responded
that "[w]e would have loved to have something like this for Lehman
Brothers. There's no doubt about it.''335
Title I of the Act 336 creates a Financial Stability Oversight Council, and
Title 11337 provides for orderly liquidation authority. In brief, the Council
is composed of ten voting members and five nonvoting members,338
whose role is to "identify risks to the financial stability of the United
States," to promote market discipline by eliminating expectations that
the government will bailout institutions in the future, and to respond to
emerging threats to the financial system. 339 To accomplish this, the
Council is to collect information, monitor the financial services market-
place, identify gaps in regulation, and probably most important:
[M]ake recommendations to the Board of Governors concerning the
establishment of heightened prudential standards for risk-based capi-
tal, leverage, liquidity, contingent capital, resolution plans and credit
exposure reports, concentration limits, enhanced public disclosures,
and overall risk management for nonbank financial companies and
large, interconnected bank holding companies supervised by the
Board of Governors.340
If a financial company 341 were determined to present systemic risk,342
the FDIC could be appointed receiver of the company. This could be
done either with the consent of the board of directors343 or pursuant to a
335. Andrew Ross Sorkin, Paulson Likes What He Sees in Overhaul, DEALBOOK (July
13, 2010), http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/13/paulson-likes-what-he-sees-in-
overhaul/.
336. Dodd-Frank §§ 101-76.
337. Id. §§ 201-17.
338. Id. § 111(b).
339. Id. § ll(a)(1).
340. Id. § ll(a)(2)(A), (C), (G), (I).
341. Id. § 201(a)(11) (the definition includes bank holding companies, non-bank finan-
cial companies supervised by the board of governors, any company that is predominantly
engaged in activities determined to be financial in nature or incidental thereto, and a sub-
sidiary of the foregoing).
342. This recommendation is made by the FDIC, either on its own motion or pursuant
to a request from the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve. Id. § 202. In the case of a broker dealer, it is the SEC, not the FDIC, that would
make the recommendation and, in the case of an insurance company, it is the director of
the Federal Insurance Office that would make the recommendation. The procedures for
the systemic risk determination are set forth in § 203. See id. § 203.
343. Id. § 202(a)(1)(A)(i).
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court order in a nonpublic hearing, in which the receivership must be
granted so long as the determination of the Secretary of the Treasury is
not "arbitrary and capricious."'344 The receiver is to take over the assets
of the company and operate it while it is in the receivership 345 and has
broad authority to sell selected assets of the company or arrange for the
acquisition of the company. 346 It can also create a "bridge financial com-
pany" to succeed to certain assets and liabilities, as an interim measure
pending a permanent transaction with a private acquirer.347 The receiver
has the authority to establish priorities and to sue to set aside fraudulent
transfers and preferences, similar to the authority contained in the bank-
ruptcy code.348 The board of directors and senior management must be
replaced, 349 and management can be held responsible for the financial
condition of the company.350 A director or senior executive officer can
also be barred for up to two years from any affiliation with any financial
company if it is determined that such person has violated any law or regu-
lation, or has engaged or participated in any unsafe or unsound practice,
or has committed a breach of fiduciary duty.351
One of the issues raised as the legislation was being considered, and
even after it was signed into law, was whether it would increase the likeli-
hood of future government bailouts.352 However, Dodd-Frank specifi-
cally provides that "[a]ll financial companies put into receivership ...
shall be liquidated," that "all funds expended in the liquidation ... shall
be recovered from the disposition of assets of [the] financial company, or
shall be the responsibility of the financial sector, through assessments,"
and that "[t]axpayers shall bear no losses from the exercise of any author-
ity under" the receivership provisions.35
3
C. THE CREDIT RATING AGENCIES: MANUFACTURING AAA RATINGS
Probably the most reprehensible players in the subprime crisis have
been the credit rating agencies. It is clear that the goal of mortgage bro-
kers, mortgage lenders, and investment banks is to make money for the
benefit of their shareholders. With respect to the credit rating agencies,
on the other hand, while they are in business, their business is involved
with the public trust. They are seen, or rather had been seen, as institu-
tions upon whom investors could rely for impartial judgment. Investors
344. Id. § 202(a)(1)(A)(iv).
345. Id. § 210(a)(1)(B).
346. Id. § 210(a)(1)(F).
347. See id. § 201(a)(3) (definition); § 210(h) (procedures and powers). The duration of
a bridge company is limited to two years, unless extended by the FDIC. See id.
§ 210(h)(12). The reason for this short duration is because the purpose of a bridge com-
pany is to serve as a vehicle for an ultimate transfer to a private buyer.
348. See id. § 210(b) (priority of expenses and unsecured claims); § 210(a)(11) (avoida-
ble transfers).
349. Id. § 206(4)(5).
350. Id. § 210(f) (the standard for liability is gross negligence).
351. Id. § 213.
352. See supra text accompanying note 20 (comments of Rep. John Boehner).
353. Dodd-Frank § 214.
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around the world relied upon their analysis. Mortgage-backed securities
and collateralized debt obligations are complex instruments,354 which few
investors would have the time or expertise to analyze. Standard and
Poor's said that "Lehman and AIG are included in 2634 tranches of 1889
synthetic CDO's. ' 355 The Securities and Exchange Commission has
observed:
Some investors use the credit ratings to assess the risk of the debt
instruments. In part, this may be due to the large number of debt
instruments in the market and their complexity. Other investors use
credit ratings to satisfy client investment mandates regarding the
types of securities they can invest in or to satisfy regulatory require-
ments based on certain levels of credit ratings, or a combination of
these conditions. Moreover, investors typically only have looked to
ratings issued by Fitch, Moody's, and S&P, which causes the arrang-
ers of the subprime RMBS and CDOs to use these three NRSROs to
obtain credit ratings for the tranche securities they brought to
market.356
As previously discussed, the period from 2004 to 2007 was a critical one
in terms of the deterioration of quality of the mortgages that were securi-
tized.357 In 2004, Moody's and Standard & Poor's "eased their stan-
dards" under pressure from Wall Street to enable more securities to be
rated AAA.358 They changed their rating models to accommodate more
concentration in one type of asset and utilize a hypothetical investment
pool.359 The overall effect was to create more AAA securities (the sup-
posedly safest type).360 Thereafter, one study found that "the value of
AAA-rated mortgage-backed securities (as measured by the correspond-
ing credit default swaps prices) [had] fallen by 70 percent between Janu-
ary 2007 and December 2008."361 According to another report, by
August 2008, Moody's had downgraded 90% of all asset-backed CDO
investments issued in 2006 and 2007, and Standard & Poor's had down-
graded 84% of the CDO tranches it rated.362 Moreover, they had down-
354. See, e.g., Ameriquest Mortg. Sec., Inc., Prospectus Supplement (Dec. 15, 2005),
available at http://www.secinfo.com/dr66r.z2F9.htm#gmw; see also Citigroup Mortg. Loan
Trust Inc., Properties Supplement (Dec. 13, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/
Archives/edgar/data/1257102/000088237705003567/d410363_424b3-file2.htm.
355. Karen Brettell, S&P Likely to Cut Derivative Deals on Lehman, AIG, REUTERS,
Sept. 16, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/rbssFinancialServicesAndRealEstateNews/id
USN1625304920080916.
356. SEC Proposed Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations,
Release No. 34-57967 [File No. S7-13-08] at 12-13 (proposed June 16, 2008) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R., pts. 240 and 249b).
357.- See supra text accompanying notes 34-52.
358. See Smith, supra note 163.
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. See Marco Pagano & Paolo Volpin, Credit Ratings Failures: Causes and Policy Op-
tions 1, Feb. 9, 2009 (working paper), available at http://www.italianacademy.columbia.edu/
publications/working-papers/2008 2009/paganovolpin-seminarIA.pdf.
362. See Cormick Grimshaw, Bringing Down Wall Street as Ratings Let Loose Subprime
Scourge, MARKET PIPELINE (Sept. 25, 2008), http://marketpipeline.blogspot.com/2008/09/
bringing-down-wall-street-as-ratings_25.html.
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graded 85% and 76%, respectively, of the AAA securities they had
rated. 363
What is particularly shocking is the lack of due diligence done by the
rating agencies in connection with issuing AAA ratings, from which they
collected hefty fees. As the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission stated,
while the rating agencies considered themselves the "'umpire in the mar-
ket, "they did not review the quality of individual mortgages in a mort-
gage-backed security, nor did they check to see that the mortgages were
what the securitizers said they were. '364 What happened? Basically, the
rating agencies were bought off by the investment bankers. At one time,
the credit rating agencies charged a subscription fee to subscribers to
cover their rating activity. 365 That has changed: the current practice is
that the company or issue being rated pays the fee.366 Thus, there is an
inherent conflict of interest. For example, Standard & Poor's claimed
that such a conflict was not a concern since it rated 37,000 issues. 367
However, with respect to structured financial products such as the securi-
tized mortgages, the rating agencies could charge almost three times as
much as they charged for rating corporate bonds. 368 This created a huge
incentive to get the business. While there are those who advocate going
back to a subscription fee,369 the rating agencies disagree.370 In an elec-
tronic world, the agencies worry about the problem of free riding.371
But the fees paid for rating services were not the only conflicts of inter-
est that infected the rating process. Former SEC Chairman Cox has ob-
served that:
[S]tructured products were specifically designed for each tranche to
achieve a particular credit rating-and the ratings agencies then
made a lucrative business of consulting with issuers on exactly how
to go about getting those ratings. Selling consulting services to enti-
ties that purchased ratings became a triple-A conflict of interest.372
363. Id.
364. FCIC REPORT, supra note 24, at 165.
365. See STANDARD & POOR'S RATINGS SERVS., ROLE AND FUNCTION OF CREDIT RAT-
ING AGENCIES IN THE U.S. SECURITIES MARKETS (2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/extra/credrate/standardpoors.htm ("Since 1968, Standard & Poor's has charged issu-
ers for its credit rating services. The practice was implemented because of increasing costs
related to credit ratings surveillance and the growing need for more ratings coverage.
Prior to that, Standard & Poor's provided its credit ratings services on the basis of subscrip-
tion fees, which were not adequate to offset the increased costs of maintaining a high level
of quality in this business.").
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. See Grimshaw, supra note 362.
369. See Pagano & Volpin, supra note 361, at 3, 8.
370. Hearing on Credit Rating Agencies Before H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov't Re-
form, 110th Cong. 8 (2008) (testimony of Raymond W. McDaniel, Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer, Moody's Corporation) available at http://democrats.oversight.house.
gov/images/stories/Hearing/committee-on-oversights/McDanielStatement.pdL
371. Marco Pagano & Paolo Volpin, supra note 361, at 3.
372. SEC Chairman Christopher Cox, Statement at Open Meeting on Rules for Credit




Fortunately, the SEC has adopted a new rule prohibiting this activ-
ity.373 Of the three rating agencies, 374 Moody's is the only freestanding,
publicly-traded agency. 375 Once again, it is instructive to look at the
stock price movement during the time of the subprime crisis. From 2003
to 2007, the price of Moody's advanced from $20 a share to about $70 a
share, or an increase of about 250%, as shown in the chart below.376 The
process repeats itself-more business means more income means stock
appreciation. There is nothing wrong with this process so long as the in-
creased business is legitimate.
MOODY'S
io .................. .. ...... .... ................... .............................................. ............................................. ....... ...................................... .. .......... .....................................................
.... .. ... ....
10
10/4/10 10/4ol .0/4/02 88/4/03 I0A/40, 014/05 10/8/06 10/4/17 I0/4/0 10/4/0
As one former Moody's analyst stated:
When I joined Moody's in late 1997, an analyst's worst fear was
that he would contribute to the assignment of a rating that was
wrong, damage Moody's reputation for getting the answer right and
lose his job as a result.
When I left Moody's, an analyst's worst fear was that he would do
something that would allow him to be singled out for jeopardizing
Moody's market share, for impairing Moody's revenue or for damag-
ing Moody's relationships with its clients and lose his job as a
373. 17 C.F.R. § 24017g-5(c)(5) (2009).
374. David Evens & Caroline Salas, Flawed Credit Ratings Reap Profits as Regulators
Fail Investors, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 29, 2009), www.bloomberg.comlapps/news?pid=news
archive&sid=a6NdKd8CfR2A.
375. Moody's became an independent, publicly traded company as a result of a spinoff
on September 30, 2000. For a history of the various spinoffs by which Moody's became an
independent company, see Moody's Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 2 (Mar. 22,
2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1059556/000095012302002821/
y58653e10-K405.htm#001.
376. See Moody's Corp. Common Stock, YAHOO! FINANCE, http://finance.yahoo.com/
q?s=MCO (last visited Oct. 9, 2009) (historical data available via navigation menu on the
left side of this page).
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result.3 7 7
How do you change the mindset that "[l]et's hope we are all wealthy
and retired by the time this house of cards falters"? 378 One way would be
to go back to the practice that prevailed before 1970 and have the inves-
tor, rather than the issuer, pay the fee. However, the implementation
process and costs for such a change-over would be substantial; accord-
ingly, a study presented to the British Treasury and Bank of England rec-
ommended that "issuers should pay an upfront fee irrespective of the
rating issued (the so-called Cuomo Plan, named after New York Attorney
General Andrew Cuomo) and credit shopping should be banned. 379
Another possibility would be to subject the rating agencies to civil lia-
bility. Until Dodd-Frank, rating agencies were insulated from liability
under Section 11 of the Federal Securities Act of 1933.380 While
Dodd-Frank would reverse that,381 the rating agencies long contended
that their ratings are opinions, which are protected under the First
Amendment as free speech.382
D. DODD-FRANK'S MORE AGGRESSIVE APPROACH TOWARD THE
CREDIT RATING AGENCIES
The current financial crisis also would not have occurred had it not
been for the ineptitude, if not concupiscence, of the credit rating agen-
cies. Recall the comment: "[l]et's hope we are all wealthy and retired by
the time this house of cards falters. '383 Since the reputation of the credit
377. Mark Froeba, Testimony of Mark Froeba, PF2 Securities Evaluations, Inc., New
York, New York Before The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (June 2, 2010) (unpub-
lished testimony), available at http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn-media/fcic-testimony/
2010-0602-Froeba.pdf.
378. SEC STAFF SUMMARY REPORT OF ISSUES IDENTIFIED IN THE COMMISSION STAFF'S
EXAMINATION OF SELECT CREDIT RATING AGENCIES 12 n.8 (2008), available at http://
www.sec.gov/news/studies/2008/craexamination070808.pdf (quoting December 2006 e-mail
from an analyst).
379. See Pagano & Volpin, supra note 361, at 3.
380. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2006); 17 CFR §230.436(g)(1) (2010) (Providing that a rating
which is assigned to a security "shall not be considered a part of the registration statement
prepared or certified by a person within the meaning of sections 7 and 11 of the Act."
Section 11 is the civil liability section for misrepresentations or omissions in a registration
statement.).
381. See Opening Statement: Hearing on Reforming Credit Rating Agencies: Before the
H. Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins., & Gov't Sponsored Enters., 111th Cong. (Sept. 30,
2009) (statement of Paul E. Kajorski, Subcomm. Chairman), available at http://www
.house.gov/apps/list/hearing/financialsvcs-dem/09 09 30-cra hearing-opening-statement
.pdf; see also infra text accompanying notes 386-99.
382. See STANDARD & POOR'S RATINGS SERVS., supra note 365 ("Today, credit rating
agencies are free to develop and publish their credit rating opinions under strong First
Amendment protections. Indeed, it is Standard & Poor's key role as a publisher of credit
ratings and financial information that has been the basis for judicial recognition of signifi-
cant First Amendment protections afforded to Standard & Poor's."); see also Frank
Partnoy, How and Why Credit Rating Agencies Are Not Like Other Gatekeepers, UNIV. OF
SAN DIEGO SCH. OF LAW (May 2006), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=
900257.
383. SEC, SUMMARY REPORT OF ISSUES IDENTIFIED IN THE COMMISSION STAFF's Ex-
AMINATION OF SELECT RATING AGENCIES 12, n.8 (e-mail from one analytic manager to a
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rating agencies was in tatters, it is not surprising that Dodd-Frank took a
principled approach in seeking to preclude a repetition of the ratings de-
bacle. Professor Partnoy has stated that the agencies "are not informa-
tion intermediaries who survive and prosper based on the quality of their
ratings. Instead, they have shifted from selling information to selling reg-
ulatory licenses. '384
1. The Credit Rating Agencies, the First Amendment, and Civil
Liability
Subtitle C of Title IX of Dodd-Frank deals with the credit rating agen-
cies. 385 The provisions start with a series of findings that are devastating
and that should undercut the argument of the rating agencies that their
ratings are protected as free speech under the First Amendment.3 86 The
findings refer to "the systemic importance of credit ratings and the reli-
ance placed on" them, and assert that the rating agencies "play a critical
'gatekeeper' role in the debt market that is functionally similar to that of
securities analysts. '38 7 Congress then found that, because the rating
senior analytic manager at a credit rating agency; the e-mail also refers to the credit rating
agencies having created a "monster") [hereinafter SUMMARY REPORT], available at http://
www.sec.gov/news/studies/2008/craexamination07O8O8.pdf.
384. Frank Partnoy, Professor of Law, Univ. of San Diego Sch. of Law, Roundtable to
Examine Oversight of Credit Rating Agencies (Apr. 15, 2009), available at http://
www.sec.gov/comments/4-579/4579-6.pdf.
385. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, §§ 931-939H, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
386. See STANDARD & POOR'S RATINGS SERVS., supra note 365 ("Today, credit rating
agencies are free to develop and publish their credit rating opinions under strong First
Amendment protections.)
387. The complete findings, set forth in Dodd-Frank § 931, are:
(1) Because of the systemic importance of credit ratings and the reliance
placed on credit ratings by individual and institutional investors and financial
regulators, the activities and performances of credit rating agencies, includ-
ing nationally recognized statistical rating organizations, are matters of na-
tional public interest, as credit rating agencies are central to capital
formation, investor confidence, and the efficient performance of the United
States economy.
(2) Credit rating agencies, including nationally recognized statistical rating
organizations, play a critical "gatekeeper" role in the debt market that is
functionally similar to that of securities analysts, who evaluate the quality of
securities in the equity market, and auditors, who review the financial state-
ments of firms. Such role justifies a similar level of public oversight and
accountability.
(3) Because credit rating agencies perform evaluative and analytical services
on behalf of clients, much as other financial "gatekeepers" do, the activities
of credit rating agencies are fundamentally commercial in character and
should be subject to the same standards of liability and oversight as apply to
auditors, securities analysts, and investment bankers.
(4) In certain activities, particularly in advising arrangers of structured finan-
cial products on potential ratings of such products, credit rating agencies face
conflicts of interest that need to be carefully monitored and that therefore
should be addressed explicitly in legislation in order to give clearer authority
to the Securities and Exchange Commission.
(5) In the recent financial crisis, the ratings on structured financial products
have proven to be inaccurate. This inaccuracy contributed significantly to the
mismanagement of risks by financial institutions and investors, which in turn
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agencies provide services on behalf of clients similar to other financial
gatekeepers, "the activities of credit rating agencies are fundamentally
commercial in character and should be subject to the same standards of
liability and oversight as apply to auditors, securities analysts, and invest-
ment bankers. '388
This finding should vitiate the rating agencies' First Amendment argu-
ment that they should have no civil liability. The findings further noted
the conflicts of interest that occurred when the agencies advised under-
writers of structured financial products on how to secure a desired rating
and further found "the ratings on structured financial products have
proven to be inaccurate" and that "[t]his inaccuracy contributed signifi-
cantly to the mismanagement of risks," which impacted the economy of
the United States and the world.389 The foregoing "necessitates in-
creased accountability on the part of the credit rating agencies. 390
Recent judicial opinions refusing to afford credit rating agencies First
Amendment protection should be bulwarked by the legislative findings in
Dodd-Frank. In Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co.,
the court stated:
It is well-established that under typical circumstances, the First
Amendment protects rating agencies, subject to an "actual malice"
exception, from liability arising out of their issuance of ratings and
reports because their ratings are considered matters of public con-
cern. However, where a rating agency has disseminated their ratings
to a select group of investors rather than to the public at large, the
rating agency is not afforded the same protection. Here, plaintiffs
have plainly alleged that the Cheyne SIV's ratings were never widely
disseminated, but were provided instead in connection with a private
placement to a select group of investors. Thus, the Rating Agencies'
First Amendment argument is rejected.391
A California state court decision, while purporting to follow the Morgan
Stanley case, used even more expansive language:
The issuance of these SIV ratings is not, however, an issue of public
concern. Rather, it is an economic activity designed for a limited
target for the purpose of making money. That is not something that
should be accorded First Amendment protection and the Defendants
are not akin to members of the financial press.392
Following up on the foregoing, Dodd-Frank, in dealing with accounta-
bility, sets forth a clear intention that the credit rating agencies are sub-
adversely impacted the health of the economy in the United States and
around the world. Such inaccuracy necessitates increased accountability on




391. Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 651 F. Supp. 2d 155,
175-76 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
392. Cal. Pub. Emps.' Ret. Sys. v. Moody's Corp., No. CGC-09-490241, 2010 WL
2286924 (Cal. Super. Ct., May 24, 2010).
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ject both to enforcement actions by the SEC and to private damage
actions by injured investors. Section 15E of the 1934 Securities Exchange
Act formerly provided that "[n]othing in this section may be construed as
creating a private right of action, and no report furnished by a nationally
recognized statistical rating organization in accordance with this section
or section 17 shall create a private right of action under section 18 or any
other provision of law."'393 This provision has now been replaced with the
following:
The enforcement and penalty provisions of this title shall apply to
statements made by a credit rating agency in the same manner and to
the same extent as such provisions apply to statements made by a
registered public accounting firm or a securities analyst under the
securities laws, and such statements shall not be deemed forward-
looking statements for the purposes of section 21E.394
Not only does this subject credit rating agencies to enforcement and
penalty actions by the SEC, but it also specifies that the credit rating
agencies may not seek to limit their responsibility by claiming that ratings
are forward-looking statements. If they were considered forward-looking
statements, the agencies would be exculpated from liability if they accom-
panied the ratings with a cautionary statement. 395
The Act likewise makes clear that the credit rating agencies can be
subjected to a cause of action brought by a private investor. In such a
case, the "state of mind" or scienter provision with respect to a suit by a
private investor was amended by adding the following:
In the case of an action for money damages brought against a credit
rating agency or a controlling person under this title, it shall be suffi-
cient, for purposes of pleading any required state of mind in relation
to such action, that the complaint state with particularity facts giving
rise to a strong inference that the credit rating agency knowingly or
recklessly failed:
(i) to conduct a reasonable investigation of the rated security
with respect to the factual elements relied upon by its own
methodology for evaluating credit risk; or
(ii) to obtain reasonable verification of such factual elements...
from other sources that the credit rating agency considered to
be competent and that were independent of the issuer and the
underwriter.396
The specter of an SEC penalty action or a private damage action
should have a sobering effect upon the management of the credit rating
393. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-7(m) (2009).
394. Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, § 933(a) (to be codified in scat-
tered sections of the U.S. Code) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(m) (2006)).
395. If a cautionary statement were employed, the maker is protected from liability
even if such person had actual knowledge that the statement was false or misleading. See
Charles W. Murdock, Corporate Corruption and the Complicity of Congress and the Su-
preme Court-The Tortuous Path from Central Bank to Stoneridge Investment Partners, 6
BERKELY Bus. L.J. 131, 188-92 (2009).
396. Dodd-Frank § 933.
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agencies. Dodd-Frank397 also sprung a bombshell with respect to the Se-
curities Act of 1933 by repealing an SEC rule that provided that a secur-
ity rating was not considered part of the registration statement. 398 This
one-sentence provision in the Act has the effect of exposing rating agen-
cies to Section 11 liability as an expert. In such a case, the rating agency
would have liability for any false or misleading statement unless "after
reasonable investigation, [the rating agency had] reasonable ground to
believe and did believe . . . that the statements therein were true and
that there was no omission to state a material fact required to be stated
therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading. '" 399
The rating agencies immediately refused to consent to the use of their
ratings in a registration statement, and the SEC responded by issuing a
no-action letter that it would take no action for a period of six months if
an asset-backed issuer omitted a ratings disclosure in the registration
statement.400 Thus, there has been a short term impasse as to whether
ratings will be included in a registration statement, as now required in
certain instances, or whether the rating agencies will capitulate and in-
stead ensure that their ratings meet the due diligence now required under
the 1934 Act.
The SEC recently extended indefinitely the waiver embodied in the
July 22, 2010, no-action letter on the basis that the rating agencies have
refused to provide their consent to being named as experts, thus bringing
the market for asset-backed securities to a halt.40 1 The SEC took such
action so that investors would not be denied the benefit of registration.
There were also several changes that might look like merely technical
corrections, but which also could be significant. In Section 15E of the
1934 Act, the words "furnished" or "furnishing" were stricken and re-
placed by the words "filed" or "filing. ' 40 2 The significance of these
changes is that there is liability for a false filing under Section 18 of the
1934 Act. Arguably, there would not be liability if the material were just
"furnished" to the SEC, rather than "filed. '40 3
2. Structural and Transparency Changes
In addition to the presently-existing power to censure, suspend, or re-
voke the registration of a rating agency, the SEC was also given the
power to censure, suspend, or bar employees associated with the rating
agency, and failure to supervise was added as a basis for discipline. 40 4
The SEC was also given additional power to suspend or revoke the regis-
397. Id. § 939G.
398. 17 C.F.R. § 230.436(g) (2009).
399. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(B)(i) (2006).
400. Ford Motor Credit Co. LLC, SEC No-Action Letter, July 22, 2010, available at
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/2010/ford72210-1120.htm.
401. Id.
402. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank § 932(a)(1) (amending 15 U.S.C. §78o-7(b)).
403. 15 U.S.C. § 78r (2006).
404. Dodd-Frank § 932(a)(3) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(d)).
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tration of the rating agency with respect to a particular class or subclass of
securities if the "rating organization does not have adequate financial and
managerial resources to consistently produce credit ratings with integ-
rity. ' 405 The impetus for this provision came from the fact that the rating
agencies, while doing a professional job with respect to corporate bonds,
for example, failed miserably in their ratings of mortgage-backed securi-
ties and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs).4 0 6
A 2008 study by the SEC of credit rating agencies disclosed that, while
the number of CDOs grew almost geometrically from 2003 until 2007, the
credit rating staff dedicated to reviewing the CDO deals was increased by
a miniscule number. 40 7 See the chart below:
PERCENTAGE CHANGE COMPARISON FROM 2002 VERSUS








2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Firm 1 Firm 2- Firm 3*
*CDO Revenue DCDO Rated Deals OCDO Staff
Firm 2 did not provide 2002 CDO revenue data. Therefore, the CDO revenue percentage change is based upon
the 2003 balance as opposed to 2002.
*** Firm 3 provided 9 months of CDO revenue for 2006. Therefore, 12 months of estimated 2006 revenue was
extrapolated for CDO by multiplying 9 months of revenue by 1.3.
The implicit premise of the new change is that, if the agency does not
staff a business segment adequately, the SEC can revoke or suspend its
registration with respect to issuing ratings by this segment.
In order to help ensure quality ratings, the Act requires that each rat-
ing agency "establish, maintain, enforce, and document an effective inter-
nal control structure governing the implementation of and adherence to
policies, procedures and methodologies for determining credit rat-
ings. ' 40 8 It further requires that the agency submit annually to the SEC
an internal controls report, which would include an assessment of its ef-
fectiveness and an attestation by the chief executive officer of such assess-
ment.40 9 This is similar to the attestation requirement for chief executive
405. Id. (adding subparagraph (d)(2)(A)).
406. See supra text accompanying notes 357-65.
407. SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 383, at 11.
408. Dodd-Frank § 932(a)(2) (adding 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(c)(3)).
409. Id.
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officers of reporting companies under Sarbanes-Oxley.410
There is a further requirement in the Act that each rating agency, in
effect, have a compliance officer who is essentially independent, that is,
he or she does not perform credit ratings, participate in the development
of methodologies, perform marketing or sales functions, or participate in
establishing compensation levels. 411 Such person, whose compensation
cannot be linked to the financial performance of the agency, is required
to submit an annual compliance report to the rating agency, which shall
file the report with the SEC. 412 The SEC is also required to issue rules
"to prevent the sales and marketing considerations" of the rating agency
"from influencing the production of ratings" by the rating agency.413 Be-
cause of the additional responsibilities imposed upon the SEC, the Act
instructs the SEC to establish an "Office of Credit Ratings," the director
of which should report directly to the SEC Chairman.41 4
In addition to placing these responsibilities upon management,
Dodd-Frank has additional provisions with respect to corporate govern-
ance. Each rating agency shall have a board of directors, half of which
must be independent, and at least one director must be a user of rat-
ings.41 5 The compensation of the independent directors cannot be linked
to the business performance of the rating agency.416 If the rating agency
is a subsidiary of another company, the foregoing responsibilities can be
assigned to a committee of the board of directors of the parent com-
pany.417 The board of directors has the duty to oversee policies and pro-
cedures for determining credit ratings, managing conflicts of interest,
monitoring the internal control system, and overseeing the compensation
and promotion policies and practices. 4 8 Clarifying responsibilities of the
board should help to redirect the focus of rating agencies, from merely
producing ratings and generating revenue to a focus on the quality of the
ratings.
Dodd-Frank also added three additional subsections to Section 15E of
the 1934 Act dealing with transparency of ratings performance, 419 credit-
rating methodologies, 420 and transparency of credit-rating methodolo-
gies.421 Basically, the first provision is designed to require the rating
agency to disclose information on its initial ratings for each type of obli-
410. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 302, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (im-
plemented by 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-15). For further discussion of this approach in Sarbanes-
Oxley, see Murdock, supra note 304, at 539-48.
411. Dodd-Frank § 932(a)(5) (adding 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(c)(3)).
412. Id.
413. Id. § 932(a)(4) (adding 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(h)(3)).
414. Id. § 932(a)(8) (striking the existing subsection and adding new 15 U.S.C. § 78o-
7 (p)).
415. Id. (adding new 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(t)).
416. Id. (adding new 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(t)(2)(C)).
417. Id. (adding new 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(t)(4)).
418. Id. (adding new 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(t)(3)).
419. Id. (adding new 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(q)).
420. Id. (adding new 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(r)).
421. Id. (adding new 15 U.S.C. § 78o-7(s)).
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gor and security, and subsequent changes to the ratings to enable the
evaluation of their accuracy, and to provide comparison among rating
agencies. The second is to require the SEC to ensure that the procedures
and methodologies of the rating agencies are in accordance with policies
and procedures that are approved'by the board and that material changes
are applied consistently; the rating agency is also required to disclose
publicly any reason for changes. The third is to require that the rating
agencies disclose the assumptions underlying their procedures, methodol-
ogies, and data that was relied upon, so users of credit information can
understand the ratings process. The SEC was instructed to develop forms
for this process to deal with both qualitative issues and quantitative issues
and has already taken some steps in this direction pursuant to the final
rules promulgated on February 2, 2009.422
These changes have already altered the landscape of credit rating and,
hopefully, will return integrity to the credit rating process.
VI. DERIVATIVES: AIG, GOLDMAN SACHS, AND CREDIT
DEFAULT SWAPS
A. THE BACKGROUND OF THE GROWTH IN DERIVATIVES
No analysis of the financial meltdown would be complete without ex-
amining the role of derivatives, particularly credit default swaps
(CDS),423 which Warren Buffett has characterized as "financial weapons
of mass destruction. '424 One of the difficulties, however, is the lack of
information. While Brooksley Born, the former head of the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission, foresaw the risks from these instruments
and sought to regulate them,425 the Clinton administration, led by Rubin
and Summers,426 in conjunction with Alan Greenspan, 427 squelched her
efforts and induced Congress, under the leadership of Senator Phil
422. See SEC Proposed Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organiza-
tions, Release No. 34-59342 [File No. 57-13-08] at 2-3 (proposed Feb. 2, 2009) (to be codi-
fied at 17 C.F.R., pts. 240 and 249b), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/find/200934-
59342.pdf.
423. A credit default swap is "a type of credit derivative allowing a purchaser of the
swap to transfer loan default risk to a seller of the swap. The seller agrees to pay the
purchaser if a default event occurs. The purchaser does not need to own the loan covered
by the swap." See FCIC REPORT, supra note 24.
424. Paul B. Farrell, Derivatives the New 'Ticking Bomb', MARKETWATCH, Mar. 10,
2008, http://www.marketwatch.com/news/story/derivatives-new-ticking-time-bomb. The
use of derivatives is alleged to have contributed to the current economic crisis in Europe
since Greece used derivatives developed by Goldman Sachs and other investment bankers
to hide its shaky financial position. See Louise Story, Landon Thomas Jr. & Nelson D.
Schwartz, Wall Street Helped to Mask Debts Shaking Europe, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2010, at
Al.
425. See Proposed Rules, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 63 Fed. Reg.
26,114-01 (May 12, 1998) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 34 & 35), available at http://web2.
westlaw.com/Find/default.wl?bhcp=l&cite=63+fr+26114&rs=LAWS2%2E0&strRecreate=
no&sv=Split&vr=1%2E0.
426. See Bowen testimony, supra note 104; Goodman, supra note 287.
427. See Goodman, supra note 287.
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Gramm, to enact legislation freeing derivatives from regulation.428
Following this, the President's Working Group on Financial Markets, in
1999, concluded that "the trading of financial derivatives by eligible swap
participants should be excluded from the CEA. To do otherwise would
perpetuate legal uncertainty or impose unnecessary regulatory burdens
and constraints upon the development of these markets in the United
States. '429 At that time, the volume of over-the-counter derivative con-
tracts was $80 trillion.430 The volume has now grown to $600 trillion.431
The markets have certainly developed! Compare this to the United
States' GDP in 2008 of about $14.2 trillion.432 Derivative contracts, how-
ever, are reported in notional value.433 In other words, for a $1 million
dollar loan, the notional value of a derivative credit default swap contract
is reported as $1 million, even though the risk of loss may not be any-
where near that figure.434 But the fact that credit default swaps are pri-
vately traded makes transparency and accurate information difficult.435
According to the Comptroller of the Currency, in the third quarter of
2009, U.S. commercial banks held $204.3 trillion of derivative contracts,
and the credit exposure was $484 billion.436 This report, however, cov-
ered only a fraction of the overall derivatives market and provided gross
information without significant detail. 437 In previous reports, the Comp-
troller of the Currency noted that "[f]rom 2003 to 2007 creditor derivative
contracts (CDSs) grew at a 100% compounded annual growth rate, '438
from about $1 trillion in 2003 to about $16 trillion in 2007. 439 This is
illustrated below:440
428. See Commentary, The Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, U.S. POLIT-
IcSONLINE (Aug. 1, 2008), http://www.uspoliticsonline.com/economic-issues/47424-com-
modity-futures-modernization-act-2000-a.html; see also Tyson Slocum, Blind Faith: How
Deregulation and Enron's Influence Over Government Looted Billions from Americans,
Pub. Citizen (DEC. 2001), available at http://www.citizen.org/cmep/energy-environuclear/
electricity/Enron/articles.cfm?ID=7104.
429. PRESIDENT'S WORKING GRP. ON FIN. MKTS., OVER-THE-COUNTER DERIVATIVES
MARKETS AND THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE Acr 1 (1999), available at http://www.trea-
sury.gov/resource-center/fin-mkts/documents/otcact.pdf.
430. Id. at 3.
431. BANK OF INT'L SETTLEMENTS, SEMIANNUAL OTC DERIVATIVES STATISTICS AT
END-DECEMBER 2009, tbl. 19 (2011), available at http://www.bis.org/statistics/otcder/
dtl920a.pdf.
432. See Google "Gross Domestic Product," http://google.com (type "gross domestic
product").
433. Summaries of Market Survey Results, INT'L SWAPS & DERIVATIVES ASsoC., availa-
ble at http://www.isde.org/stastics/recent.html (last visited Aug. 20, 2011).
434. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF CURRENCY, QUARTERLY REPORT ON BANK
TRADING AND DERIVATIVES ACTIVITIES THIRD QUARTER 2008 6 (2008) [hereinafter OCC
2008 Report].
435. Id.
436. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF CURRENCY, QUARTERLY REPORT ON BANK
TRADING AND DERIVATIVES ACTIVITIES THIRD QUARTER 2009 1 (2009).
437. See id.
438. OCC 2008 REPORT, supra note 434, at 5.




DERIVATIVE CONTRACTS BY TYPE ($ BILLIONS)
fnKom 00 0 0% 09q2 6M 3
lntest Rate 24,785 27,772 32,938 38,305 48,347 61,856 75,518 84,520 107,415 129,574 164,404 169,373 171,903 172,561
Foreign Exch 7,386 5,915 6,099 5,736 6,076 7,182 8,607 9,282 11,900 16,614 16,824 14,872 15,166 15,609
EqulUes 501 672 858 770 763 829 1,120 1,255 2,271 2,522 2,207 2,174 2,042 Z,182
Co moditie 183 171 222 179 233 214 289 598 893 1,073 1,050 938 909 926
Credlt Detvallves 144 287 426 395 635 1,001 2,347 5,822 9,019 15,861 15,897 14,607 13,440 12,986
TOTAL 32,999 34,816 40,543 45,305 56,075 71,082 87,0 101,477 131,499 165,645 200,382 201,964 203,460 204,264
B. AIG's ENTRY INTO THE DERIVATIVE BUSINESS AND
ITS DOWNFALL
The federal government's bailout of AIG, which could have been as
much as $180.5 billion,441 has prompted Congress to seek detail from
AIG about its derivative activity. 442 Unfortunately, the SEC initially sup-
ported AIG in keeping secret the details of AIG's funneling of billions of
dollars of bailout money to major financial institutions443 to satisfy, ar-
guably at 100 cents on the dollar, AIG's obligations under credit default
swaps it issued to the institutions.444 The exhibit detailing this informa-
tion was recently disclosed to the public,4 4 5 listing more than a dozen
financial institutions, domestic and foreign, that were beneficiaries of the
credit default swaps issued from AIG.446  It also listed the various
tranches of mortgage-backed securities that were insured 447 and the no-
tional value of the credit default swaps, which were over $62 trillion and
reflected an obligation of AIG under the CDSs of over $32.5 billion.448
What were the incentives that led AIG, which had prided itself on its
AAA credit rating and its ability to manage and hedge risk, to incur lia-
bilities of this magnitude?
By way of background, the "quants ' ' 449 behind AIG's entry into the
441. See Joint Press Release, Fed. Reserve, U.S. Treasury and Federal Reserve Board
Announce Participation in AIG Restructuring Plan (Mar. 2, 2009), available at http://
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/other/20090302a.htm.
442. See Jim Puzzanghera, Geithner Defends AIG Bailout at House Hearing, L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 28, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/an/28fbusiness/la-fi-aig-geithner28-
2010jan28.
443. Matthew Goldstein, SEC Order Helps Maintain AIG Bailout Mystery, REUTERS,
Jan. 11, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USN1116982020100111.
444. See Matthew Goldstein, AIG's Mysterious Schedule A Finally Revealed, REUTERS,
Jan. 27, 2010, http:/fblogs.reuters.com/reuters-deazone/2010/01/27/aigs-mysterious-sched-
ule-a-finally-revealed/ (characterizing the AIG bailout as a "gift to the Wall Street banks").
445. Id.
446. AIG, Schedule A-List of Derivative Transactions, REUTERS, 1, http://
static.reuters.com/resources/media/editorial/20100127/Schedule%20A.pdf (last visited Aug.
20, 2011).
447. Id.
448. Id. at 5.
449. "Quants" is the designation in financial circles of highly educated and sophisti-
cated people who do quantitative analysis, basically the application of higher mathematics
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derivative business were Howard Sosin and Randy Rackson. When they
left Drexel to form the Financial Products Unit at AIG, they negotiated
for 38% of the profits450 and set up a system that supposedly "married
technology, intelligence, verve, and cultural discipline. '451 According to
them, "[t]he excitement of it wasn't the money. The money was the
scorecard. The drive behind it was creating something new."'452 The first
derivative they entered into was a $1 billion interest rate swap that was
ten times larger than the typical Wall Street swap at that time.453 A swap
of this sort had minimal exposure vis-A-vis its notional value and could be
hedged. 454 It earned $3 million for Financial Products, as much as AIG's
other financial operations earned in a year.455 This encouraged addi-
tional focus upon derivatives.
Ten years later, Financial Products created a new derivative contract, a
credit default swap.456 This instrument looked like it could mint money;
the computer model showed that AIG would have a 99.85% chance of
never having to make any payment.457 Tom Savage, the then-President
of Financial Products stated, "[t]he models suggested that the risk was so
remote that the fees were almost free money. Just put it on your books
and enjoy the money. '458 However, the computer models were based
upon corporate debt, a subject upon which there existed years of histori-
cal financial data.459
Unfortunately, AIG moved into guaranteeing securities involving
mortgage-backed securities, and including collateralized debt obligations,
which increasingly incorporated subprime and Alt-A loans. 460 Not only
was there limited historical data on these loans, but the data that did exist
was stale since, as discussed earlier, underwriting standards were erod-
ing.461 Paul Wilmot, one of the world's leading quants, stated in 2009
with respect to CDOs: "They built these things on false assumptions with-
out testing them, and stuffed them full of trillions of dollars. How could
anyone have thought that was a good idea? ... We don't have the tools
yet to truly price them. People thought we did, but they were nowhere
to finance. Sosin was a finance scholar "who had honed his theories" at Bell Labs before
moving to Drexel Burnham Lambert, while Rackson was a "computer wizard" from the
Wharton Business School. See Robert O'Harrow Jr. & Brady Dennis, What Went Wrong:













460. Id. at 4.
461. See supra text accompanying notes 172-83.
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near robust enough. '462 In other words, garbage in equals garbage out.
It was the reliance upon its AAA rating that, in part, led to AIG's
downfall. To appreciate this, consider the interrelationships between the
CDOs issued by the investment bankers and the credit default swaps is-
sued by AIG. As stated earlier, a CDO is a complex instrument. First,
take a pool of mortgages whose tranches are rated from AAA to BB, or
even unrated. Then take slices, some BBB, some BB and lower, and put
them in a CDO. Even though none of the mortgage slices are AAA, the
rating agencies would give the top tranches of the CDO an AAA rating,
arguably because it had the first claim on payments in the CDO pool and
was undergirded by the lower tranches. 463 This is somewhat similar to
the medieval alchemists who supposedly made gold out of base metal. To
enhance the top tranche, the investment bankers would purchase credit
default insurance from AIG or another vendor.464
Now, the AAA tranche looked good to investors. In fact, it looked so
good that there was less interest in the lower-rated tranches, with the
result that the financial institutions who syndicated the lower-rated
CDOs sometimes got stuck with them, a subject discussed in the next
section. But the AAA tranche was readily salable-its income was un-
dergirded by the lower tranches and was guaranteed by AIG, with its
AAA credit rating. Consequently, it was rated AAA by the rating
agencies.
The undergirding by the lower rated tranches was somewhat illusory.
If there were ten tranches, the image might be of a cylinder with the top
462. Matthew Phillips, Revenge of the Nerd, NEWSWEEK, June 8, 2009, http://
www.newsweek.com/id/200015/output/print.
463. The tranching process itself is deceptive. The SEC explained the process as
follows:
For example, if a trust issued securities in 10 different tranches of securities,
the first (or senior) tranche would have nine subordinate tranches, the next
highest tranche would have eight subordinate tranches and so on down the
capital structure. Losses of interest and principal experienced by the trust
from delinquencies and defaults among loans in the pool are allocated first to
the lowest tranche until its principal amount is exhausted and then to the
next lowest tranche and so on up the capital structure. Consequently, the
senior tranche would not incur any loss until the principal amounts from all
the lower tranches have been exhausted through the absorption of losses
from the underlying loans.
See SEC, Proposed Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations, Re-
lease No. 34-57967, at 9-11 (2008). This suggests a linear relationship; in other words, the
top tranche is supported by the assets and income expected by the other nine tranches.
But, for example, in the Ameriquest Mortgage Securities, Inc/Asset Backed Pass-Through
Certificates/Series 2005-Rll . 424B5, Dec. 19, 2005, SEC File 333-121781-11, in a
$1,793,610,000 offering of mortgage backed securities, five tranches totaling $1,483,410,000
were rated AAA, and another seven tranches totaling $251,650,000 were rated A- or bet-
ter. The last three tranches, rated BBB+ to BBB-, totaled only $58,550,000. So, while
there were twelve tranches below the AAA tranches, they totaled only 17% of the offer-
ing. SEC-Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc/Asset Backed Pass-Through Certificates/
Series 2005-R11, http://www.secinfo.com/dr66r.z2F9.htm, at 1, 88 (last visited Feb. 16,
2010).
464. Matthew Phillips, The Monster That Ate Wall Street, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 26, 2008,
http://thedailybeat.com/newsweek/2008/09/26/the-monster-that-ate-wall-street.html.
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tranche undergirded by the nine lower tranches. Thus, the top tranche
would not be affected until 90% of the value had been lost. But, in real-
ity, the picture was similar to a cone. In a $1,793,610,000 offering of
mortgage-backed securities by Ameriquest Securities, five tranches total-
ing $1,483,410,000 were rated AAA, and another seven tranches totaling
$251,650,000 were rated A- or better.465 The last three tranches, rated
BBB+ to BBB-, totaled only $58,550,000.466 So, while there were twelve
tranches below the AAA tranches, they totaled only 17% of the offer-
ing.4 6 7 This is illustrated below:
THIS IS A MORE ACCURATE PICTURE OF THE TRANCHES
83% AAA
7 tranches
3%/ BBB+/BBB- [3 tranches]
The problem was that by 2007, "[d]eals were flying out so fast that the
Wall Street firms sometimes could not tell investors what specific collat-
eral was going into which CDO, making a mockery of anyone who tried
to do a fundamental analysis of the assets backing the bonds before
agreeing to buy."' 468 For example, in February and March of 2007, "Mer-
rill Lynch[ ] sold $29 billion of the securities, 60% more than in any previ-
ous two-month period," leading to the profits and stock price growth
previously discussed.469 Even under the pressure of this volume, the rat-
ing agencies were churning out their AAA ratings for securities that, in a
465. Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc/Asset Backed Pass-Through Certificates/Series
2005-Rll, SEC INFO (Dec. 19, 2005), http://www.secinfo.com/dr66r.z2F9.htm.
466. Id.
467. Id.
468. Jill Drew, Frenzy, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/12/15/AR2008121503561_pf.html. To hide its exposure to its sub-
prime mortgages, Merrill Lynch created special-purpose entities into which it dumped sub-
prime mortgages. The entities were funded through the issuance of short-term notes to
investors that supposedly enabled Merrill Lynch to sell the mortgages and receive cash.
But the notes were guaranteed by Merrill Lynch so Merrill Lynch's liability was essentially
unchanged. See Louise Story, Merrill's Risk Disclosure Dodges Are Unearthed, N.Y.




few months, the rating agencies would be downgrading.470
Then came the chain reaction. Apparently, AIG did not need to post
collateral as long as it maintained its own AAA rating.471 But when it
was downgraded to AA, it was required to post collateral as the CDOs
began to default.472 As the CDOs were downgraded, more collateral
calls came, triggering a liquidity crisis.473 To complete the picture, as the
CDOs dropped in value, the capital of the financial institutions became
impaired.474
C. CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS, GOLDMAN SACHS, AND MAGNETAR
There are several issues with the derivatives known as credit default
swaps. One is the problem of transparency, or the lack of information
not only about volume, but also about the resources, or lack thereof,
backing the guarantee. The CDOs are essentially incomprehensible. 475
But neither the underwriter, the buyer, nor the rating agency needed to
worry when a AAA business like AIG was guaranteeing the obligation-
assuming, of course, AIG had the financial wherewithal to support its
guarantee. The problem is similar to that of the mortgage bankers: they
did not need to worry about the creditworthiness of the mortgagor if they
could sell the mortgages to an investment banker who would securitize
them. With respect to the resulting CDOs, neither the underwriter nor
the buyer needed to worry as long as the rating agency gave the instru-
ment a AAA rating, and a AAA company like AIG guaranteed the obli-
gation. With no likely liability, no need to perform due diligence!
Everybody was making so much money (or so they thought) that nobody
needed to worry.
The second issue is that credit default swap is unlike an interest rate
swap or currency swap in which a party is trying to hedge its risk from
activities, such as the change in interest rates or a change in currency
value, over which it has no control.476 In a credit default swap, the credi-
tor, who is seeking protection from another, is the very person who has
the greatest opportunity to assess the risk because the creditor is directly
involved in creating the debt instrument. 477 Thus, there is a marked
asymmetry in information between the creditor who seeks protection,
and who has, or should have done, the due diligence and has the relevant
information, and the issuer of the swap who provides protection.
470. See supra text accompanying notes 361-64.
471. Id.
472. Id.
473. Robert O'Harrow Jr. & Brady Dennis, Downgrades and Downfall, WASH. POST,
Dec. 31, 2008, http:l/www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/contentarticle/2008/12/30/AR2008
123003431_pf.html.
474. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
475. See supra text accompanying notes 463-68.
476. Managing Investment Risk, FINRA, http://www.fina.org/investors/smartinvesting/
Advancedinvestinglmanaging/investmentrisk/ (last visited Sept. 1, 2011).
477. Patrick Bolton & Martin Dehmke, Credit Default Swaps & The Empty Creditor
Problem, 8 REV. OF FIN. STUD. 2617, 2617 (2011).
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In effect, the creditor is buying insurance against the debtor's default.
But since this is not treated as insurance, there has, up to now, been no
obligation that the guarantor of the debt set aside adequate reserves to
fund the expected losses. Unfortunately, companies like AIG assumed
that there would be no losses and that the "premiums" were pure profit.
Accordingly, from a policy perspective, should credit default swaps
even exist? Just because an "innovative" financial instrument can be cre-
ated, such as a pick-a-pay mortgage loan, does not necessarily mean that
it should be created. While there are those who consider all derivatives
gambling, there is no question that interest rate swaps and currency swaps
fulfill a useful business function through hedging risks that neither party
controls. But to carry forward the gambling analogy, CDSs are gambling
with loaded dice since the insured has better data than the insurer.
The market is supposed to effect efficiency. But it is not efficient for
both the creditor in a credit default swap and the provider of protection
to conduct due diligence. Certainly, we would expect the creditor who
made the loan to perform due diligence. When third parties trade CDSs,
the likelihood of meaningful due diligence is even more attenuated.
Just like insuring your home, should a purchaser of credit protection
have an insurable interest? An unrelated third party could not purchase
insurance on your home because of moral hazard: while you do not want
your home to burn down, there is no downside to the third party if your
home bums, but there is a substantial upside from the insurance payout if
your home burns. This is the moral hazard issue. In the financial world,
an unrelated third-party can purchase credit default swap insurance.
Moreover, if we do not require an insurable interest, there is no limit to
the amount of insurance that can be purchased. This is destabilizing be-
cause the effect of one obligor's failure is magnified by the number of
credit default swaps outstanding on that obligor.
Senator Dorgan had proposed banning "naked credit default swaps,"
but the proposal ran into stiff resistance.478 The argument was made that
persons other than a creditor could have a stake in the financial strength
of a debtor, such as a supplier or landlord of a business. 479 This has some
superficial plausibility; however, is the market for CDSs composed of
suppliers and landlords, or rather speculators? A better argument is that
a CDS market does provide pricing information and liquidity. But at
what price?
The moral hazard involved in credit default swaps burst into the head-
lines when the SEC sued Goldman Sachs and an employee, Fabrice
Tourre, in connection with a synthetic CDO, Abacus 2007-AC1, which
Goldman structured and marketed to investors. 480 While a CDO is based
478. See, e.g., David M. Mason, The Senator Has No Clothes: Why a Ban on 'Naked'
Credit Default Swaps Is Ill-Advised and Impractical, THE HERITAGE FOUN. (May 5, 2010),
http://repoa.heritage.org/wm2887.
479. See id.




on the performance of the underlying mortgage-backed securities, a syn-
thetic CDO involves credit default swaps on the underlying mortgage-
backed securities. 481 The person buying protection pays a premium to
the provider of protection. Thus, the purchasers of the synthetic CDO
would receive their income from the premiums; on the other hand, the
person receiving protection would only benefit if the underlying securities
defaulted. Thus, the buyer of protection wants the house to burn down.
The SEC's complaint alleged that the offering documents stated that
the reference portfolio of residential mortgage-backed securities was cho-
sen by ACA Management, a company experienced in analyzing credit
risk in this area.482 In point of fact, Paulson & Co. had approached
Goldman about creating a synthetic CDO, since Paulson wanted to bet
against the subprime market.483 Paulson participated in the choice of the
mortgage-backed securities against which the investors would provide
protection, and then purchased such protection. Consequently, it was in
Paulson's interest to choose securities likely to default, or experience
what are known as credit events.484
Goldman's "sin" was failing to disclose the role of Paulson. Conse-
quently, the question was whether Paulson's role was a material fact, the
omission of which would give rise to liability.485 While the reaction of
many would be that any investor would want to know if the impetus for
creating the investment in question came from someone who wanted the
investment to fail, a countervailing argument is that in any credit default
swap, there must be a counterparty betting against the swap. Investors
cannot get the benefit of selling protection unless there is someone who
wants to buy the protection. However, if the buyer had an insurable in-
terest, such that the buyer had a stake if the investment went bad, there
would not be the same degree of moral hazard as when the buyer has no
stake in the underlying assets, but only believes that they will fail and
wants to make money on that gamble.
Just prior to the filing of the SEC complaint against Goldman, ProPub-
lica released a report detailing how one hedge fund, Magnetar Capital,
created CDOs from 2006 to 2007 that helped keep the subprime market
going.486 At the time, there were ominous signs about the housing mar-
ket, and securitization was becoming more difficult since fewer investors
were available to purchase the lower or equity tranches of CDOs. 487
Magnetar filled this void by purchasing the equity tranches, but then bet
481. Bill Coneny, Why the Synthetic CDO Matters in the Goldman Sachs Case,
DAILYMARKETS.COM (Apr. 21, 2010), http://www.dailymarkets.com/stock/2010/04/21/Why-
the-synthetic-cdo-matters-in-the-goldman-sachs-case.
482. Complaint, supra note 480, at 1-2.
483. Id. at 2.
484. Id.
485. Id. at 20-21.
486. Jesse Eisinger & Jake Bernstein, The Magnetar Trade: How One Hedge Fund




The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act
against the higher-rated tranches by purchasing credit default swaps.488
Since the equity tranche has the highest interest rate, as long as the hous-
ing market continued, Magnetar had interest income to cover its pre-
mium payments on the CDSs. But when the market crashed, Magnetar
was rewarded even more handsomely by its recovery on the swaps.489 It
profited as the market went up, and it profited many times over when the
market fell.490
On July 15, 2010, the SEC announced that Goldman had settled;
Goldman agreed to pay a $550 million penalty ($250 million to be re-
turned to two investors and $300 million to be paid to the U.S. Treasury),
and acknowledged that it had misstated or omitted key facts:
Goldman acknowledges that the marketing materials for the ABA-
CUS 2007-AC1 transaction contained incomplete information. In
particular, it was a mistake for the Goldman marketing materials to
state that the reference portfolio was "selected by" ACA Manage-
ment LLC without disclosing the role of Paulson & Co. Inc. [sic] in
the portfolio selection process and that Paulson's economic interests
were adverse to CDO investors. Goldman regrets that the market-
ing materials did not contain that disclosure. 491
Goldman also agreed to remedial action in connection with its review
and approval of mortgage-backed securities, including the use of outside
counsel in the review of marketing materials for such offerings and the
training of its employees in connection with its business standards. 492
D. THE RESPONSE OF DODD-FRANK TO DERIVATIVES
As the current crisis developed, regulators began considering a central
clearinghouse to provide some degree of transparency. 493 As the Comp-
troller of Currency stated in its 2008 report, "[t]he OCC is working with
other financial supervisors and major market participants to address in-
frastructure issues and credit derivatives, including a central counterparty
clearinghouse strategy." 494 Even the President's 1999 committee report
recognized:
[C]learing systems can serve a valuable function in reducing systemic
risk by preventing the failure of a single market participant from
having a disproportionate effect on the overall market. Clearing sys-
tems also facilitate the offset and netting of obligations arising under
contracts that are cleared through the system. Because they may




491. Press Release, SEC, Goldman Sachs to Pay Record $550 Million to Settle SEC
Charges Related to Subprime Mortgage CDO (July 15, 2010), available at http:I/
www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-123.htm.
492. Id.
493. See infra note 505 for the approach of Dodd-Frank in this regard.
494. OCC 2008 Report, supra note 434, at 6.
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clearing systems should be subject to regulatory oversight in order to
help ensure that proper risk management procedures are established
and implemented and that the clearing system is properly
structured. 495
Some support had also developed from industry to regulate derivatives
and create a clearing authority. 496 An industry survey reported that
"[t]he case is most pressing for credit default swaps, ' 497 which, as stated
above, are instruments replete with moral hazard.
As finally enacted, Title VII of Dodd-Frank deals extensively with de-
rivatives.498 At the outset of Title VII, the Act explicitly provides that
"no federal assistance may be provided to any swaps entity with respect
to any swap, security-based swap, or other activity of the swaps entity. '499
A swaps entity is any "swap dealer, security-based swap dealer, major
swap participant, or major security-based swap participant. '50 0 This
could impact depository institutions. However, a depository institution
can establish a subsidiary that is a swaps entity;50 1 it is also permitted to
engage in hedging and risk-mitigating activities relating to its business,
but not credit default swaps unless they are cleared.50 2 It also gives the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and the SEC authority
to issue a report with respect to any type of swap that is determined to be
detrimental to the stability of a financial market or to participants in a
495. PRESIDENT'S WORKING GRP. ON FIN. MKTS., supra note 429, at 14.
496. See infra note 506 for the approach of Dodd-Frank in this regard.
497. See Centralized Clearing for OTC Derivatives Receives Industry Support but Con-
cerns Remain, FINEXTRA (Feb. 4, 2010), http://www.finextra.com/news/fullstory.aspx?news
itemid=21043.
498. Dodd-Frank, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, §§ 701-74 (2010) (to be codified
in scattered sections of the U.S. Code). The Conference Committee Summaries Title VII
as follows:
Mandatory clearing of swaps and security-based swaps for those trades that
are eligible for clearing as determined by both the clearing houses and the
regulators;
Mandatory trading on an exchange or swap (or security based swap) execu-
tion facility should the transactions be cleared and a facility will accept it for
trading;
Public trade reporting of all cleared and uncleared swaps and security-based
swaps;
Regulators have authority to impose capital on dealers and major swap
participants;
Regulators have authority to impose margin requirements only on dealers
and major participants for uncleared swaps, adding safeguards to the system
by ensuring dealers and major swap participants have adequate financial re-
sources to meet obligations;
Position limits on swaps contracts that perform or affect a significant price
discovery function and requirements to aggregate limits across markets; and
Prohibitions against market manipulation.
See Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, 111th Cong. 4173 (2010)
to accompany H.R. 4173, available at http://docs.house.gov/rules/finserv/lll_hr4173_
finsrvcrjes.pdf.
499. Dodd-Frank § 716(a).
500. Id. § 716 (b)(2).
501. Id. § 716(c).
502. Id. § 716(d).
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financial market.50 3 Hopefully, the federal regulators will review the de-
sirability of naked credit default swaps. The Act precludes the regulation
of swaps as insurance under state law. 50 4
The goal of the Act was basically to improve transparency through
public reporting of transaction and pricing data,505 and to create clearing
and margin requirements, which would reduce counterparty and systemic
risk. This would be accomplished by centrally clearing as many deriva-
tives as possible, 50 6 by trading on exchanges, and by subjecting swap deal-
ers and major market participants 50 7 to capital and margin requirements,
both the initial and variation.508 The Act requires registration of deriva-
tives clearing orgafiizations, 50 9 swap data depositories, 510 swap dealers
and major swap participants, 511 and swap execution facilities. 512
These provisions will not take effect for 360 days and require extensive
rulemaking, particularly by the CFTC and the SEC.513 The scope of this
undertaking is massive. It remains to be seen to what extent derivatives
can be standardized so as to be exchange-traded and cleared. One indus-
try professional stated that "[e]very swap transaction is unique, like a
snowflake, and you can't make snowflakes with a cookie cutter. ''514 The
determination of capital and margin requirements is left to rulemaking.
503. Id. § 714.
504. Id. § 722(b).
505. Id. § 727 (adding 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(13)(b)(i)-(iv) (providing for real-time public re-
porting of cleared swap transactions; with respect to swaps that are not cleared, real-time
public reporting is required but in a manner that does not disclose the business transactions
and market positions of any person).
506. Id. § 723 (adding 7 U.S.C. § 2(h) (clearing is mandatory, but the CFTC can deter-
mine if a particular swap or category of swap should be cleared; there is also an exception
for clearing if; one of the counterparties is not a financial entity, is using the swap to hedge
commercial risk, and notifies the CFTC as to how it will meet its financial obligations with
respect to swaps).
507. A major market participant is any person who is not a swap dealer and who main-
tains a substantial position, not held for hedging, and whose outstanding swaps create sub-
stantial counterparty exposure, or is a financial entity that is highly leveraged, and not
subject to federal banking capital requirements, and who maintains a substantial position
in swaps. See id. § 721(a)(16) (adding 7 U.S.C. § la(33)).
508. Id. § 731(adding 7 U.S.C. § 4s(e) (The federal regulators are instructed to adopt
rules imposing capital requirements, and initial and variation margin requirements for
swaps that are not cleared, for swap dealers and nature swap participants.). For swaps that
are cleared, the swaps clearing organization must have core principles that include risk
management, which encompasses margin from each member and participant that is "suffi-
cient to cover potential exposures to normal market conditions." Id. § 725 (adding 7
U.S.C. § 7a-l(c)(2)(D)).
509. Id. § 725.
510. Id. § 728. A swap data repository is a person that collects and maintains informa-
tion or records with respect to transactions or positions in, or the terms and conditions of,
swaps entered into by others. See id. § 721(a)(21) (adding 7 U.S.C. § la(48)).
511. Id. § 731.
512. Id. § 733.
513. Id. § 774 (or "60 days after publication of a final rule or regulation implementing"
a provision of Title VII).
514. Mark C. Brickell, Testimony of Mark C. Brickell, Managing Director of J.P. Mor-
gan Securities, Inc., Before the House Committee on Banking and Financial Services (July
17, 1998), available at http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/bank/hba50076_0f.htm.
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But from a standpoint of transparency, the Act is a step in the right
direction.
VII. CONCLUSION
Paradoxically, during this past decade a dramatic increase in wealth has
also led to a drastic decrease in wealth, as the demand created by the
surge in assets under investment sparked the creation and bundling of
toxic mortgages, which in turn led to the financial crisis.
Numerous factors coalesced to lead to the meltdown. Borrowers,
mortgage brokers, and mortgage lenders combined to create unsound
mortgages that were candidates for default. Liars' loans and "affordable"
2/28 mortgages with teaser rates were "manufactured," primarily by non-
bank lenders, and sold to GSEs and investment banks to package into
securities. Thus, the lender and the investment banker sloughed off their
economic risk, and neither had "any skin in the game," which led to an
absence of sound underwriting and due diligence.
Had Dodd-Frank been in effect in 2000, this probably would not have
occurred. Financial institutions must now make a good faith determina-
tion, based on verified documentation, that the borrower can repay the
loan on a fully amortized basis, and not based on an initial teaser rate. If
the lender or investment bank is not dealing with a "qualified loan," the
institution must retain a portion of the risk. Predatory lending should
also be mitigated by the oversight of the new Consumer Financial Protec-
tion Bureau.
From the standpoint of the lender, the investment banker, and the
credit rating agency, more business means more profits, which leads to
higher stock prices and greater executive compensation. Thus, manage-
ment has an incentive to take undue risk. The entire subject of stock
options needs to be re-examined, and clawback clauses need to become
standard in management contracts to stem short-term opportunism.
Dodd-Frank takes a step in this direction, but only a very small one.
Leverage, or phrased differently, inadequate capitalization, is the stuff
out of which great fortunes are made. Unfortunately, as the past few
years have revealed, it is also the stuff out of which great bankruptcies
are made. The problem of excessive leverage has been recognized in
Dodd-Frank, but the solution has been left to the regulators. To a certain
extent, the Volcker Rule, as embodied in the Act, will cause some separa-
tion of trading and banking activities. However, little has been done to
stem the concentration of financial power. This has been aggravated by
the financial crisis, as failed institutions, such as Countrywide and Merrill
Lynch, have been acquired by Bank of America, and Bear Stearns and
Washington Mutual by J.P. Morgan Chase. Consequently, institutions
that were "too big to fail" before the financial crisis are now even bigger.
As Greenspan opined, if they are "too big to fail" they should be broken
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up: this is a policy alternative that should be seriously considered.5 15
The credit rating agencies were probably the most reprehensible play-
ers; they held themselves out as guardians of integrity while selling their
AAA ratings to make a fast buck. The investment community relied
upon the rating agencies to its detriment. Thousands of ratings were dra-
matically downgraded, sometimes only months after they were issued.
The short-term perspective cost the rating agencies a high price since,
under Dodd-Frank, they are now highly regulated, compelled to be
transparent, and have lost their supposed First Amendment protection
against civil liability. However, the problem still remains that the entity
that seeks the rating pays the rating agency.
Whether the problems relating to derivatives have been resolved is still
an open question. There is a serious moral hazard when the financial
institution that creates a debt, or a securitized instrument purchases
credit insurance from another entity, such as AIG. Because of the infor-
mational asymmetry, the creator of the instrument can insure against its
own lack of due diligence. Moreover, when people trade credit default
swaps without having interests in the underlying obligation, the effect of
default is magnified throughout the system. Whether this risk is offset by
liquidity and pricing transparency possibilities is another policy issue that
deserves serious concern.
As a result of Dodd-Frank, the derivative business certainly will be
more transparent, which is a step in the right direction. But the extent to
which derivatives will be cleared and traded on exchanges, with capital
and margin requirements to protect counterparties and the economic sys-
tem, remains to be seen.
Overall, Dodd-Frank is a substantial step in the right direction, but
additional steps still need to be taken. The overall key to avoiding finan-
cial crises is integrity and courage. The corporate culture needs to reject
the ethic reflected in "[l]et's hope we are all wealthy and retired by the
time this house of cards falters. '516 Moreover, politicians need the cour-
age to stand up to lobbying pressure and do what is necessary to curb the
concentration of power in our financial system and management incen-
tives for short-term profits.
515. See Greenspan, supra note 323.
516. See SUMMARY REPORT, supra note 383.
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